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OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS

Abstract
The complexity of issues in health care in the United States—specifically
insurance coverage, access, affordability, quality of care, and financing—requires
effective new models for governing, in which governmental and non-governmental
organizations seek to solve problems collaboratively rather than independently. This
research explores collaborative governance as a model to form new partnerships among
for-profit, nonprofit, and public organizations in an effort to create community-based,
locally governed health care entities in Oregon through coordinated care organizations
(CCOs). A key question is whether collaboration, through CCOs, brings together
government and non-governmental organizations to solve “intractable problems” by
establishing new public-private partnerships in Medicaid. The research focuses on the
formation of CCOs, including the influence of local, political, institutional, and historical
contexts, planning processes, and governance structures. The hypothesis is that
conditions, norms, governance structures and processes, and the presence or absence of a
combination of these factors, facilitate or impede participation and decision-making, and
over time, successful system integration by these new complex organizations.
This study developed insights into similarities and differences among CCO
governance structures by investigating three CCOs. Findings from the case study suggest
that the following key factors influence the collaborative governance process among
government and non-governmental organizations within CCOs: prior history of conflict
or cooperation; open, transparent, and inclusive processes for stakeholders; face-to-face
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dialogue, trust building, and shared understanding; and high-functioning governing
boards. Results also indicate that maintaining stakeholder participation can be
challenging due to time and cost, power imbalances and competing interests among
stakeholders, and mistrust and lack of facilitative leadership. The results suggest that
collaborative governance is a strategic approach for the allocation of limited resources
across public, private, and nonprofit organizations to deliver services to Oregon’s
Medicaid population.
The significance of this study is that it identified starting conditions that facilitate
and hinder the ability of CCOs to effectively solve problems through governance
mechanisms. Oregon’s CCOs offer an example of multiple layers of governing
institutions—federal, state, and county—using formal authority to influence a specified
set of outcomes, the Triple Aim, in a specific policy domain: provision of health care
services for underserved Oregonians. Results of the study can help inform a larger, more
fundamental question in public administration about contemporary governance: whether
government through collaborative governance can create the “conditions for rule and
collective action” through public-private partnerships to achieve policy goals (Stoker,
1998). Further research is needed to better understand whether local community-based
organizations such as CCOs offer a sustainable model to address policy issues in other
arenas by which there is “more government action and less government involvement”
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). This study contributes to the theory of collaborative
governance and may inform future policy decisions about CCOs in Oregon and, more
broadly, ongoing national health care reform efforts.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Never before has there been such a political imperative to do something about
health care. – Governor Kitzhaber, 1998
Through public policy and implementation, federal and state public institutions
have served as active participants in promoting and supporting health care reform. This
has primarily taken place through the private health care marketplace. Past and current
reform efforts have been designed to create significant changes in the delivery,
organization, and financing of health care services. Often these efforts seek to increase
access to care, expand publicly funded health insurance coverage, promote quality
improvement and patient safety, undertake cost containment, and foster community and
population health advancements. At a national level, health care reform serves as an
increasingly pressing social and economic issue, yet also a polarizing political issue, most
recently observed with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) in 2009.
Many of the policy goals and objectives proposed in the ACA—outlined in an
extraordinarily, complex framework of Congressional legislation, federal statutes, and
ongoing administration rule-making—aim to address one of the most fundamental,
complicated, and politically divisive issues in recent U.S. history: the country’s
increasingly fragmented, failing, and unsustainable health care system (Schwartz &
Damico, 2010). A significant provision of the ACA is the Medicaid expansion, an
attempt by Congress to build further on the success of Medicaid, a cooperative federal-
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state program. Medicaid has increased publicly funded health insurance coverage from
four million to 47 million recipients over the past 40 years (Truffer, Klemm, Wolfe, &
Rennie, 2010).
The U.S. health care system has become intractably intertwined with federal,
state, and local government through the policymaking process as part of a concerted
attempt to confront persistent health care challenges. With passage of a host of federalstate health partnership initiatives such as Medicaid in the 1960s and the State Children’s
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in the 1990s, these efforts have resulted in a
patchwork of attempts to solve a problem that requires a comprehensive national
solution. In the absence of national health care reform, states have elected to take a more
“aggressive role” in putting forth policy solutions to the problems of an imperfect health
care system that is widely perceived to be in a perpetual state of crisis (Goldberger,
1990). A majority of states have enacted a number of local health reform efforts in the
vacuum of comprehensive national health care reform. This effort has resulted in a
complex structural misalignment between state government and health policy, i.e. the
problem of governance (Morone, 2001). Most state health policy is interlaced with
federal programs as well as agencies and funding mechanisms, providing the
quintessential example of American federalism.
This American style of “marble cake” federalism has resulted in health care
policy and funding responsibilities that are shared across different levels of government
with substantial overlap in the health policymaking activities among federal and state
officials and administrators. States, often characterized as “laboratories of democracy”
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(Justice Brandeis, 1932),1 are largely responsible for establishing new health care policies
and programs, which offer an opportunity for early experimentation and evaluation
before being adopted at the federal level. Over time, a number of health policy
innovations, initially developed by states, have been adopted by the federal government
and are evolving into national programs. For example, early health care reform efforts in
New York and Massachusetts resulted in the CHIP and the individual mandate, a pivotal
component of the ACA (Holahan et al., 2003; Morone, 2001).
Federal health care reform embodied in the ACA will require considerable effort
by the states. Significant pieces of federal health care reform efforts will be implemented,
including expansion of public health insurance through Medicaid by addition of eight
million individuals among states that opt to expand Medicaid,2 and state and federal
health insurance exchanges in 2014. These federal-state reform efforts are further
complicated by the fact that most health services, including primary and community
health, occur at the local level (Altman & Morgan, 1983). Many states are now working
to transform their health care delivery system faster and more comprehensively than as
supported by the ACA. Oregon is one of the many states leading the way to establish an
integrated and coordinated health care system that will improve quality of care, contain
rising costs, and improve individual and community health (Oregon Health Policy Board
[OHPB], 2010, p. 5).
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1

The term originates from a U.S. Supreme Court opinion issued by Supreme Court Louis Justice Brandeis
(1932). New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 285 U.S. 262. (1932). Retrieved from
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=CASE&court=US&vol=285&page=262
2

Individuals under age 65 with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL).
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Background
State governments are active participants in contributing to, and even leading,
health care reform efforts. Oregon is no exception, having been at the forefront of health
care reform efforts for more than two decades (OHPB, 2010).3 Through passage of House
Bill 3650 in 2011, the Oregon Legislature and Governor John Kitzhaber laid the
foundation for the creation of coordinated care organizations (CCOs). This legislation
was the embodiment of transformation for Oregon’s health care delivery system,
designed around the Triple Aim of improving health, health care, and reducing costs
(Berwick, Nolan, & Whittington, 2008; OHPB, 2012, p. 9).
Oregon’s CCOs are intended to create community-based organizations governed
by health care providers, community members, and organizations responsible for
financial risk to create a “more coordinated and affordable, patient-centered health care
delivery system” (Oregon Health Authority, 2012, p. 1). Oregon’s proposed model for
health care reform parallels one of the key provisions of the ACA: establishing
accountable care organizations (ACOs). ACOs are organizational arrangements in which
provider groups voluntarily accept responsibility for the cost and quality of health care
services for a specific population of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries (Shortell et
al., 2010). Oregon’s model for coordinated and integrated care delivery significantly
expands upon the ACO framework. CCOs will be responsible for the integration and
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Oregon legislation: Senate Bill 27 (1989), Senate Bill 27 (2007), Senate Bill 329 (2007), House Bill 3368
(2007), House Bill 2009 (2009), House Bill 3650 (2011), and House Bill 1580 (2012).

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS

5

coordination of physical, mental, behavioral, and dental care services for Oregon’s
Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in the Oregon Health Plan (OHP).
In an effort to reform major components of the state’s health care system at the
community level, these newly established entities will offer a new care delivery model
and serve as a single point of accountability in providing comprehensive and integrated
health care services for a defined population (OHPB, 2012). Coordinated care
organizations are required to meet a set of criteria in establishing a CCO, operate within a
new global budget model, achieve performance goals, and held accountable for the Triple
Aim. The basic components of a CCO mirror a number of concepts put forward in key
provisions of the ACA for ACOs, which include financial incentives and a bundled
payment model, patient-centered care and integration of services, and measurement and
accountability mechanisms (National Governors Association, 2011; Rittenhouse,
Shortell, & Fisher, 2009).
From a state policy perspective, unique to CCOs is the requirement to establish a
board and comprehensive governing structure. The CCO governance structure was
established through public contracting, state statutes, administrative rulemaking, and a
federal waiver approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in
July 2012. A governance structure ensures adequate representation among legal entities
that share the financial risk in caring for a defined Medicaid population, guarantees
representation of stakeholders from the health delivery system (including those affected
by the changes), and supports a sustainable model (OHPB, 2012). CCOs are encouraged
to include organizations within their partnership such as hospital systems, managed care

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS

6

organizations, community health centers, insurers, local mental health authorities, county
public health agencies, and dental providers (Oregon Health Policy Board, 2012).
According to the Health Policy Board’s (OHPB) 2012 CCO implementation
proposal, there is “no single governance solution” and “there is risk in being too
prescriptive beyond the statutory definition of a CCO governing board” (p. 15).
Therefore, the governance structure will be critical in the impending success (or failure)
of CCOs and, potentially, Oregon’s broader effort to transform the state’s health care
system. The Health Policy Board put forward the following as the criteria for a CCO
governance structure (OHPB, 2012, pp. 15-16; ORS 414.625):
•

ensure entities bearing financial risk for the organization make up the governing
board’s majority interest;

•

include members representing major components of the health care delivery
system;

•

include consumer representation on the governing board outside of those
members sharing in financial risk;

•

reflect the community's needs;

•

assure the CCO’s decision-making is consistent with the values of the members
and the community;

•

support the goals of state health care transformation (i.e. the Triple Aim); and

•

provide a formal process for selecting members of the governing board,
community advisory council (CAC), and any other councils or committees of the
governing board.
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As CCOs develop, a fundamental challenge will be establishing and maintaining
an effective governance model—one that is able to both meet the criteria put forth by the
Oregon Health Authority (OHA) and still be responsive to the needs of its community.
Multiple factors are likely to influence the effectiveness of CCO governance, including
the following:
•

governance structure, including rules, functions, and responsibilities;

•

rules governing participation in a CCO;

•

public accountability, legitimacy, and transparency;

•

implementation of and adherence to federal and state regulations and Medicaid
policy governing CCOs, including how implementation barriers are addressed;
and,

•

coordination among stakeholders including state and local government partners,
health care delivery organizations, individual medical providers, insurers, and
consumer groups, among others.

Statement of the Problem
Federalism, health policy, and the Oregon Health Plan. The history of
Oregon’s health care reform began with the creation of Medicare and Medicaid by
Congress, signed into law by President Johnson in 1965 (Brown & Sparer, 2003). This
national effort addressed the lack of access to basic health care services among the
nation’s poor, elderly, and children. These two programs, along with the State Children’s
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), have intertwined federal and state government in
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health policy, changes in health care delivery, and financing for the past 50 years—an
inevitable outcome within a federalist system of government.
Medicare was established to provide universal, federally funded health insurance
for all seniors over the age of 65, without any responsibility among states for the
financing or administration of the program. Medicaid, on the other hand, is a federal-state
partnership comprised of federal and state financing that provides health insurance for
certain categories of poor people, primarily children and pregnant women (Brown &
Sparer, 2003). Both programs have a complex and multifaceted history, especially
Medicaid because it is a shared and joint responsibility among federal and state
governments in the financing of health coverage for low-income Americans. Medicare
and Medicaid now play a critical role in the U.S. health care system, but Medicaid is the
program that has most often stirred the debate about the role of state and federal
government in health care. For the past 25 years, Oregon has been at the forefront of this
controversy in its commitment to reform the state’s Medicaid program.
Medicaid remains a popular federal program among many states, largely because
it provides flexibility in the design and ability to modify a state’s Medicaid program, and
it offers a beneficial financial arrangement for states (Holahan, Weil, & Wiener, 2003).
While it was originally intended to sponsor health insurance coverage for the very poor,
innovative states such as Oregon have leveraged the program’s flexibility to substantially
expand insurance coverage, providing benefits and services to populations beyond the
very poor. These populations include the elderly poor, disabled, working poor,
individuals with developmental disabilities, and families and children above the federally
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mandated poverty level. The financial structure and dynamic in Medicaid is a federalstate arrangement in which the federal government finances the majority of state’s
Medicaid program’s expenses. For states, every dollar potentially saved in general
revenue from reducing Medicaid expenditures equates to two or three federal dollars lost
due to the federal-state match requirement of Medicaid. Over the years, Oregon has
sought to maximize this financial structure and is attempting to further leverage this
favorable relationship in creating CCOs.
Medicaid, health care reform, and civic engagement: Oregon style. Through
the federal demonstration waiver process, states have implemented a number of creative
solutions to address a range of health care issues. Oregon is considered one of the more
innovative states with its approach to Medicaid (see Bodenheimer, 1997; Brown, 1991;
Jacobs, Marmor, & Oberlander, 1999; Leichter, 1999; Oberlander, 2007; Sipes-Metzler,
1994; Wiener, 1992). Issues addressed through the federal waiver process include
addressing the growing numbers of uninsured by expanding coverage and types of
services to targeted population groups; improving the quality of services delivered and
financed; attempting to control escalating health care costs, largely through managed
care; reducing disparities of care including access and quality; or some combination
thereof.
Oregon’s Medicaid program, the Oregon Health Plan (OHP), has been a national
leader, and continues to lead through innovative and committed policymakers and health
care reformers, notably the “intellectual father” of the OHP, Governor John Kitzhaber
(Wiener, 1992, p. 26). Prior to the creation of OHP, Oregon embarked upon a
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comprehensive public participation process, which led to the support of a deliberative
decision-making process for the state’s Medicaid program, which continues today.
Community involvement in state health policy is a defining feature in Oregon, dating
back to the early 1980s with Oregon Health Decisions, a nonprofit organization that was
focused on utilizing citizen engagement to inform both health care related issues and the
Oregon Medicaid Prioritization Project (Leichter, 1999; Sipes-Metzler, 1994).
Oregon as health policy entrepreneur. The Oregon Health Plan was designed to
meet three main objectives, with the overarching goal to provide access to health care for
all Oregonians. The first objective was to reform the state’s existing Medicaid program
by elimination of the categorical eligibility criteria set by the federal government. Oregon
sought to expand the eligible population for Medicaid to all persons with incomes below
the 100% federal poverty level (FPL), regardless of whether an individual was
categorically eligible (Kitzhaber, 1993). Traditionally, those who were “categorically
eligible” for Medicaid coverage have included individuals from families with children
and pregnant women as well as low-income individuals, including the elderly, the aged,
and the blind. A second objective was to reform the state’s small group insurance market
by offering guaranteed issue of insurance coverage, including automatic coverage
renewal for individuals with preexisting conditions who were considered high-risk for
insurance coverage in the private market. This objective would be achieved through a
public-private partnership financed partially with employer contributions. The third
objective was an attempt at cost containment through what became known as the
prioritized list (DiPrete & Coffman, 2007; Jacobs, Marmor, & Oberlander, 1999).
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The Oregon legislation that enacted OHP required the creation of an independent
commission to oversee development of a prioritized list of medical services that would be
funded for individuals enrolled in OHP (DiPrete & Coffman, 2007). The Health Services
Commission, established in 1987 was comprised of 11 members: five physicians, four
consumer representatives, a public health nurse, and a social worker. The Committee was
tasked to consider the comparative benefits of health services, ranking the services from
most to least important, ensuring the final ranking of services reflected community values
regarding treatments (Sipes-Metzler, 1999, p. 308). After a two-year period, the
commission presented a list of 709 condition-treatment pairings or paired medical
conditions and treatments, which are ranked hierarchically from the most to the least
medically necessary, and which are based on the latest research on the effectiveness of
treatments. In 1989, the Legislature agreed to fund a package of benefits that included the
first 587 of the pairings. Oregon led the way for other states because it was the first state
to finally succeed in establishing a formal process to determine the level of services to be
covered based upon a priority ranking system and available state funding (DiPrete &
Coffman, 2007). Other services covered include diagnostic services to determine a
patient’s condition, ancillary services medically appropriate for the treatment of covered
conditions, hospital services, and prescription drugs (DiPrete & Coffman, 2007).
The state—the first to do so—succeeded in establishing a formal process by
which to determine the level of services covered, based upon a priority ranking system,
that is matched with available state funding. The list is modified and revised every two
years, coinciding with Oregon’s biennial legislative session (DiPrete, & Coffman, 2007).
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The Oregon Legislature is statutorily prohibited from modifying the prioritized list; it
may only determine how much will be funded based on state fiscal resources. Therefore,
services for Medicaid beneficiaries above the cut-off line established by the State’s
budgetary resources are funded, and those below the line are not funded.
Another first during this two-year process was the level of public engagement in
creating the prioritized list. The commission supported 11 public hearings, 47 community
meetings in every county in the state, as well as a statewide telephone survey of 1,000
individuals (Kitzhaber, 1993; Wiener, 1992, p. 28). At the end of the public process, over
3,500 individuals provided information to the commission about citizen values regarding
health coverage and health services (Sipes-Metzler, 1999, p. 309). From a state health
policy and community engagement perspective, the level of involvement in the policy
decision-making process that determined the state’s benefit coverage for its Medicaid
population was sweeping. It was also an intentionally open and transparent process. A
key outcome embodied in the creation of the OHP prioritized list was that the state
intentionally fostered a process for citizen participation in a health policy debate, and it
was able to “blend medical fact and public value to form public policy” (Sipes-Metzler,
1999, p. 313). The final prioritized list reflected the community’s values, to a degree, due
to the extensive process of public involvement (Kitzhaber, 1993).
A decade after OHP. From 1994 through 2003, OHP rapidly expanded into a
complex Medicaid delivery system in Oregon. In less than a decade, OHP provided 1.4
million individuals with access to health care; another 29,000 individuals, previously
denied coverage due to preexisting conditions, obtained insurance coverage through a
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high-risk pool called the Oregon Medical Insurance Pool (Office for Health Policy and
Research, 2003, p. 1). In 2003, in response to an economic downturn and the resulting
state fiscal crisis, coupled with steadily increasing health care costs, Oregon redesigned
OHP in an effort to maintain Medicaid coverage while containing costs (Office for
Health Policy and Research, 2003). The intentional outcome was the creation of two
different benefit packages for Oregon’s Medicaid population: OHP Standard and OHP
Plus. The unanticipated outcome of Oregon’s Medicaid policy experiment was a
significant decrease in the number of individuals enrolled in OHP Standard—up to a 50%
decrease among some of the most vulnerable Oregonians (Wallace, McConnell, Gallia, &
Edlund, 2010). A number of important policy lessons warrant consideration from these
unanticipated outcomes; these will be addressed in Chapter 2. These important policy
lessons, as well as the recognized value and importance of public participation in state
health policy, have emboldened Oregon in its commitment to reform its Medicaid
program.
Oregon’s health system transformation. For the past 25 years Oregon has
worked to improve the state’s health delivery system, expand coverage through both its
public and private health insurance markets, reduce unnecessary and non-effective health
care treatments and services, and continually ensure public participation and engagement
in the health policy decision-making process. These incremental steps in health reform
continue today with the state’s most recent health reform effort of establishing
coordinated care organizations (CCOs).
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The CCO reform effort attempts, once again, to modify which services are
covered for Medicaid beneficiaries in Oregon, the types of services financed, and how
services are delivered at the community level. Oregon did not wait for national health
care reform and for provisions of the ACA to take effect. Rather, the state took the
initiative to reform its Medicaid delivery system, representing an “evolution of OHP”
(OHA, 2012, p. 6). Oregon’s most recent reform effort is designed to establish a
coordinated and integrated health care model, enrolling the majority of the state’s
Medicaid population in CCOs, including the estimated 200,000 individuals who became
eligible for Medicaid in 2014 (OHA, 2012). However, for CCOs to be successful and
avoid any unanticipated and undesired outcomes such as those experienced in past
reforms efforts around OHP, the issue of governance will need to be addressed.
According to Governor Kitzhaber, “Solving the health care problem is going to
require some sort of new governance structure” (Goldsmith, 2003, p. 118). The CCO
model of health care reform offers just that: a new model for community health
governance in which the community accepts and shares the costs and risks of caring for
its residents. Once again, Oregon’s health care leaders and policymakers continue to
leverage the state’s participatory political culture to build support for advancing health
care reform and further build upon the success initially achieved in establishing OHP and
the prioritized list. A key strategy in advancing health reform is the open and transparent
decision-making process, mobilization of broad stakeholder support, and buy-in through
public forums. The CCO initiative is a logical extension of the state’s commitment to
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advance health care reform through broad stakeholder support at the community level
through CCO governance models.
Purpose and Significance of the Study
The purpose of this study was to explore CCOs and understand the process and
conditions under which participation and decision-making among stakeholders is
facilitated or impeded through collaborative governance. This study observed the
governance process in order to assess and evaluate future policy considerations about
CCOs and, more broadly, informs state-level health care reform. The theory of
collaborative governance offers a promising analytic framework for investigating CCOs.
Public, private, and nonprofit agencies must work collectively in new and distinctive
ways, in accordance with Oregon statutes and federal rules that govern Medicaid, in order
for CCOs to achieve the desired outcomes. It is unknown whether a preferred model of
governance may emerge in terms of facilitating effective CCOs that generate benefits for
providers; consumers; local, state, and federal agencies; and other stakeholders involved
with health care reform efforts. The importance of researching the CCO collaborative
governance infrastructure and process was to determine how the presence of a
combination of key factors, or their absence, affect decision-making among these new
complex organizations.
This study sought to enhance our understanding of a model of community
governance intended to improve the health status of individuals and communities by
involving local agencies and individuals in an effort to create a new health system that is
responsive to, and accountable for, communities in Oregon. It is important to develop an
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understanding regarding whether a collaborative governance model, including certain
factors and arrangements, will be more or less effective in supporting state-level health
care reform in Medicaid. This study explored and assessed principal differences in CCO
development affected by local political, institutional, and historical contexts, planning
processes, and governance structures. Important factors include the history of conflict or
cooperation, incentives to participate among a broad and diverse group of stakeholders,
power and resource differences, leadership, and presence of a formal structure (Ansell &
Gash, 2007). The significance of this study was that it (1) learned about conditions that
facilitate or impede the ability of CCOs to effectively solve problems through governance
mechanisms, (2) developed insights into similarities and differences among CCO
governance structures, and (3) advanced present understanding of the potential for, and
limitations of, a collaborative governance model in supporting health care reform.
Research Question
The central research question that guided this study was the following: What are
the key factors of collaborative governance that facilitate or impede the ability of CCOs
to implement health care reform?
Theoretical Framework
Health policy has drifted toward intervention while seeking to evade the
dilemmas of governing the health system publicly. (Mead, 1977, p. 40)
The theory of governance has been studied extensively within the fields of
political science and public administration (Frederickson, 2007). Numerous scholars (see
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Hill & Lynn, 2001) have sought to define, analyze, and redefine this concept as the role
of government in contemporary America has evolved and shifted due to numerous
external and internal forces. Furthermore, the role and responsibility of the public sector
has been challenged and blurred while it tries to maintain accountability of public
institutions, administrators, and elected officials (Hill & Lynn, 2001). In the ensuing
debate around the theory of modern governance, a precise and widely agreed upon
concept has been somewhat elusive among scholars, with multiple governance models
put forth, to the point of having “governance” described as “everywhere and [appearing]
to mean anything and everything” (Frederickson, 2007, p. 287). Nevertheless, the concept
remains of critical importance to scholars and public administrators. The problem of
governance, ensuring either general welfare and maintaining effectiveness of public
institutions, includes formation and implementation of public policy, in an attempt to deal
with the increasing complexities of society. Such complexities include the ability to
respond to persistent political and economic issues—in this case, principally promoting
and protecting individual and community health by developing and implementing
statewide health reform at the local level through a new model of health care delivery:
CCOs.
It is postulated that governance clearly provides a useful analytic framework for
scholars. One theory of governance in particular is collaborative governance, which was
used to study the development of CCOs in Oregon. It has been stated that the theory of
governance offers “a simplifying lens to a complex reality,” one which can be used to
study the intersections of public policy, health reform, and the emerging world of CCOs
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(Stoker, 1998, p. 26). The premise of collaborative governance involves broad
participation in problem solving through an arrangement that provides a mechanism in
which public, state, regional, and local government agencies, nonprofit organizations,
businesses, and other non-governmental stakeholders can work together (Ansell & Gash,
2007; Freeman, 1997). For the purpose of this study, in using Ansell and Gash’s (2007)
definition of collaborative governance, they defines governances as “a governing
arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in
a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative
and that aims to make or implement public policy or public programs or assets” (p. 544).
A collaborative governance framework was used to identify and explore factors that
influence whether this new model of governance can support achievement of the Triple
Aim through CCOs.
Methodology
The design for this research was a multi-case study. The flexibility of using a case
study is that this approach lends itself to the investigation of dynamic, rapidly changing
social phenomena. In addition, conducting a case study is commonly used as a method in
public administration and political science because it seeks to draw lessons from
problems specific to government and governance (McNabb, 2002). By adopting a case
study approach, different forms of collaborative governance can be studied together,
helping to develop an understanding of this contemporary governance phenomenon
(McNabb, 2002, p. 287). This study examined three CCOs; the selection criteria are
described in Chapter 3.
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The preferred multi-case research approach was used to compare and contrast
CCO governance models. Comparative analysis was used to help assess the relative role
and function of the CCO governance structure by examining different organizations and
their respective approaches to community-based governance. Findings from this study
will help inform ongoing change and adaptation among CCOs seeking to modify existing
governance arrangements, with the expressed goal of enabling and facilitating
achievement of the Triple Aim. The unit of analysis for this study was coordinated care
organizations responsible for taking care of individuals in Oregon who are eligible for
Medicaid.
Governance research is challenging for a number of reasons. The foremost
challenge is the difficulty in trying to understand any potential effect or causality among
an identified policy intervention, utilizing data or measurable outcomes, couched within a
theoretical framework, all of which are bound to be “embedded in a wider social,
political, and economic” context (Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2002, p. 17). According to
Lynn et al. (2002), a critical problem in governance research is “explor[ing] causal
relationships beyond a narrow perimeter of theoretical possibilities that leaves too much
out of the picture” (p. 18). The challenge or limitation in this study, and in all empirical
research, is to not ignore the broader context in which CCO governance is emerging, and
still engage in research that results in findings and contributions which have implications
for scholars and practitioners (Lynn, 2001).
Data collection. Data collection consisted of two methods: in-depth interviews
and document analysis. Interviews were comprised of semi-structured interviews with
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board members of CCOs, members of the Community Advisory Committees required for
all CCOs, and policy experts and administrators from Oregon’s executive branches.
Document or content analysis of written materials included review of newly enacted
policies, statutes and regulatory frameworks, and internal documents as available. A
structured framework was developed and used to code collected data into themes with
comparisons explored among potential relations among themes. Additional background
and contextual materials were included in the analysis using the structured framework to
assess profiles of CCO governance models.
Data analysis. The analysis of the data collected was conducted using a five-step
approach: (1) organize data by key constructs (which is operationalized in Chapter 3), (2)
generate categories and themes, (3) code data by categories and themes, (4) develop
generalizations from the data and search for alternative interpretations, and (5) form final
generalizable findings into a report (McNabb, 2002 p. 296). Upon completion of this
procedure, a narrative description of key findings was prepared based on the analysis and
interpretation of findings. Chapter 3 presents a detailed overview the study’s data
collection and analysis methodology.
Organization of the Study
This dissertation is divided into five chapters including the introduction. The
introduction has framed the problem, identified the central research question, introduced
the theoretical framework, and described the purpose and significance of the study.
Chapter 2 provides a history of health care reform in the context of American federalism
and history of the Oregon Health Plan. It also presents a theoretical framework and
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comprehensive assessment of governance through an extensive literature review, drawing
upon the fields of health services research, public administration, and political science.
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the methodology, including discussion of the
qualitative approach, development of key research constructs or variables, unit of
analysis, and the analytic framework deployed for analysis. In addition, the third chapter
covers key assumptions and limitations of the study, including criteria used to exclude
key relevant issues beyond the parameters of the study. Chapter 4 presents analysis of the
research findings, including in-depth discussion of key findings within the context of the
framework of the study. The fifth and final chapter synthesizes implications for
policymakers, elected officials, state leaders, public administrators and researchers
around state level health policy, and the administration and governance of community
health systems. It concludes with a discussion of the limitations and assumptions of the
study and identifies the need for additional research, framing research questions for
future study.
Summary
Successful reform is going to require a sustainable process that will involve a
number of incremental steps. These steps must be sequential and cumulative,
leading over time towards a clear policy objective. – Governor Kitzhaber, 1999
America’s health care system faces a Gordian Knot in that no single entity, public
or private, has the “knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally”
(Kooiman as cited in Stoker, 1998, p. 22). CCOs aim to tackle such fundamental
problems by creating a unique interdependent relationship among diverse groups of
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stakeholders by establishing a new interactive system of community health governance.
Oregon, along with many other states, will continue to be challenged over the coming
years to develop and implement new approaches to achieve significant health care
reform, with or without national health reform. One step toward achieving this goal is to
understand the potential of a collaborative governance model relative to CCOs as well as
to assess influential factors in the model of governance among CCOs. Findings from this
study can help inform the respective roles and responsibilities for public and private
stakeholders within the context of coordinated care entities and inform potential reform
efforts in other states.
Oregon’s newest approach in addressing these issues, creating CCOs at the local
level, offers a promising solution to these problems by fundamentally redesigning the
state’s “sick care” system into a health system. If promoting population health is the goal,
containing costs and ensuring safe and effective health service delivery are viewed as
vexing problems in today’s health care system. CCOs provide a new approach to address
these challenges and assess whether the collaborative governance model is most suited to
manage this new complex governance relationship among public, private, and nonprofit
entities. This research should serve as an informative and valuable exercise: It lays the
foundation for researchers to further assess whether CCOs are viable models to leverage
to advance broad health policy goals in Oregon.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Related Literature
Health care in the United States is a wicked social problem. Compared to other
industrialized countries, access and quality of health care services in the U.S. are modest
at best (Commonwealth Fund, 2011; Squires, 2012). The U.S. spends more on health care
than any other country—almost twice more than all other industrialized countries—yet in
2000, the U.S. health care system ranked 37th in population-based health outcomes and
ranked last in preventable deaths compared to 18 industrialized countries (World Health
Organization, 2000; Nolte & McKee, 2008). From an international perspective, the U.S.
ranks near the bottom among most measures of health status, ranking 46th in life
expectancy and 42nd in infant mortality, when compared with 192 other nations
(Schroeder, 2007). The number of uninsured, estimated at 60 million in 2011, continues
to increase, affordability continues to decline, and performance and quality are
inconsistent (Cohen & Martinez, 2011; Commonwealth Fund, 2011).
For decades, national and state health reform efforts have attempted to address the
steady erosion of employer-sponsored health insurance as well as provide better access
and affordable coverage, contain rising premiums and out-of-pocket expenses, and reduce
the rates of uninsured (Gold, Mittler, Aizer, & Lyons, 2001; Lilie-Blanton & Hoffman,
2005; Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009; Paul-Shaheen, 1998).4 These issues are further
compounded by an aging population burdened with an increasing prevalence of chronic
diseases that include obesity, diabetes, and heart and cardiovascular disease to list a few.
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For a complete history of health care reform in the United States, see Starr, P. (1984). The Social
Transformation of American Medicine, and Starr, P. (2011). Remedy and Reaction: The Peculiar American
Struggle Over Health Care Reform.
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Such disease burdens often lead to expensive medical services and end-of-life care,
where a large portion of total health care expenditures occur in the last year of life (Liu,
Wiener, & Niefeld, 2006).
Public agencies across all levels of government recognize the importance of a
healthy population but are asked to “do more with less.” In an era of decentralized and
“smaller” government, the reality is that government can no longer single-handedly fix
the health care crisis. Rather, the promise of government is satisfying the need to grapple
with health care reform through facilitating new models of new governance in health care
enterprise. At stake are the health of entire communities, which when put at risk
adversely affect employment, educational opportunities, social cohesion, and the
opportunity for individuals and families to live as productive members of society (see
Marmot & Wilkinson, 2006). Regrettably, this “risk” is becoming the reality for
communities across the U.S. as overall health and well-being continue to decline in the
face of unsustainable health care expenditures and increasing rates of uninsured. The U.S.
continues to invest an increasing percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in
health related expenditures, estimated to reach 19.8% by 2020 (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid [CMS], 2012). We can no longer afford to invest $1 out of $7 into a
dysfunctional, fragmented, and inequitable health delivery system (CMS, 2012).
Government may no longer be the solution for addressing this wicked problem, but
governance may offer an effective solution.
Confronted with these facts, most health policy researchers, elected officials, and
policymakers have reached a tenable consensus: The fragmented health care delivery
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system is unsustainable (Justice, Hess, & Weil, 2009; Stanek, Dierker, Henderson, &
Tollen, 2012). Faced with mounting federal debt and a historic recession that eroded
coverage, affordability, and resources in almost every state, elected officials are taking
action (Smith, Gifford, Ellis, Rudowitz, & Snyder, 2011). Appointed public officials are
responding by rethinking the role of public institutions in the context of financing,
delivery, and organization of health services. States are working to maximize limited
resources and address the complexities of health care in an era of economic and political
uncertainty (Weil et al., 2009).
States have historically served as policy innovators, as “laboratories of
democracy” in a federalist system of government (Justice Brandeis, 1932).5 Individual
states are seeking reforms to control health care costs by bending the cost curve and
sponsoring multi-payer efforts to improve primary care and increase care coordination.
States continue to provide coverage to the growing ranks of uninsured through federalstate programs such as Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), in
addition to supporting insurance reform by setting up state-based health insurance
exchanges (Stanek et al., 2012).
In a challenging economic and politically partisan environment, in which much of
the national conversation revolves around federal health reform, states are moving ahead,
laying the foundation for comprehensive reform and informing the federal government on
broader national reform initiatives. Among these leading states is Oregon, which is
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The term originates from a U.S. Supreme Court opinion issued by Justice Louis Brandeis (1932). New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 285 U.S. 262. (1932). Retrieved from
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=CASE&court=US&vol=285&page=262
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pursuing comprehensive reform of its Medicaid health delivery system by creating
community-governed and accountable integrated health systems: coordinated care
organizations (CCOs). In May 2012, Oregon entered an historic five-year agreement with
the Obama Administration and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to
create a new federal-state partnership that supports a redesign of Oregon’s Medicaid
program.6
Oregon decided to move beyond implementation of major components of the
federal health reform legislation provided for in the Accountable Care Act (ACA) passed
by Congress in 2010. In 2012, the state moved to implement a new model of care
delivery for its 600,000 Medicaid recipients. Oregon is working to advance
comprehensive health care reform by establishing community-based integrated delivery
systems or CCOs (Oregon Health Fund Board [OHFB], 2008; Oregon Health Policy
Board [OHPB], January 2012). CCOs are required to accept a global payment for a
defined Medicaid population, report on performance, and will be held accountable by the
Oregon Health Authority (OHPB, January 2012). Oregon is working to build on its past
successes with Medicaid, which include creating a prioritized list, expanding Medicaid
coverage, and shifting resources from high-utilization inpatient settings to primary and
preventive care services integrated at the community level (Oregon Health Authority
[OHA], March 2012).
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Governor Jon Kitzhaber, Official Press Release, May 3, 2012. Retrieved from:
http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/media_room/press_releases/p2012/press_050312.shtml
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The overarching policy goal of Oregon’s health reform, referred to as “health
system transformation”, is to achieve better health, better health care, and lower costs for
Oregonians (OHPB, January 2012). However, the true promise of Oregon’s CCO model
is to demonstrate whether such goals are achievable at the state level. To substantially
bend the cost curve, Oregon will need to reform their delivery system to empower local
communities and pay for health outcomes instead of encounters. As the Affordable Care
Act adds millions of new Medicaid enrollees across the country in 2014 (see Sommers,
Swartz, & Epstein, 2011), demonstrating on-the-ground solutions that sustainably
improve client experience and contain costs will be particularly important. Oregon sees
its health care reform amongst its Medicaid population as laying the foundation and
framework to transform the entire state’s health delivery system into a community-based
comprehensive health system.
Chapter Organization
This chapter presents the rationale for conducting exploratory research on a new
model of health care organization and delivery in Oregon. The research problem is
described to support the importance and significance of exploring this model. This study
seeks to contribute in both theory and practice by exploring whether collaborative
governance serves as an effective model to support the transformation of communitybased health services. The literature review represents the body of knowledge and
evidence pertinent to inform the research study, specifically state-level health care
reform, the history of Oregon’s Medicaid program, important historical factors unique to
the state, and models of collaborative governance.
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The chapter is organized into six sections. The first section provides a synthesis of
issues that frame the research, specifically the U.S. health care system and Medicaid. The
second section outlines the history of the Oregon Health Plan and the state’s unique
model of community engagement as well as its lasting influence on health policy. The
third section presents salient theoretical perspectives related to contemporary governance,
including integrated health delivery networks, along with the adopted framework for the
CCO collaborative governance model. The next two sections highlight the central
purpose and significance of the study, including the principal research question. The final
section offers a conclusion and outline of Chapter 3.
Overview
With unprecedented collaboration between local communities, health care
providers, and our federal partners, Oregon is on the right track to create a system
that will both improve care and reduce costs. – Governor Kitzhaber, 20127
Federal and state governments realize reform is inevitable because of health
care’s financial unsustainability, which has bankrupted industries and government
agencies across the country. It remains a highly polarized and charged political and social
issue. The states along with the federal government are struggling to finance health care
coverage and services, particularly publicly funded health insurance, in an era of rapidly
decreasing budgets and rising health care costs (Smith et al., 2011). Public officials and
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Press Release, May 3, 2012
http://www.oregon.gov/gov/media_room/pages/press_releasesp2012/press_050312.aspx
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agencies are seeking solutions to the problems of cost, access, and quality, while having
to operate in an increasingly partisan and polarized political climate.
As a result of the “Great Recession,” states have faced significant budget deficits
that stem from shortfalls in revenue, budget cuts, restrictions on tax increases, and a
prolonged stalled economic recovery. Still, several states are forging ahead by passing
health reform legislation. Out of economic necessity, select states are navigating
challenging political and economic issues. They are supporting health reform to manage
the harsh fiscal realities of the prolonged Great Recession. Because of an unexpected and
historic policy window, states are now pursuing health reform and are seeking to leverage
this unique opportunity to pass and implement substantive legislation (Kingdon, 1995).
Whether supporting health reform or otherwise, almost all states are faced with
less financial and human resources in an era of devolution and hollow government.
Therefore, states that are working to implement reforms are engaged in unprecedented
multi-sectorial approaches to a problem that spans the public, private, and nonprofit
sectors. The public sector cannot achieve health care reform solely through legislation,
administration rule-making, regulation, or other tools traditionally used by government
(Salamon, 2003). New approaches and new partnerships are needed.
One new approach unites organizations across the public, private, and nonprofit
sectors by collaborating to address problems of cost, access, and quality. Such an
approach is largely unprecedented in terms of sharing responsibility with reforming
health care in a dynamic and competitive marketplace. While entities and organizations
are working together across sectors, a new strategy for improving the health care delivery
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system has taken hold, one which aims to improve quality, increase population health,
and control cost and expenditures. Oregon has adopted this Triple Aim (Berwick, Nolan,
& Whittington, 2008) as its guiding strategy for health reform. In 2011 and 2012, a
bipartisan legislature and a governor (who was formerly an emergency room physician)
championed health reform and decided to lead efforts to adopt the Triple Aim and
redesign the state’s successful Medicaid program, the Oregon Health Plan (OHP).
The Oregon Health Plan, established in 1989, continues to offer quality health
care services to the state’s most vulnerable population groups (OHBP, 2012, p. 1).
Simultaneously, OHP has managed to contain health care spending to some extent for
Oregon’s Medicaid Program, resulting in savings to the federal and state government of
approximately $15 billion since 1994 (OHA, March 2012). As with many other states
from 2009-2011, Oregon’s Medicaid expenditures increased at an unsustainable rate and
far exceeded available state revenue (OHPB, 2012). Through CCOs, Oregon hopes to
continue building upon the OHP’s success and address the long-term issue around
financial viability of the state’s Medicaid program.
In 2009, the Oregon Legislature passed House Bill 2009, which was the
culmination of a two-year planning process that began with the passage of the Healthy
Oregon Act in 2007 (Senate Bill 329). The 2009 legislation was the result of an extensive
public engagement process and input from over 2,000 individuals. This provided a
“blueprint” to reform Oregon’s health care system by addressing the issues of cost,
quality, and access—referred to as the Triple Aim (Berwick et al., 2008; Oregon Health
Fund Board [OHFB], 2008; OHPB, 2012). This legislation also established the Oregon
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Health Authority, appointed to serve as the “macro-integrator” of the Triple Aim (OHFB,
2008, p. 7). Then in 2011 the Oregon Legislature with support from Governor Kitzhaber
passed House Bill 3650, creating the framework for statewide health care transformation,
culminating in 2012 with House Bill 1580, which enabled legislation to implement a new
model of health care delivery to OHP clients through CCOs.
Shifting from policy issues of access and coverage of health services, Oregon is
now creating a new model for organizing, delivering, and financing the physical,
behavioral, mental, and dental services for OHP beneficiaries (OHA, 2012; OHPB,
2012). CCOs are community-based organizations responsible for care integration and
coordination for individuals eligible for Medicaid and eventually individuals dually
eligible for Medicaid and Medicare. According to the Oregon Health Policy Board (2012)
and Governor Kitzhaber, (2012), CCOs are merely the next stage of health reform, which
started with the creation of the OHP (OHBP, 2012, p. 1).
Central to this new community-based health delivery model is the notion of
collaborative governance, as required by Oregon statute 414.625 (2011 edition) and
administrative rules issued 2012 (Oregon Administrative Rule 410-141-3015). It is
unclear whether a collaborative governance model for CCOs will prove an effective
model by which to facilitate the coordination and integration of health services for OHP
beneficiaries. Nonetheless, this model of governance holds promise in transforming
Oregon’s health delivery system. The model requires entities across the public, private,
and nonprofit sector—including organizations tied to financing, insurance, and delivery
of services—to collaborate toward a set of shared goals: the Triple Aim.
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The challenge is that many of these same entities have historically organized for
survival in an external environment characterized by an imperfect yet competitive and
regulated market place (Oregon Department of Consumer & Business Services
[ODCBS], 2012). The exact opposite is required through CCOs and collaborative
governance. Health care organizations and provider communities now have been asked
by the state to self-organize as a single coordinated organization. Without an effective
and well-functioning model of collaborative governance for CCOs, Oregon risks being
unable to implement health care transformation and not leveraging the $1.9 billion
available in federal funding over a five-year period.
The importance of CCOs as the driving vehicle for transforming Oregon’s health
care delivery system is clear. What is not as understood is whether collaborative
governance will prove effective and resilient enough to achieve the desired outcomes
proposed by the governor, the Oregon Legislature, and the Oregon Health Authority. The
concept of collaborative governance is not new by any means; however, it is new as a
model for organizing a comprehensive community-based system of coordinated and
integrated care. In terms of governance, a key challenge for CCOs is shifting from illness
to wellness, from inpatient and acute care to prevention and primary care. Some
organizations that have historically benefited from the status quo could now be adversely
affected financially; others will likely benefit. Shifting from the traditional medical model
to an untested model of health promotion and disease prevention, one that is personcentered, presents significant challenges that will likely lead to conflict. This will start at
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the community level, as CCOs are held accountable by the state; and the state by the
federal government.
Framing the Historical Context and Oregon Perspective
The history of the U.S. health care system and past efforts to reform health care,
both nationally and among states, occurred in a system of federalism. Whether past
reform efforts have attempted to manage costs, improve quality, or expand access, the
delivery, financing, and organization of health care services has remained an almost
unattainable end goal. This section will review the history of health care reform, focusing
on Medicaid, and examine the environment for health reform, which consists of a mix of
public-private entities operating in an imperfect health care market, regulated and
financed by the public sector. Issues framing the research include an historical review of
the Oregon Health Plan and assessment of how Oregon’s community-participatory model
has influenced health policy and OHP over the span of two-plus decades.
Drawing on appropriate theoretical domains and academic disciplines, instructive
concepts relevant to the study include the dilemma of contemporary governance,
specifically the challenge of collaborative governance in the context of CCOs and state
health policy. These are examined and informed by the fields of public administration
and policy, political science, and organizational theory. Taken as a whole, these issues
frame the importance of collaborative governance as a potential model to help implement
a redesigned system of health care delivery for a large population. They also begin to
frame key constructs and factors that support an effective governance model for a
community-based health delivery system. Finally, this set of issues highlights the
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significance and timing of this study in an era of broad scale health reform at the national
and state levels.
United States and Health Care Reform
The financing, delivery, and costs of health care have been multi-faceted and
multi-sector problems. Past efforts across the public, private, and nonprofit sectors have
attempted to wrestle with issues including rising costs, increasing rates of uninsured, and
problems related to access and quality. The most notable and broad scale historical effort
was the creation of Medicare and Medicaid, from which most health care reform efforts
stem. Other multi-sector efforts include the Leapfrog Group, comprised of large
employers aimed to influence quality and affordability; the National Quality Forum and
the National Committee for Quality Assurance, seeking to accredit and certify health care
organizations and professionals; and managed care organizations (MCOs) and health
maintenance organizations (HMO).
In the aggregate, such initiatives (and countless others) have demonstrated an
inability for any single sector to contain the rising costs of health care, improve the
quality of health services at a population level, or expand insurance coverage to the
remaining tens of millions of uninsured and underinsured. These issues are intractable
health care dilemmas that go beyond a single solution by any one sector, public or
private. Although most of health care is delivered at the community level, these issues
and challenges extend far beyond any one community or public institution. In Oregon,
CCOs attempt to bridge federal and state policy and agencies, formally link health care
organizations and providers, and thus affect access, cost, and quality.
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Case for Comprehensive Health Care Reform
The national conversation around health care and health reform is not necessarily
about the legitimacy to support reform, but rather how to achieve reform and who should
be responsible for it. Oregon has taken this conversation one step further by not only
addressing what and when to reform, but also how to proceed. The case is no longer
about whether to promote reform, either at the national or state level; it now appears
focused on the means and mechanisms by which to achieve it. Whether undertaken at the
federal or state level, all health reform occurs in a system of federalism, which is the
federal-state structure by which reform must proceed, particularly for Medicaid. Prior to
assessing federal and state health policy within the context of American system of
federalism, it is helpful to review the three main components of contemporary health
reform: improving care, population health, and cost containment (Berwick, Nolan, &
Whittington, 2008).
Without comprehensive national health care reform (achieved only recently with
passage of the ACA in 2010), the lesson learned from past efforts is there is no single
approach or strategy that will effectively achieve multiple goals around reducing costs,
expanding coverage, and improving the quality and affordability of health care services
to all Americans. To complicate matters further, most of health care is local. In other
words, health care resources and service delivery are highly localized, which CCOs are
working to integrate and coordinate across the state. In tandem, population or
community-based health is also local. Approximately 10% of an individual’s health status
is attributed to health services (Shi & Singh, 2008, p. 49), so reform efforts aimed to
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change the delivery and organization of health services are best suited at the regional and
local level because health care is regionalized.8 Examples that illustrate this include
federal designations such Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs), which indicate
localities that have shortages of primary medical care, dental, or mental health providers.9
Similarly, there are Medically Underserved Areas or Populations (MUA/MUP), which
designate areas in the U.S. that have few primary care providers, high infant mortality,
high poverty, or high numbers of elderly population.10 Because health care is best
understood as being local, that is the logical starting place for transforming community
delivery systems in Oregon.
In Oregon, community-based health services consist of numerous organizations.
These range from individual and small primary care providers to independent practice
associations (IPAs), hospitals, and integrated delivery systems as well as labs,
pharmacies, community health centers, post-acute and long-term care organizations,
mental health providers, dental providers, alcohol and drug treatment centers, and
physical rehabilitation centers (for a comprehensive overview of the components of the
U.S. health care system, see Shi & Singh, 2008). These community organizations are forprofit, nonprofit, or operated by public agencies. Extent and availability of communitybased services varies by community, as does the number of health insurers in a specified
marketplace. What is not unique, however, in most urban, suburban, and even rural
communities is the delivery of health care services, which are fragmented, too often
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For example, see Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care.
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration.
Retrieved from http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/shortage/
10
Ibid.
9
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uncoordinated, and offer duplicative, unnecessary, and non-evidence based services.
Some of these inefficient outcomes are the result of a largely unregulated sphere, often
referred as the competitive health care marketplace. The bottom line is that many health
delivery systems across communities in Oregon and elsewhere are not supporting the
Triple Aim.
Access, Cost, and Quality: Triple Aim
The best evidence suggests that most individuals receive only half the preventive
care recommended, people with acute or chronic conditions receive about two-thirds of
the care they need, and about one-fifth to one-third of both acute and chronic care is
unnecessary (Schuster, Elizabeth, McGlynn, & Brook, 1998). This estimate does not
factor in the tens of millions of uninsured and underinsured who often have minimal-tono access to primary care services, delay seeking services, or seek treatment in
inappropriate and costly settings such as emergency departments (Wolman & Miller,
2004). Further complications include the limited differences of health care services,
utilization, and cost when comparing private and public health coverage. Individuals,
largely those covered from their employers or the small and individual insurance market,
often do not appear to have better health outcomes than individuals insured through
publicly funded program including Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP). This does not apply to the uninsured or those with limited access to
primary, preventive, or tertiary services.
Access and coverage. Having access to health services—predominately
insurance coverage—matters. Health insurance is one of the most significant factors in
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determining an individual's access to health care services in the United States including
Medicaid coverage (Hadley, 2003; Smedley, 2008; Baicker, Taubman, Allen, Bernstein,
Gruber, Newhouse, et al., 2003; Sommers, Long, & Baicker, 2014). Compared to their
insured counterparts, uninsured individuals are less likely to receive preventive and
primary care services or have a regular source of care. They are more likely to go without
needed medical care and more likely to have poorer health outcomes (Hadley, 2003;
Weinick, Zuvekas, & Cohen, 2000). This is especially true for low-income racial and
ethnic minorities (see Smedley, Stith, & Nelson, 2002). The fragmented U.S. health care
system has historically disadvantaged the poor. This is especially the case for low-income
minorities because the most significant factor in their access to health care services is the
presence or absence of health insurance (Andrulis, 1998; Weinick et al., 2000; Zuvekas &
Taliaferro, 2003). Numerous studies have shown that public health insurance coverage,
including Medicaid, improves access to health care services, the likelihood of receiving
appropriate services when needed, and health outcomes among both adults and children
(Berk & Schur, 1998; Hadley, 2003).
Published in 1982, the landmark RAND health insurance experiment was the
result of a decade-long study of over 7,000 participants, which sought to understand the
effects of health insurance and cost sharing (Rand, 2006). The study found an important
relationship between insurance status and the consequences for health: The poorest and
sickest individuals in the study had improved health outcomes, which were attributed to
having access to health services (Rand, 2006). Another key finding was the effect of costsharing and use of medical services, based on five types of health insurance plans
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provided to study participants. In essence, participants who experienced cost sharing
available through four of the five plans, the fifth being free, decreased service utilization
of both needed and unneeded health services.
As a result of historical, political, and economic factors as well as persistent
inequalities in American social structure, disparities in access to health care remain
widespread (Hargraves & Hadley, 2003; see Shi & Stevens, 2005). From a health system
perspective, there is compelling evidence that access to primary care is associated with
preventing illness and premature death, improving health, and increasing equity in health
services across population subgroups (Starfield, Shi, & Macinko, 2005).
The absence of health insurance contributes to racial and ethnic disparities
because the uninsured lack a steady source of health care, frequently experience delays in
seeking needed care, receive less care when they do, and have poorer levels of health
generally (Zuvekas & Taliaferro, 2003). Individuals from diverse racial and ethnic
backgrounds are adversely affected by widespread disparities in health status and the
quality of health care services (Zuvekas & Taliaferro, 2003). Historical rates of racial and
ethnic disparities found in accessing health care services and utilization are alarming
(Smedley et al., 2002). Therefore, public policies are particularly important for achieving
national priorities that seek to expand insurance coverage and access to health care
services. Medicaid provides coverage to a disproportionate number of racial and ethnic
minorities, including the poor and children (the population coverage among Medicaid
enrollees will be covered in the section on the history of Medicaid).
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Quality and costs. The United States is one of the only advanced economic
countries devoid of a single payer health delivery system or universal insurance. Access
to affordable, quality, and continuous health services is increasingly difficult for tens of
millions of individuals, particularly those not eligible for publicly funded or employersponsored health insurance. Spiraling health care costs, estimated to reach $2.7 trillion by
2020 (or 20% of GDP) (CMS, 2012), along with poor health status and outcomes among
the elderly, poor, disabled, individuals with chronic morbidities, working poor, people of
color, uninsured and underinsured, and undocumented aliens are nearing a tipping point.
As the cost of health care continues to increase, the number of uninsured continues to
increase.
Although the U.S. invests greatly in health care, the quality of health care services
is at best marginal and at worst poor (see Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2001). The
country’s fragmented, disjointed, and massive health care industry continues to require
increasing financial and human resources. Americans can no longer afford to invest
increasing rates of the country’s GDP into a system that is responsible for affecting
approximately 10% of an individual’s health status (Shi & Singh, 2008). The tradeoff in
this scenario is that other public goods such as education and community infrastructure—
factors that contribute far more to one’s health and health status—are being cut because
of lacking resources, namely public funding. To start understanding the array of factors
contributing to this unsustainable paradigm, it is helpful to consider the broader
environmental context in which health care operates, primarily the nexus of federalism
and state health policy.
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State Health Policy: Birth of Medicaid
The American style of “marble cake” federalism has resulted in health policy and
funding being shared across different governments with a substantial overlap in the health
policymaking activities among federal and state officials and administrators. States are
often responsible for establishing new health care policies and programs, sometimes
independently, other times in partnership with the federal government. Federalism offers
an opportunity for early experimentation and evaluation of health policy and
implementation at the state level before being adopted at the federal level. This is evident
in that many health policy innovations developed by states over time are adopted by the
federal government and evolve into national programs. For example, early health care
reform efforts in New York and Massachusetts resulted in the CHIP and the Individual
Mandate (a pivotal component of the ACA) (Holahan et al., 2003; Morone, 2001).
Federal health care reform embodied in the ACA requires considerable effort among the
states. Significant components of federal health care reform will be implemented,
including the expansion of public health insurance through Medicaid s and the
establishment of state and federal health insurance exchanges by 2014.
History of Medicaid in a federalist system. Medicare and Medicaid were
created by Congress and signed into law by President Johnson in 1965 to address the lack
of access to basic health care services among the nation’s poor, elderly, and youth. These
two programs, along with the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP),
established in 1997, have intertwined federal and state government in health policy,
health care delivery, and financing for the past 50 years; some would argue this was
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inevitable within a federalist system of government. Medicare was established to provide
universal federally funded health insurance for all seniors over the age of 65, without any
state responsibility to finance or administer the program.
Medicaid is a federal-state partnership comprised of joint financing that provides
health insurance for certain categories of poor people, primarily pregnant women and
children (Brown & Sparer, 2003). Medicaid has a complex and multifaceted history as a
shared financial responsibility among federal and state government to provide health
coverage for low-income Americans. Medicare and Medicaid now play a critical role in
the U.S. health care system. However, Medicaid often stirs the policy debate about the
role of state and federal government in health care. Oregon has often been at the forefront
of this controversy in its effort to reform the state’s Medicaid program (see Bodenheimer,
1997; Brown, 1991; Jacobs, Marmor, & Oberlander, 1999; Leichter, 1999; Oberlander,
2007; Sipes-Metzler, 1994; Wiener, 1992).
Medicaid has successfully improved access to health services for tens of millions
of low-income individuals (see Engel, 2006; Weil, 2003). The program is often called the
“backbone” for financing and providing health coverage to the country’s most vulnerable
(Holahan, Weil, & Wiener, 2003). Through the federal demonstration waiver process,
states continue to implement creative solutions that address a range of health care issues,
which are authorized through the federal review and approval process, commonly
referred to as the waiver process (Thompson & Burke, 2007). Historical waiver issues
have included attempts by states to address the growing number of uninsured by
expanding coverage and types of services to targeted population groups; improving the
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quality of services delivered and financed; controlling escalating health care costs, often
through managed care; reducing disparities of care including access and quality; or some
combination of these. Medicaid remains a popular federal program among many states,
largely because it provides flexibility in the design and ability to modify a state’s
Medicaid program, and it offers a beneficial financial arrangement for states (Holahan,
Weil, & Wiener, 2003).
Medicaid from a state perspective. As individuals lose insurance coverage
either through unemployment or transitioning to employers that do not provide health
coverage, those eligible for Medicaid and CHIP increase. Consequently, there is an
interesting trend between employment and Medicaid coverage. As individuals lose
employment in periods of economic downturn, such as the recent “Great Recession” as
well as previous economic downturns, they simultaneously lose health coverage, which
often extends to the entire family (e.g. children or dependents). Simultaneously, federal
and state governments experience a decrease in funding as the result of a retracting
economy. These combined factors compound the problem of coverage: While individuals
lose their employer-sponsored coverage and government agencies lose funding for
publicly available health insurance, the demand for Medicaid and CHIP increases (Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2011).
Many states have balanced budget amendments and cannot borrow to backfill
state budgets. They often bear the brunt of the harsh economy and are faced with difficult
decisions including modifying eligibility for programs such as Medicaid and CHIP to
meet available revenue targets (Boyd, 2003; Smith et al., 2011). This creates a perfect
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storm, exacerbated by the reality of spiraling health care costs, increasing numbers of
uninsured, growing ranks of the working poor, and a sicker population because of rising
rates of obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and an aging generation of baby
boomers. Faced with these challenges, states continue to reform their health care systems
in an effort to control costs, improve quality, expand access, and capitalize on resources
in an era of the shrinking public sector and decline in the role of government, especially
at the federal level.
Many States are actively seeking to reform their health care systems (see National
Governors Association [NGA] 2011 report). In response to the economic downturn, some
states such as Arizona even had to consider cutting services such as coverage for organ
transplants, which are costly, while other states have sought to reduce provider
reimbursement rates in order to contain costs.11 On the other hand, several states have
taken a different approach with delivery systems and financing reforms. Examples
include Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Oregon
(NGA, 2011). These states are working to address multiple issues including insurance
expansion, cost containment or payment reform, quality and patient safety, access to
comprehensive services, health information technology, and moving from a fragmented
to a coordinated system of care delivery through the tools available via public policy
(Justice, Hess, & Weil, 2009; NGA, 2011). Essentially, these states are working to
restructure health delivery systems to improve quality and efficiency of services while
moving toward a sustainable health care system.
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Changing Paradigm: States as Health Policy Innovators
States have been driving reform efforts, past and present, creating innovative
approaches to health reform (Bovbjerg, Wiener, & Housman, 2003). They continue to
explore new models for payment, integration, care coordination, cost-effective treatments
and coverage, financing methodologies, incentive structures, and efforts to either
maintain existing coverage rates or expand coverage and access to primary care services.
These changes are occurring in an era symbolized by the devolution of public programs
and funding from the federal government. States are working cooperatively through a
variety of partnerships among private and nonprofit entities to establish a continuum of
integrated and comprehensive models of health services.
States are learning how to leverage public policy as a means to foster the
networks and new “paradigms of care” while maintaining costs and ensuring
performance and accountability. They are fostering new models of care such as patientcentered medical homes, payment bundling and pay-for-performance methodologies, and
promotion of health homes and accountable care organizations (ACOs) (NGA, 2011).
Building new networks and partnerships, however, presents challenges in a sector that
historically has been fragmented and beholden, often through the political process, to
powerful stakeholders. Nevertheless, states continue to move forward with health reform,
often out of economic necessity and driven by external forces beyond the control of their
legislatures.
The emerging intra- and inter-organizational relationships necessary to establish
integrated or coordinated delivery systems is unprecedented. Past attempts of establishing
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health maintenance organizations or managed care organizations were largely contained
to hospital systems. Physical, behavioral, and dental providers as well as hospitals, longterm care providers, and payers need to collaborate to establish community-based
comprehensive integrated care systems. This requires new approaches and ultimately new
models for governance.
That said, there are two important considerations in terms of state health policy:
(1) establish statewide integrated delivery systems that support better patient care, better
community health, and reduce costs; and (2) foster new networks and partnerships for
creating integrated statewide delivery systems for the Medicaid population. To transition
to a new delivery system, states can no longer approach reform in a piecemeal fashion.
States need to enact and support comprehensive legislation that fosters re-engineering of
the delivery system by encouraging collaboration among groups of providers, hospitals
and hospital systems, specialty practices, payers, and non-medical community partners as
well as state, county, and city agencies. Oregon is leveraging competition by targeted
changes through Medicaid, the commercially insured market, and public employee
insurance. As significant payors, regulators, and administrators of health care programs
and services, states have an opportunity to serve in a new capacity or modified role as the
facilitators and conveners in the health care marketplace.
Blazing the Trail: History of the Oregon Health Plan
Oregon has a national reputation as a leader in reforming health care and is
considered one of the more innovative states in its approach to Medicaid. This reputation
took hold in 1994 when the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) granted
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Oregon its initial section 1115(a) Demonstration under the Social Security Act (OHA,
2012). The federal waiver allowed the state to implement the Oregon Health Plan, which
continues to lead by innovative and committed policymakers and health care reformers,
including the “intellectual father” of the OHP, Governor John Kitzhaber (Wiener, 1992,
p. 26).
In March 2012, the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) requested an amendment to
its existing federal waiver for Medicaid. Through this modified federal waiver, the state
received approval by CMS to support Oregon in its goal to integrate physical, behavioral,
and dental services for OHP beneficiaries through CCOs. The Oregon Health Authority
(OHA) is the agency responsible for the state’s health programs including public health,
Medicaid and CHIP programs, and its sister agency, the Department of Human Services
among other programs, and it is working to integrate several of these intra-agencies for
better health reform. The OHA is leveraging the state’s purchasing power in the health
care marketplace, initially through Medicaid, but eventually by integrating an additional
800,000 individuals covered through the Public Educators Benefit Board (PEBB), the
Oregon Educators Benefit Board (OEBB), and the state’s employee health program (see
Oregon House Bill 3650, Section 13[2][e], 2011). The next sections examine the
historical development of Oregon’s Medicaid program within social, political, and
institutional contexts.
Oregon as a policy entrepreneur: Historical perspective. Community
involvement in state health policy has become a defining feature in Oregon, dating from
the early 1980s with Oregon Health Decisions, a nonprofit organization that was focused
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on health care related issues and citizen engagement (Sipes-Metzler, 1994). Aside from
serving as a leader in state health reform, Oregon has a distinct reputation for extensive
community and stakeholder input into health policy development and implementation.
Early efforts in the state to develop comprehensive health reform policy started with the
Health Policy Commission created in 2003, and continued with the Health Fund Board
between 2007-2009. The current Health Policy Board (2009-present) involves hundreds
of individuals on work groups, committees, and boards and encourages input and public
comment from thousands of Oregonians.
Oregon continues to rely on public committees and councils to formulate
significant health policy. For example, the executive branch supports over 220 standing
public committees and councils that cover education, transportation, natural resources,
labor, and health care among countless others.12 These committees provide public forums
for input and stakeholder feedback. This same process resulted in the implementation
proposal for CCOs, which involved more than 60 public meetings and input from over
2,000 Oregonians (OHPB, 2011).
In 1987, Oregon Health Decisions, under the leadership of John Kitzhaber (then
state senate president), held a forum regarding a recent decision by the Oregon
Legislature to stop funding optional Medicaid services for the majority of organ
transplants (Sipes-Metzler, 1994). The forum resulted in a proclamation titled “Quality of
Life in Allocation Health Care Resources,” which outlined a framework and set of
principles for decisions about the allocation of health care resources (Sipes-Metzler,
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1994, p. 27). The Oregon Health Decisions initiative resulted in the active engagement
and participation of Oregonians at the community and state levels on an unprecedented
scale on important health policy issues. Around the same time, the Oregon Legislature
initiated the Oregon Medicaid Prioritization Project (Sipes-Metzler, 1994, p. 27). The
result of this project was a consensus that health services in the state could be prioritized
(Leichter, 1999).
The Oregon Health Plan is guided by a lasting vision to provide access to health
care for all Oregonians. From a policy perspective, Oregon historically has tried to
expand Medicaid coverage to previously non-categorically eligible Oregonians, and
finance the expansion by limiting medical services for all individuals covered in OHP,
thus controlling costs by using the prioritized list. This approach was viewed as highly
contentious and considered by proponents an attempt to ration medical care for the poor
(Jacobs, Marmor, & Oberlander, 1999). The net result did not ration or significantly
contain Medicaid expenditures as anticipated (Jacobs et al., 1999). Instead, it created a
formal process that defines health benefits for Oregon’s Medicaid program. Creation of
the prioritized list also addressed the contentious and difficult question regarding which
services would be covered under OHP.
The Oregon legislation that enacted OHP required an independent commission to
oversee the process, which then lead to the prioritized list of medical services. Oregon’s
Health Services Commission, established in 1987, was a governor-appointed, senateconfirmed group of experts and public members that regularly reviewed the available
evidence on clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of health services (DiPrete &

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS

50

Coffman, 2007). When formed, the commission included 11 members: five physicians,
four consumer representatives, a public health nurse, and a social worker. The
commission was tasked to consider the comparative benefits of health services, rank the
services from most to least important, and ensure that the final ranking of services
reflected community values regarding treatments (Sipes-Metzler, 1999, p. 308). The final
list would determine which services could be funded for individuals enrolled in OHP.
The public input and development process of the prioritized list involved review
and debate of over 10,000 medical diagnoses and treatments, eventually whittled down to
a final list of 709 condition-treatment pairings presented by the commission (Leichter,
1999, p. 149). In 1989, the legislature agreed to fund a package of benefits that included
the first 587 of the pairings (Leichter, 1999). The prioritized list now consists of paired
medical conditions and treatments, ranked hierarchically from the most to the least
medically necessary based on the latest research on the effectiveness of treatments
(DiPrete & Coffman, 2007). Other services covered include diagnostic services to
determine a patient’s condition, ancillary services medically appropriate for the treatment
of covered conditions, hospital services, and prescription drugs (DiPrete & Coffman,
2007).
The state—the first to do so—succeeded in establishing a formal process by
which to determine the level of services covered, based on a priority ranking system that
was matched with available state funding. The list is modified and revised every two
years by the commission, coinciding with Oregon’s biennial legislative session (DiPrete
& Coffman, 2007). The Oregon Legislature is statutorily prohibited from modifying the
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prioritized list; it may only determine funding based on state fiscal resources. This
structure explicitly creates accountability by determining which services are funded.
Services above the cut-off line, established by the state’s budgetary resources, are funded;
those below the line are not.
Evidence-based benefit design in Oregon continues to be a centerpiece of the
Oregon Health Plan and serves as the mechanism to determine which benefits are
covered by the state’s Medicaid managed care and fee-for-service programs. The Health
Services Commission was a forum for public input and participation in the decisionmaking process that resulted in coverage of Medicaid services for OHP beneficiaries.
Then in January 2012, after nearly a quarter of a century, the Health Services
Commission’s work was transitioned to the Health Evidence Review Commission
(HERC), along with comparative effectiveness reviews of medical technology that was
previously managed by another public committee. The governor has requested that the
HERC expand upon the Health Services Commission work to date by developing and
gaining consensus on evidence-based clinical guidelines and other coverage guidance that
will support CCOs in providing high quality care and reducing unnecessary utilization of
services.
A notable outcome of the two-year process that resulted in the prioritized list was
the level of public engagement. The commission supported 11 public hearings, 47
community meetings in every county of the state (36 total), and a statewide telephone
survey of 1,000 individuals (Kitzhaber, 1993; Wiener, 1992, p. 28). At the end of the
public process, over 3,500 individuals provided information to the commission regarding
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citizen values around health coverage and health services (Sipes-Metzler, 1999, p. 309).
From a health policy and community engagement perspective, the level of involvement in
determining the state’s benefit coverage for its Medicaid population was unprecedented.
It was an intentionally open and transparent process. According to Sipes-Metzler (1999),
a key outcome of creating the OHP prioritized list was that the state intentionally fostered
a process for citizen participation in a health policy debate, blending medical fact and
public value to form public policy (p. 313). The final prioritized list reflected the
community’s values, an outcome attributed to the extensive process of public
involvement (Kitzhaber, 1993). This process has become institutionalized in formulation,
and implementing health policy in Oregon’s Medicaid waiver for the prioritized list was
initially denied by the federal Department of Human and Health Services (DHHS). In
1994, the waiver was finally approved. Oregon had successfully shifted the health care
policy debate from coverage of individuals to coverage of services (Speight as cited in
Leichter, 1999, p. 157). Oregon’s approach to modifying its Medicaid program allows the
state to use the prioritized list, especially during periods of economic recession, to reduce
covered benefits instead of changing eligibility (reducing OHP enrollment) as a means to
control costs. Oregon has also been able to better manage Medicaid costs through
mandated managed care enrollment for the majority of OHP beneficiaries.
A decade after OHP: Setbacks through incremental health reform. From
1994 through 2003, OHP rapidly expanded into a complex Medicaid delivery system in
Oregon. In less than a decade, OHP managed to provide 1.4 million individuals access to
health care, largely through Medicaid managed care organizations (MCOs). Another
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29,000 individuals previously denied coverage due to preexisting conditions were also
able to obtain insurance coverage through a high-risk pool called the Oregon Medical
Insurance Pool (OHPR, 2003, p. 1). An important change to the OHP delivery system
during this time was a shift from large managed health plans and organizations to locally
developed managed care organizations for the OHP population (OHPR, 2000).
After a period of stability, Oregon’s Medicaid delivery system faced some
difficult challenges. The first of these challenges was caused by a competitive
marketplace and disruptive market forces. The result was a series of mergers,
acquisitions, and conversions among managed care organizations (MCOs), physicians,
and hospitals. Some hospitals and clinics closed, physician group practices dissolved, and
large MCOs exited the Medicaid insurance market (OHPR, 2000, p. 5). During this time,
insurance premiums and provider payment levels changed, often due to steady increases
in insurance premiums and decreases in provider payments among those that provided
care to OHP beneficiaries. The mergers and consolidation of Oregon’s health care
organizations significantly changed Oregon’s OHP delivery system (OHPR, 2000, p. 5).
In 2000, the Office for Health Policy and Research (OHPR) reported governance
as a key determinant of delivery system stability (p. 2). The issue of stability of the
Medicaid governance and delivery system continues to be a pivotal challenge, one with
which CCOs have been tasked. The second challenge was the economic downturn and
resulting state fiscal crisis, coupled with steadily increasing health care costs. In 2002,
Oregon decided to redesign OHP in an effort to maintain Medicaid coverage through cost
containment beyond the prioritized list (OHPR, 2003). The immediate result was two
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different benefit packages for Oregon’s Medicaid population: OHP Standard and OHP
Plus.
OHP Plus was designed to provide the existing Medicaid benefit package to the
categorically eligible (Wallace, McConnell, Gallia, & Edlund, 2010). For OHP Standard,
the idea was to expanded coverage to adults or the working poor, those not categorically
eligible but still eligible under the state’s initial Medicaid waiver (Wallace et al., 2010;
Wright, Carlson, Allen, Homgren, & Rustvold, 2010). There are important distinctions
between OHP Plus and OHP Standard. At that time, individuals enrolled in the OHP
Standard benefit package would receive a smaller benefit package than individuals in
OHP Plus. They were also assessed higher copayments and required to pay monthly
premiums (which were not income based) for coverage. One other notable difference was
individuals covered by OHP Standard who did not pay their monthly premium for
coverage were automatically disenrolled for a six-month period (Wallace et al., 2010).
Results of OHP Plus and OHP Standard were mixed. Some of the intended goals
were achieved, but more importantly there were some unintended results. Oregon’s
second experiment in Medicaid created a significant decrease in the number of
individuals enrolled in OHP Standard, as much as a 50% decrease among some of the
most vulnerable Oregonians (Wallace et al., 2010). This adverse outcome was due to
increased premium payments combined with elimination of benefits, which significantly
disadvantaged those expressly intended to be helped by Medicaid, i.e. the poor. Also,
parents with children who lost OHP coverage during this period were more likely to have
uninsured children even though they were eligible for Medicaid coverage (Devoe, Krois,
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Edlund, Smith, & Carlson, 2008). The unifying theme around most of this work is
Oregon’s continued engagement and public process, which continue to shape the state’s
health policy and resultant implementation effort. Building on the success of past
Medicaid initiatives, including the prioritized list, the level of civic engagement and
stakeholder participation, and lessons learned through OHP Standard and OHP Plus,
Oregon continues to further reform the state’s Medicaid system.
Oregon’s health system transformation: Governing the ungovernable. Over
the past two decades, Oregon has attempted to redesign the state’s Medicaid program to
expand coverage through both the state’s public and private health insurance markets.
Oregon has also used health policy to improve the state’s Medicaid delivery system,
reduce unnecessary and non-effective health care treatments and services, and continually
ensure public participation and engagement in the decision-making process around health
policy. These incremental reforms in health care delivery continue today with the state’s
most recent health reform effort—establishing coordinated care organizations, or CCOs.
As with prior health reform initiatives, numerous communities and stakeholders continue
to be involved in the various stages of development and implementation of CCOs.
Oregon is implementing its most ambitious OHP redesign plan to date, focusing
on person-centered, integrated, coordinated care and alignment of financial incentives.
The state expects to demonstrate that such innovations can improve health outcomes and
the quality of care as well as protect individuals’ rights and hold costs to a sustainable,
fixed rate of per capita cost growth. Oregon’s Health System Transformation, the next
stage of innovation for Oregon’s mature managed care system, has the promise to
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improve health outcomes and simultaneously bend the health cost curve. Oregon has
been successfully using managed system for the past 30 years, which has resulted in
following achievements (OHA, March 2012, p. 3):
•

cost savings of $15 billion per the federal evaluations of Oregon’s 1115 waiver
since 1989;

•

limited reliance on institutional care for those needing long-term supports and
services;

•

comparatively low hospitalization rates; and

•

among the highest rates of Medicaid managed care, with approximately 78% of
OHP enrollees.
What is a care organization? Oregon envisions CCOs as community-based

organizations governed by a partnership among care providers, community members, and
those taking financial risk, namely existing MCOs and hospital systems. Oregon
envisions that CCOs will be flexible in addressing community needs and will be held
accountable not just to the OHA, but primarily to those served by the CCO, the
community. CCOs will partner with local public health departments, hospital systems,
and local mental health agencies. These organizations are tasked to focus on health
disparities in their communities and to take into account the needs of individuals served
by OHP as well as ensure that provider networks are organized to be responsive to
community needs. Coordinated care organizations effectively started operating in August
2012 (OHPB, 2012).

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS

57

Each CCO is responsible for the integration and coordination of physical,
behavioral, and oral health care for individuals eligible for Medicaid, and beginning in
2014, an additional 200,000 individuals are now covered through OHP. CCOs are the
single point of accountability for the health quality and outcomes for the enrolled
Medicaid populations they serve. Considered as the sum of numerous parts, each CCO
includes traditional and non-traditional health care providers, MCOs, behavioral health
specialists, hospitals, community health centers, dentists, and naturopaths. These
organizations serve as a new model for integration of care delivery at the community
level.
CCOs operate with a single global budget for their populations, which grows at a
fixed rate per capita with some financial flexibility to ensure available resources are used
to achieve the best possible outcomes. The goal is to create financial incentives that
support the Triple Aim with CCO global budgets designed to cover the broadest range of
funded services for the most individuals to combat unsustainable health care costs. The
global budget approach allows CCOs maximum flexibility to dedicate resources to the
most efficient forms of care. After establishing the baseline global budget, OHA is
seeking to contain CCO global budgets to a sustainable, fixed annualized rate of growth
after developing an appropriate methodology by working with CMS. CCOs also have the
flexibility to adopt alternative payment methodologies for their providers, thus changing
the incentive structure and moving towards pay-for-performance models or health
outcomes, rather than fee-for-service based on utilization. CCOs are responsible for
services historically provided outside the managed care system. This approach enables
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CCOs to fully integrate and coordinate services and achieve economies of scale and
scope.
In summary, CCOs are accountable for outcomes associated with better health,
better quality of care, and more sustainable costs for their defined OHP populations.
CCO performance is accessed via publicly reported metrics and contractual quality
measures that function both as an assurance that these entities are providing quality and
preventative care for their population and as an incentive to encourage them to transform
care delivery. OHA is phasing in accountability metrics and performance expectations
over time (OHBP, 2012). Quality incentives have been incorporated into the global
budget methodology to reward CCOs for improving health outcomes and to increase
payments for quality of care instead of quantity of care.
Theoretical Perspective: New Governance for Complex Organizations in Health
Care
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more
uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of
things. (Machiavelli, p. 21)
Environmental and contextual factors. The evolving U.S. health care system
creates economic and societal incentives for public, private, and nonprofit organizations
to collaborate in pursuit of a collective benefit. For decades, in response to changing
environmental conditions, health care organizations adapted by developing new strategies
and structures. This was especially the case in the 1980s and 1990s, when countless
health care organizations found themselves reorganized to improve efficiency, control
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costs, improve patient outcomes, enhance accountability, and help ensure long-term
survival (Bazzoli, Dynan, Burns, & Yap, 2004, p. 248). According to Bazzoli et al.
(2004), there were three main types of organizational change during these two decades:
(1) horizontal integration and consolidation of hospitals, (2) horizontal integration and
consolidation of physicians, and (3) vertical integration and consolidation among
hospitals and physicians (p. 250). Examples of the complex organizations include
independent practice associations (IPAs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), health
maintenance organizations (HMOs), managed care organizations (MCOs), and integrated
delivery networks (IDNs), among others (Mick & Wyttenbach, 2003; Shi & Singh,
2008). Essentially, multiple organizations joined in order to carry out the delivery of
health services through organizational integration of financing, insurance, delivery, and
payment functions (Shi & Singh, 2008, p. 343). The organizational changes were in
response to turbulent environmental conditions and external contextual factors (Bazzoli et
al., 2004).
Since the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, the federal government has
become increasingly intertwined in the financing, delivery, and regulation of health
services delivery. Shortly after the passage of Medicare and Medicaid, new public
organizations and actors emerged in health care that included politicians, federal
policymakers, and administrative agencies (Mick & Wyttenbach, 2003, p. 37). Newly
established federal and state agencies took on new regulatory and administrative
functions, which introduced a new layer of complexity in terms of governance structure
for the new complex health care organizations. The most complex of these organizations
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are integrated systems, defined by Shortell et al. (1993) as “a network of organizations
that provides or arranges to provide a coordinated continuum of services to a defined
population and is willing to be held clinically and fiscally accountable for the outcomes
and the health status of the population served” (p. 447). In an effort to reform care
delivery and control costs, integrated delivery systems or networks (IDNs) emerged
through significant horizontal and vertical integration of health care organizations,
including IPAs, PPOs, and MCOs. In 2008, there were over 580 IDNs in operation (Shi
& Singh, 2008, p. 368). Integrated delivery networks or systems have in turn led to
increasingly more complex, multi-sector health care organizations, which in turn have
created a need to develop new, less hierarchical models of effective governance to sustain
these complex partnerships. Coordinated care organizations offer yet another model for
integrated health care delivery.
Another phenomenon occurred during this period: the emergence of the
“corporatization of American medicine” (Starr, 1984). At issue was the transformation
and rise of for-profit organizations in health care, marked by increasing market
competition and consolidation of health care entities across the country (Alexander &
D’Aunno, 2003). Organizational theory can start to explain the vertical and horizontal
integration of health care entities during the era of the corporatization of medicine. This
section will examine key theorists and concepts from organizational theory to inform the
concept of coordinated integrated care organizations. Important concepts include
organizational field, complex organizations, open systems, institutional logic, actors, and
governance structures.
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Organizational theorists Mick and Wyttenbach (2003) use the concept of
“organizational field” to conceptualize and measure institutional and organizational
change in health care services (p. 25). Drawing upon DiMaggio and Powell’s 1983 study
(as cited in Mick et al., 2003), the concept of organizational field refers to organizations
that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers,
resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that
produce similar services or products (p. 25). In health care, the organizational field
consists of a geographic area in which certain actors are involved in the financing and
delivery of health care services. According to Scott (as cited in Mick & Wyttenbach,
2003, p. 127), there are three important concepts in organizational field: institutional
logic, actors, and governance structures. Institutional logic refers to the goals within an
organizational field and the means by which they are achieved; actors are defined by and
operate according to the principles of the institutional logic; governance structures refers
to the mechanisms that legitimately enforce and modify the institutional logic (Wholey &
Burns, 2003, p. 126).
For CCOs, the health care organizational field consists of local health care
markets, institutional logic, actors, and governance structure (Wholey & Burns, 2003, p.
127). Institutional theory states that organizations, in health care or otherwise, should be
understood as “open systems” in which organizations are influenced by their external
environments (Scott, 2003, p. 119). They are also considered as having the ability to
shape their external environments. This contrasts with the early theory of “closed
systems” in which organizations are considered as not being influenced by their

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS

62

environments. The organizational field offers an important level of analysis for CCOs
because it provides a construct by which to describe a collection of organizations that
compete and cooperate; operate with common rules, norms, and values; and share
horizontal and vertical ties among similar and dissimilar organizations (Scott, 2003, pp.
130-131). The notion of organizational field is also useful to help describe CCOs’
localized environments, an important contextual factor.
Another important factor is determining which actors decide to participate as
members of a CCO. It is conceivable that incentives established through the governance
structure will likely affect which organizations decide to initially participate, continue to
participate over time, or initially participate but then discontinue based on the incentive
structure (Scott, 2003, p. 175). According to Scott (2003), there are three types of
incentives for organization to employ: (1) material, which often include tangible
monetary rewards or value; (2) solidary, which are intangible rewards derived from being
associated with an organization; and (3) purposive, also intangible in nature but attributed
to rewards created by supporting the organization and its goals (Scott, 2003, p. 176).
The creation of CCOs is vastly affecting regional and local health care markets
and organizations therein for the explicit purpose of integrating a fragmented marketplace
through formal authority and government policies established in HB 3650. With
bipartisan support of the legislative branch, the governor and OHA (otherwise known as
the executive branch of government) are deploying institutional pressures to reshape the
health care delivery system for 600,000 Oregonians (as of 2012). This regulation
establishes norms through the pursuit of the Triple Aim, and it prescribes a complex
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model for integrating and coordinating the physical, mental, and behavioral services
within a community (eventually extending to dental services). A critical question that
emerges from these broad scale changes is how these new complex organizations are
governed. To understand contemporary governance in terms of complex health care
organizations or CCOs, including roles and structure, it is important to first describe the
underlying concept of contemporary governance.
Blurred boundaries: Contemporary governance. The theory of governance has
been studied extensively within the fields of political science and public administration
(Frederickson, 2007). Scholars have sought to define, analyze, and redefine this concept
as the role of government in contemporary America has evolved and shifted due to
numerous external and internal forces (see Hill & Lynn, 2001). Furthermore, the role and
responsibility of the public sector has been challenged and blurred while it has tried to
maintain accountability of public institutions, administrators, and elected officials (Hill &
Lynn, 2001). In the ensuing debate around the theory of modern governance, a precise
and widely agreed upon concept has been somewhat elusive among scholars. Multiple
governance models have been put forth, to the point of having “governance” described as
“everywhere and [appearing] to mean anything and everything” (Frederickson, 2007, p.
287). Nevertheless, the concept remains of critical importance to scholars and
policymakers, particularly for administrators.
Traditional democratic governance and contemporary public institutions have
been challenged over the past century. A new environment of governance exists due to
the rapid growth and increasing complexity of the modern state and administration of
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public affairs, gradual deregulation and decentralization, privatization, devolution from
the federal government to states, and new public management reforms efforts (Hill &
Lynn, 2001). These efforts have sought to address the premise that the “state is the
problem, not the solution” to the challenges of modernity. In response to these trends, all
levels of government are seeking creative solutions to continue to solve complex
problems, but through a decentralized model of governance. New models of governance
are needed to effectively address practical problems through cooperation rather than
competition (Fung & Wright, 2001). The history of the OHP is an example in which the
state experimented with addressing practical problems related to health care by governing
Oregon’s Medicaid program (Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 17).
The traditional model of governance, or the vertical model, was grounded in
hierarchical authority. This model has now been superseded by “contemporary” model(s)
of governance as power is increasingly decentralized and horizontally dispersed with
negotiated authority, often through contracting (Cooper, 2005, p. 5). This presents a
challenging dilemma for public institutions in terms of governance—either govern by
authority or govern by contract. The Oregon Health Authority has elected to implement
transformative health policy through state statutes and administrative rules, which is
governing by authority. However, OHA is also governing by contract—contracting with
CCOs to provide comprehensive and integrated health services to individuals enrolled in
Medicaid.
According to Stoker (1998), governance refers to “the development of governing
styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become
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blurred” (p. 17). The world in which public policy, including health policy, is formulated
and then implemented is vastly more complex and interdependent than a century ago.
Oregon’s CCOs are an example of such complexity and interdependencies. This new
environment is characterized as an “ecosystem” of modern governance that is
increasingly reliant upon public and nonprofit actors operating across sectors as the
means by which to achieve an end: maintaining the functions of government while
promoting and protecting the general welfare. Creating CCOs is example in which
boundaries between and within state and local health departments, as well as between
private and nonprofit sectors, are “blurred” in an effort to reorganize Oregon’s health care
delivery system through CCOs.
It is important to define and conceptualize contemporary governance. According
to Stoker (1998), there are five key propositions that describe governance. The first
proposition states that governance consists of a set of government institutions, but these
institutions can include actors outside traditional government (Stoker, 1998, p. 18).
Second, responsibilities traditionally managed by public institutions are transferred
beyond the traditional governance boundaries, thus the “blurring” of boundaries and
responsibilities across sectors (Stoker, 1998). The third and fourth propositions describe
governance as requiring collective action between institutions and often involve “selfgoverning” networks of actors that are autonomous. The fifth proposition views
government (or institutions) as having the authority to “steer and guide” resources and
entities in the private and nonprofit sectors towards problem solving (Stoker, 1998, p.
18).
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The underlying premise is that although there is less direct government
involvement, there is more government action. Because of the complexity of modern
social and economic issues, there is no single actor, public or private, that has the
knowledge, resources, or capacity to tackle problems unilaterally (Kooiman as cited in
Stoker, 1998, p. 22). Modernity necessitates new forms of interaction and partnership
across sectors. The notion of CCOs is just that: requiring local and regional private,
public, and nonprofit entities to enter a partnership that involves collective action and
shared accountability in working towards a shared vision of the Triple Aim. The Oregon
Legislature and the Oregon Health Authority are “steering and guiding” health care
reform through implementation of CCOs, while recognizing the limitations of state or
local government in being able to adequately address the issues of health care costs,
quality, or population health. Oregon’s public institutions, which are legislatively
responsible for the health and well-being of Oregonians, are working to create new
environmental conditions by blurring the traditional boundaries found across the multisector health care enterprise. This is done to foster engagement among public, private,
and nonprofit actors in an effort to collectively solve problems, such as in health care
(Stoker, 1998).
Contemporary governance paradox: Less government and more governance.
Another problem of contemporary governance is the creation of ‘hollow
government.’ This concept describes government functioning as a network comprised of
various government agencies and private organizations collaborating to deliver public
goods and services. This contrasts the vertical model of governance, where government is
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the sole provider of public goods and services. In contemporary governance, government
no longer has the capacity to deliver significant portions of many of its mandated
services, and thus it is “hollowed out.” In other words, government must utilize and
depend upon nongovernmental organizations to deliver public goods and services,
accomplished via contracting out these services through networks (Cooper, 2003, p. 113).
Traditionally many of these goods and services were directly provided by public
agencies. The foremost problem associated with hollow government is the degree, which
a governing institution becomes so hollow it can no longer serve its primary functions.
The Oregon Health Authority, an agency within the executive branch, is using its
authority to promulgate administrative rules that govern CCO activity. They are also
contracting with nongovernmental organizations to ensure provision of services to
900,000 individuals enrolled in OHP (as of May 2014). Therefore, OHA is partnering
with non-governmental organizations as a means of solving a capacity dilemma (Cooper,
2003, p. 58). The OHA is collaborating and contracting with nongovernmental
organizations as a means to provide resources and services at the community level
because such services either cannot or should not continue to be provided solely by
government (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p. 4). A key question is whether this
arrangement will effectively address the contemporary governance paradox as described
by George Frederickson (2007): “What people want is less government and more
governance” (p. 2). It is too early to answer such a fundamental question; nonetheless, it
is one of great importance.
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Governing by contract presents another dilemma: inadequate capacity by public
agencies to manage contracts for goods and services (Cooper, 2003, p. 44). Contract
management capacity of state and local agencies is often inadequate. As part of the
contracting process and stipulated by the Oregon Legislature, the OHA is requiring that
CCOs be held accountable for performance and quality criteria. Similarly, the Oregon
Legislature is requiring the OHA to report quarterly on the implementation progress of
CCOs to ensure accountability among one of the largest state agencies in Oregon, which
is responsible for the health and well-being of hundreds of thousands of individuals.
Although outside the scope of this study, the capacity, expertise, or resources required to
effectively manage contracts with CCOs may present an interesting set of challenges to
the Oregon Health Authority in an era of “hollowed out” government.
Complex Organizations and Collaborative Governance: CCOs
The scarce commodity in health policy is not so much resources, as governance
and the political fortitude it requires…. (L. Mead, 1977, p. 44)
It is postulated that governance, especially contemporary governance, still offers a
useful analytic framework for scholars. The main theory of governance, collaborative
governance, used in this study to explore the early development of CCOs in Oregon, may
serve as an innovative organizational form capable of meeting the challenges of
integration and coordination in health care reform. The theory of collaborative
governance offers “a simplifying lens to a complex reality,” one used to study the
intersections of public policy, health reform, and the emerging world of CCOs (Stoker,
1998, p. 26). The premise of collaborative governance involves broad participation in

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS

69

problem solving through a mechanism in which public, state, regional and local
government agencies, nonprofit organizations, businesses, and other non-governmental
stakeholders can work together (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Freeman, 1997).
A key factor in creating effective and lasting partnerships in integrated health
systems or other managed care arrangements is governance. Governance is the “ultimate
integrator” and defining feature of integrated delivery systems (Pointer, Alexander, &
Zuckerman, 1995, p. 3). Coordinated care organizations are a new hybrid model of an
integrated delivery system with a distinct set of governance issues. The first issue is the
levels of governance (Pointer et al., 1995). CCOs can develop a centralized or
decentralized model with multiple layers of governance depending on the number of
boards created to govern its various components. A second issue is created by the size
and complexity of a CCO, including the number of sub-organizations. Organizations that
form a CCO will likely retain a substantial amount of organizational independence and
autonomy, which may present a set of governance issues. A third challenge stems from a
shift in responsibility toward improving the health of a defined population and away from
illness prevention (Pointer et al., 1995, p. 9). This new responsibility calls for new
performance measures, accountability mechanisms, and performance assessment across
the CCOs, including the effectiveness of the individual sub-organizations. A fourth
challenge is answering the question of “who participates” in the CCO as well as on the
governing board. A CCO governing board requires a mix of “skills, knowledge,
experience, and perspectives” that spans the health care continuum, including community
members. An important challenge for any CCO is to determine how its governance
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structure “aligns with, and facilitates development” of the CCO (Pointer et al., 2005, p.
14).
A collaborative governance framework can be used to identify and explore factors
that influence whether this new model of governance supports achievement of the Triple
Aim through CCOs. The study did not evaluate “outcomes” of CCOs but rather the
conditions in which stakeholders decided to engage with one another—essentially the
governance structure and process.
Collaborative governance can take any number of forms. Examples are somewhat
extensive, ranging from deliberative democracy and network democracy to dispute
resolution in the policy process (Bingham, 2010). The principal premise of collaborative
governance describes the relationship between governing entities and the governed, an
approach that can foster increased participation and collaboration. One of the unique and
principal aspects of collaborative governance is its inclusiveness: It often includes
collaboration among a range of public agencies including state, regional, and local
government agencies, nonprofit organizations, businesses, and other nongovernmental
stakeholders (Bingham, 2010). This emerging governance model offers an alternative for
solving problems in an era when the traditional hierarchical and bureaucratic structure of
governance, traditional command, and control can no longer effectively support this
function. A critical aspect is the model’s ability to broadly engage the public and affected
stakeholders in a deliberative and consensus-oriented process, i.e. public participation, in
a governance model that is explicitly constructed to resolve one or more issues within a
community—in Oregon’s case, the health care delivery reform.
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The collaborative governance model provides an innovative approach for
consensus around making decisions, setting priorities, selecting among the priorities, and
implementing solutions to the issues identified. Collaborative governance is multisectorial and includes involvement through civic engagement, dialogue, deliberative
democracy, multi-stakeholder collaboration, and dispute resolution (Bingham, 2010, p.
299). Several important factors distinguish collaborative governance from traditional
models of governance. First, collaborative governance is not the traditional commandand-control model of governing. Second, collaborative governance presents a bottom-up
approach. Third, collaborative governance offers a new model that attempts to address
the rapidly transitioning world of increasing privatization of activities and functions, the
devolution of traditional pubic responsibilities to lower levels of government, and
outsourcing contracting services and functions to the private and nonprofit sectors. It is
important to recognize the substantial body of literature that addressed the concept of
hollowing out of government (see Salamon, 2002; Cooper, 2003; Agranoff & McGuire,
2003).
Collaborative governance is a useful theory because CCOs consist of public and
private stakeholders joined to support a unified purpose or mission. The majority of
research on collaborative governance is from case studies (Ansell & Gash, 2007). An
early scholar of collaborative governance defined the model as requiring problem
solving, broad participation, provisional solutions, the sharing of regulatory responsibility
across the public-private divide, and a flexible engaged agency (Freeman, 1997, p. 3).
Freeman’s (1997) model of collaborative governance is characterized by five defining
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features: (1) problem-solving orientation, (2) participation by affected parties in the
decision-making process, (3) interim or temporary solutions, (4) accountability that is no
longer merely between public and private parties but also toward each other, and (5) the
facilitation and convening of an agency (p. 23). The first feature, ‘problem-solving
orientation,’ requires that actors participating in the governance process share
information and try to identify practical solutions. ‘Participation,’ Freeman’s second
concept, requires that participants or stakeholders affected by the problem(s) engage in
all stages of the decision-making process. The third concept entails the governance entity
settling on temporary or interim solutions due to external factors and uncertainty. The
fourth concept of ‘accountability’ moves away from traditional accountability
mechanisms that exist in hierarchical governance models. Accountability in this context
refers to participants keeping one another accountable, often requiring new oversight
mechanisms. The last concept of an “engaged agency” refers to when the state serves in
the role of “facilitator” and often provides technical assistance, funding, and
organizational support, often as the “final decision-maker” (Freeman, 1997, p. 23).
Definition of collaborative governance. This study used Ansell and Gash’s
(2007) definition of collaborative governance as “a governing arrangement where one or
more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decisionmaking process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make
or implement public policy or public programs or assets” (p. 544). There are six key
constructs or criteria embedded in their definition. First is the notion that collaborative
governance occurs through initiation by public agencies or institutions. Second is that
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participants in the model are non-state actors. The OHA is the public agency responsible
for “approving and certifying” CCOs in Oregon. At any time, a CCO can lose its
certification status if the OHA determines it is not meeting the required benchmarks or
outcomes. Third, non-state actors directly engage in the decision-making process, rather
than indirectly through those that initiate the model, i.e. public entities. The fourth notion
is that the “forum” or governance model is formalized and facilitates meetings. This
entails a structure, organization, and shared resources among the stakeholders. The fifth
and sixth criteria are that the decision-making process occurs through consensus and the
collaborative is focused on public policy or management (Ansell & Gash, 2007, pp. 544545).
An important consideration is that this model conceptualizes “governance” as a
decision-making model, guided by consensus, formalized and facilitated by non-state
actors. The premise of governance in their model is “collective decision-making,” in
which all stakeholders are directly included in the decision-making process (Ansell &
Gash, 2007, p. 545). A distinctive feature of collaborative governance is that it focuses on
public policies and issues. There are alternative models where public agencies and nonstate actors engage in decision-making processes. One such model is the concept of a
policy network. However, there is a distinct difference between policy networks and
collaborative governance. The difference is that collaborative governance consists of
formal decision-making processes and structure, contrasted with a policy network, which
may be intentionally informal in structure. A third model for decision-making among
state and non-state actors is through public-private partnerships. Again, the difference
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between these two models is that public-private partnerships are established to
“coordinate” activities between public and private actors, whereas collaborative
governance is intentionally designed to foster a consensus-oriented approach to decisionmaking, which is different than mere coordination across sectors.
The Oregon Legislature passed legislation requiring CCOs to adopt a
collaborative governance model. According to Ansell and Gash (2007), collaborative
governance is “favorable when policies are determined to result in a difficult
implementation process” (p. 563), which one could argue is the case with CCOs. Two
additional aspects of Ansell and Gash’s (2007) model are that non-state actors or
participants, including the public stakeholder that initiated the governance model, engage
with one another as well as recognize that the collaborative is responsible for policy
implementation and the resultant outcomes.
It is important to also define the concept of collaboration. According to Gray
(1989), collaboration is a “process through which parties who see different aspects of a
problem can constructively explore the differences and search for solutions that go
beyond their own limited visions of what is possible” (p. 5). More recently, Lawrence,
Phillips, and Hardy (1999) described collaboration as a “cooperative, interorganizational
relationship that relies on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms of control” (p.
481). The researchers, after conducting a systematic review of the literature, defined
collaboration as the following:
A process in which autonomous or semi-autonomous actors interact through
formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing
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their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them
together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial
interactions. (Thompson, Perry, & Miller, 2007, p. 25)
According to Thomson et al. (2007), the least researched and understood aspect of
collaboration is the “interactive process,” or the structure and decision-making process
used to solve problems of collection action, i.e. governance.
Issues with Collaborative Governance in Health Care
It falls to governance to determine how to allocate scarce resources in the
community interest and whether health care organizations are, in fact, community
service organizations or competitive business entities. (Alexander & Zuckerman,
1989, p. 762)
The literature indicates there are a number of issues and challenges in
collaborative governance, particularly in the context of health care organizations.
Problems among collaborating organizations include little to no history of working
together, suspicions and mistrust, cultural differences among organizations, lack of
commitment to a shared mission, inadequate infrastructure, and a breakdown in sharing
resources, risks, responsibilities, and accountability among the partnering organizations
(Pointer, Alexander, & Zuckerman, 1995). One of the most challenging aspects for
collaborative governance models in health care is the unequal position of power and
information asymmetries that can exist among organizations. Some organizations within
a collaborative or community health partnership may have more resources or broader and
more influential power within a community, and thus may dominate the decision-making
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process. The challenge is larger, well-resourced organizations dominating weaker
organizations to unreasonably advance their interests.
An effective governance model will manage the inherent tension between
individual organizational interests and the collective interests of the CCO. Such tensions
can occur when the collaboration’s goals conflict with those of individual organizations.
An individual organization’s mission, if challenged through the collaborative, may lead
to that organization exiting the CCO. The key for organizations participating in a CCO is
to ensure that individual and shared interests are complementary. In any collaborative
organization, an individual organization’s interests and goals vary and are in frequent
conflict. Additionally, smaller organizations may fear losing control. Governance is at the
forefront of these tensions.
Collaborative Governance and CCOs
According to Governor Kitzhaber, “Solving the health care problem is going to
require some sort of new governance structure” (Goldsmith, 2003, p. 118). The CCO
model of health care reform offers just that: a new model for community health
governance in which the community accepts and shares in the costs and risk of caring for
its residents. Again, Oregon’s health care leaders and policy makers continue to leverage
the state’s participatory political culture to build support for advancing health care
reform, further building upon the success initially achieved in establishing OHP and the
prioritized list. Key strategies in advancing health reform are the open and transparent
decision-making process, mobilization of broad stakeholder support, and buy-in through
public forums. In other words, Oregon’s health care reformers continue to involve
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individuals in the health care decision-making and priority-setting process, thereby
legitimizing the policy process and any ensuing outcomes.
Coordinated care organizations were created through the expansion of existing
networks of health care providers and organizations, consolidation of hospitals and
managed care organizations in certain markets, increased demand in the health care
workforce including different types of care providers, new infrastructure, new
partnerships, and possibly significant horizontal and vertical integration of health care
organizations. To achieve these desired ends, the state prescribed that CCOs adopt a
model of collaborative governance. Oregon established criteria for CCOs and their
governing boards to support the creation of sustainable, successful organizations. Each
CCO’s governance structure is required to include a majority interest of entities that share
in the financial risk of the organization. In the context of CCO governance, an entity has
financial risk when it assumes risk for health care expenses or service delivery either
through contractual agreements or as the result of administering a global budget. In
addition, each CCO is required to convene a community advisory council (CAC) that
includes representatives of both the community and county government, but with
consumers representing the majority of membership (OHPR, 2012). This council is
required to meet regularly to ensure that the health care needs of the consumers and the
community are being addressed by the CCO.
In 2000, the Oregon Health Council’s Subcommittee on Access identified the
importance of governance (OHPR, 2000, p. 7). At that time, the subcommittee stated
governance can either “make or break the health care delivery system in a community or
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region” (OHPR, 2000, p. 7). This assumes a governance entity exists within a
community, which is not the case for most Oregon communities. The study identified key
factors that will likely affect governance of delivery systems at the community level in
Oregon, which are all present in the CCO concept. These factors are the following:
•

community-based mission,

•

local/regional control versus “remote control” by outside entities,

•

financial management approach that supports the mission and includes cost
sharing,

•

timely availability of data that is useful and actionable,

•

collaborative relationships among providers and hospitals, and

•

equitable sharing of savings and losses in relation to the “burden” of patient care.
(OHPR, 2000, p. 6)

Significance of the Study
This study sought to enhance our understanding of three community-based
organization’s approach to collaborative governance in an effort to improve the health
status by being responsive to and accountable for community health in Oregon. It is
important to understand to what degree collaborative governance is effective in
supporting state-level health care reform. This study explored and assessed principal
differences in CCO development affected by local political, institutional, and historical
contexts, planning processes, and governance structure. Important factors include the
history of conflict or cooperation, incentives for participation among a broad and diverse
group of stakeholders, power and resource differences, leadership, and presence of a
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formal structure (Ansell & Gash, 2007). The significance of this study is that it (1)
learned about conditions that facilitate or impede the ability of CCOs to effectively solve
problems through governance mechanisms, (2) developed insight into similarities and
differences among CCO governance structures, and (3) advanced the present
understanding of the potential and limitations of a collaborative governance model in
supporting health care reform.
It is unknown whether CCOs will be successful as intended and whether some
CCOs may fail over time, thus affecting the 900,000 Oregonians covered in OHP as of
May 2014. Also unknown is whether CCOs will be able to generate sufficient
commitment, shared values and common vision, and interdependency to serve as a lasting
model for reforming health care. CCOs may only realize incremental improvements in a
largely unchanged and still fragmented Medicaid system. A worst-case scenario is not
realizing the state’s long-term goal of extending the CCO model to all OHA covered
lives, approximately 1.4 million individuals. The result is one less model to support
health reform. To place a finer point of what is at risk: the collapse of any CCO as a
result of failed governance, potentially crippling the Oregon Health Plan, and a loss of an
estimated cost-savings of $3.1 billion to the state and $1.9 billion in federal revenue over
a five-year period.
Conclusion
With the combination of its early work towards establishing a health insurance
exchange, a legislatively approved blueprint for Oregon’s health system transformation,
and the OHP, Oregon has a proven track record of being at the forefront of health reform.
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The CCO model, implemented statewide in Oregon with its focus on local community
needs assessment and accountability for outcomes, will be widely replicable in other
areas around the country. This model squarely targets the Triple Aim and will allow
communities to move beyond addressing the low-hanging fruit, with one-time cost
savings that fundamentally realigns the health system to achieve desired health outcomes
while reining in cost growth. This type of system transformation and cost-curve bending
is a promising direction for the rest of the country, and the model being developed in
Oregon will demonstrate how it can be replicated in other states.
Valid and reliable instruments are needed to assess the factors of collaborative
governance among CCOs. These will measure and describe early stages of CCO
formation and implementation in Oregon and are important to help understand what
factors may determine the effectiveness and sustainability of a CCO. They can also help
gain a better understanding of the factors likely to affect CCO governance and ultimately
influence the ability of CCOs to support Oregon’s pursuit of the Triple Aim.
Understanding these constructs can promote the successful implementation of future
CCOs within Oregon as well as other states in an unwavering effort to achieve
comprehensive health care reform.
In Chapter 3, the study methods are covered and include the research design,
approach to data analysis, and data collection instruments. In addition, key variables,
definitions, and constructs of CCO governance are operationalized, including an analytic
framework for the study.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Chapter 3 presents a detailed overview of the qualitative multi-case research
design. The main sections described in this chapter include an overview and justification
for the research design; review of the guiding research questions; study population and
selection criteria; working definitions, key concepts, and conceptual variables; methods
for data collection and analysis; limitations and assumptions; and conclusion. The
flexibility of using this collective or multi-case study approach lends itself to the
investigation of dynamic, rapidly changing social phenomena (Stake, 1994). In addition,
case studies are commonly used in public administration and political science because
they seek to understand and draw lessons from problems specific to government and
governance (McNabb, 2002). By adopting this approach, different forms of collaborative
governance models among Oregon’s coordinated care organizations (CCOs) can be
studied simultaneously, which will help develop an understanding of this contemporary
governance phenomenon (McNabb, 2002, p. 287). This study examined three CCOs
based on selection criteria (described later in the chapter).
The multi-case research approach compared and contrasted CCO governance
models in Oregon. Comparative analysis helps to assess the relative role and function of
the CCO governance structure by examining different organizations and their respective
approaches to community-based collaborative governance. Findings from this study can
inform change and adaptation among CCOs seeking to establish effective existing
governance arrangements, with the expressed goal of enabling and facilitating the Triple
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Aim. The unit of analysis for this study is coordinated care organizations responsible for
Oregon’s Medicaid population.
Research Design Overview
Governance research is challenging for several reasons (see Hill & Lynn, 2001).
The foremost difficulty is understanding the potential effects or causalities among an
identified policy intervention, utilizing data or measurable outcomes, couched within a
theoretical framework, all of which are bound to be “embedded in a wider social,
political, and economic” context (Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2002, p. 17). According to
Lynn et al. (2002), a critical problem in governance research is “explor[ing] causal
relationships beyond a narrow perimeter of theoretical possibilities that leaves too much
out of the picture” (p. 18). The challenge or limitation in this study, and in all empirical
research, is to acknowledge the broader context in which CCO governance is emerging,
and still engage in research that results in findings and contributions that have
implications for scholars and practitioners (Lynn et al., 2002).
This study was structured to allow for flexibility in response to the dynamic and
rapidly evolving CCO landscape. Explicitly, this approach allowed the study to better
understand how change is transpiring within and across CCOs as well as identify key
internal and external contextual factors that influence the effectiveness of CCOs’
collaborative governance structure. The results of this study, aimed at exploring the
process of CCO development and early implementation, provide important insights and
hypotheses for future quantitative studies that aim to assess outcomes over time.
Assessing outcomes in terms of enhanced integration or coordination of health services,
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changes in utilization, or cost implications from health system transformation is likely to
take a minimum of 1-2 years. This study focused on the process rather than outcomes of
CCOs.
This study developed an understanding of the CCO governance structure and any
variations therein and learned about the collaborative governance process adopted and
deployed within CCOs. The hypothesis was that a preferred governance structure or
model would influence and affect the collaborative process. An effective collaborative
governance model and its key functions and structure are interdependent to the extent of
significantly affecting desired outcomes of CCOs. For any organization, including
complex organizations such as CCOs, the governance structure influences the decisionmaking processes, which either facilitate or impede the effectiveness of the organization
in the short- and long-term.
Justification of Research Design
According to Yin (1984), the case study approach to research attempts to examine
“a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources
of evidence are used” (as cited in McNabb, 2002, p. 286). The study examined three
CCOs. Studying multiple individual cases will develop an enhanced understanding of
the phenomenon, i.e. collaborative governance models (McNabb, 2002, p. 287). The
selected cases chosen for study were CCOs that present “new” solutions to problems
rooted in the delivery of health care: the financing and quality of care for Oregon’s
Medicaid population. The phenomenon of interest is the governance structure and
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processes of CCOs and the relationships therein. By using multiple data collection
strategies (in-depth key informant interviews and extensive documentation review), the
study incorporated triangulation to examine the collaborative governance process.
There are several additional characteristics that make a case study the most
appropriate design. The first characteristic is when randomization is either not possible or
suitable, such as in this study. The second characteristic is the infeasibility of studying an
entire population, in this case all 14 CCOs; there are insufficient resources available to
include all 14 proposed CCOs for this study. The last characteristic that supports use of
this design is when there is value in collecting information cost-effectively (Depoy &
Gitlin, 1998, pp. 142-143), which is the case for this dissertation research study.
There are five components or structure to any case study: (1) research question,
(2) set of propositions, (3) unit(s) of analysis, (4) rationale linking the information to the
propositions, and (5) selected criteria used to interpret the case(s) (Yin as cited in
McNabb, 2002, p. 291). The inquiry in the phenomenon of collaborative governance
models is again best suited using a case study approach because the phenomenon is
newly emerging and rather dynamic. By selecting a subset of the potential 14 CCOs in
Oregon (as of May 2012), the study had an opportunity to explore different concepts that
constitute the model of collaborative governance as defined in the study. The selected
CCOs serve as representative cases for study and provided information about models of
collaborative governance across different CCO types and geographic regions in Oregon.
Lang and Heiss (1990) assert that case studies are optimal for researching “processes and
interactions, which cannot be studied effectively except as they interact and function
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within the entity itself” (p. 86). To examine structure and governance within a CCO,
which include processes and interactions, a case study is the preferred approach.
Research Questions
The central research question that guided this study was the following: “What are
the key factors of collaborative governance that facilitate or impede the ability of CCOs
to implement health care reform?” Stated differently, the purpose of this study was to
answer “to what extent, and in what way, does governance enhance system integration
and effectiveness” so that the desired outcome occurs: improvement in the health status
of Oregon’s Medicaid population over time (Pointer et al., 1995, p. 10). The challenge is
determining which governance structure and processes are more or less effective in
integrating components of a system that has historically been fragmented and
unorganized.
The study developed insights into the types and processes of CCO governance
structures and functions as well as identified potential internal and external barriers that
impede integration of services at the CCO level. Of particular interest was identifying the
experiences that facilitate collaboration, success, and failure in CCOs. Important
dimensions needed to be examined to develop an understanding of the potential
relationships between newly formed organizations. The dimensions below are adapted
from Fung and Wright (2001, p. 30) and Thompson, Perry, and Miller (2007). These
were used to design the interview protocol, described later in this chapter. Exploring key
dimensions of complex governance arrangements requires addressing the following
questions:
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•

How genuinely collaborative is the actual decision-making process in the CCO?

•

How effectively are decisions that are made through the CCO governance
structure translated into real action?

•

Is there clarity of roles and responsibilities, communication processes to enhance
coordination, and mechanisms to monitor activities of all CCO participants?

•

To what extent does the governance structure manage any tension between the
collective interests of the CCO and those of the individual collaborative partners?

•

To what extent are the entities within a CCO able to effectively monitor the
implementation of their decisions?

•

To what extent are decisions coordinated among the organizational units that
collectively form the CCO?

•

To what extent does the collaborative governance model constitute an effective
problem-solving process for the CCO?

•

Which attributes of the governance structure are more desirable in terms of
effectiveness with the CCO?
As part of the OHA certification process, CCO applicants were required to submit

answers to a series of questions related to their proposed governance structure (OHA
RFA, 2012, p. 58), which were then used to inform the data collection. The questions are
as follows:
•

How do entities bearing financial risk for the organization make up the governing
board’s majority interest?
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How does the governing board include members representing major components
of the health care delivery system?

•

How will consumers be represented in the portion of the governing board that is
not composed of those with financial risk in the organization?

•

How does the governing board makeup reflect the community needs and support
the goals of health care transformation?

•

What are the criteria and processes for selecting members on the governing board,
CAC, and any other councils or committees of the governing board?

•

How will the CAC and any other councils or committees of the governing board
support and augment their decision-making?

•

What are the initial and lasting structures that will support meaningful
engagement and participation of CAC members, and how will they address
barriers to participation?

•

What are the governance structure criteria?

•

What criteria were used to select governing members?

•

How will the CCO assure transparency in governance?
Combined, these questions begin to offer an analytic framework for structuring

and organizing data into concrete components by which to assess and compare
collaborative governance structure and processes within and across CCOs. These
potential elements indicate existence of a governance structure, type of structure,
composition and representation of the governance structure, and the selection process
adopted for inclusion on a CCO’s governing board. Throughout this chapter, the term
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“governing board” is used interchangeably with the term “board.” Also, the term
“system” is used interchangeably to refer to a coordinated care organization. The next
section will describe the operationalization of the key concepts and variables relevant to
the study.
Concepts and Variables
There are a number of important concepts of interest in the study. Key concepts
include governance, collaborative governance, governance structure, and coordinated
care organizations. Conceptualizing complex concepts involves breaking down individual
concepts into components or dimensions. The process occurs when concepts are
operationalized into variables (Singleton & Straits, 2005). Drawing on the literature
describing governance structures and functions within integrated hospital systems,
including the theory of collaborative governance, a conceptual model of CCO
collaborative governance is constructed. Prior to having developed the analytic
framework or conceptual model for this study, a brief review of the key concepts were
performed, which included their operationalization and related variables as necessary.
One key concept is the CCO governance structure. According to the Oregon
Health Authority, a CCO is required to “support a sustainable and successful organization
that can deliver the greatest possible health care within available resources, where
success is defined through the Triple Aim (Oregon Health Authority [OHA], 2012, p.
71). As defined under Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) 414.625, a CCO is “a corporation,
governmental agency, public corporation or other legal entity that is certified as meeting
the criteria adopted by the Oregon Health Authority to be accountable for care
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management and to provide integrated and coordinated health care for each of the
organization’s members.” This definition was adopted for this study.
Oregon Revised Statute 414.625(1) states that CCOs “may be local, communitybased organizations or statewide organizations with community-based participation in
governance or any combination of the two.” Furthermore, a CCO may contract with
counties or any public or private entities to provide services to its members. Also, a CCO
can be a single corporate structure or a network of providers organized through
contractual relationships. The underlying principle of any CCO governance structure is
that it should emphasize collaborative governance for community benefit (OHA, 2012, p.
71).
The governance structure of a CCO is complex because multiple organizations
have joined with one another. The complexity of the arrangements and governance
structure is determined in large part by the number of organizations; the size of partnering
organizations; types of organizations involved; mix of for-profit, nonprofit, and public
organizations; and past history, among other factors. Two additional factors are the
region and population(s) covered. For this study, the term region refers to the
geographical boundaries of the area served by a CCO as well as the governing body of
each county that has jurisdiction over all or part of the CCO’s service area (ORS
414.018[5][b]). A CCO’s population includes all Medicaid beneficiaries who decide not
to voluntary opt-out of their assigned CCO. The level and degree of integration and
coordination achieved across all of a CCO’s organizations will directly facilitate or
impede its ability to effectively function and support the Triple Aim.
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The CCO governance structure is specified in Oregon legislation and statute.
According to the OHA’s implementation proposal, CCOs are required to create a
“governing board with a majority interest consisting of representation by entities that
share financial risk as well as representation from the major components of the health
care delivery system” (Oregon Health Policy Board [OHPB], 2012, p. 15). The OHA also
stipulated that participation of local agencies and other nonprofit agencies in the CCO
governance structure served as an important consideration in the certification process
required by all CCOs. The governance structure as required in Oregon Senate Bill 1580
(2012) includes the following requirements for all CCO boards:
•

a majority interest consisting of individuals who share in the financial risk of the
organization and who must constitute a majority of the governance structure;

•

major components of the health care delivery system that include
o at least two health care providers in active practice, including a licensed
physician or a nurse practitioner whose area of practice is primary care,
and
o a mental health or chemical dependency treatment provider;

•

at least two members from the community at large, to ensure that the CCO’s
decision-making is consistent with the values of the members and the community;

•

representation on the governing board that should reflect the needs of its defined
populations; and

•

at least one member of the community advisory council.
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In addition to the requirements described above, a CCO governance structure
board is also required to do the following:
•

implement and formalize coordination and ensure relationships exist between
CCOs and the local Medicaid-funded long-term care (LTC) providers;

•

enter into agreements with local mental health authorities and community mental
health programs to develop a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or contract,
detailing coordination agreements for members that receive mental health
services; and

•

develop relationships with social and support services in a CCO’s service area.
The Oregon Health Authority also created a broad and comprehensive list towards

developing a comprehensive and integrated Medicaid delivery system. According to the
Request for Applications (RFA), the following treatments and providers were considered
as constituting an integrated and coordinated delivery system (OHPB, 2012, pp. 66-67):
Acute inpatient hospital

•

Community prevention services

psychiatric care

•

Dialysis services

•

Addiction treatment

•

Federally qualified health centers

•

Ambulance and emergency

•

Health care interpreters

•

medical transportation
•

Assertive Community Treatment

•

Chemical dependency treatment

•

(qualified/certified)
•

Health education, health
promotion, health literacy

providers

•

Home health

Community health workers

•

Hospice
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•

Hospital

•

Imaging center

•

Intensive case management

•

Rural health centers

•

Mental health providers

•

School-based health centers

•

Navigators

•

Specialty physicians

•

Oral health providers

•

Supported employment

•

Palliative care

•

Tertiary hospital services

•

Patient-centered primary care

•

Tribal and Urban Indian Health

•

providers

Services

homes
•

Peer specialists

Pharmacies and durable medical

•

Urgent care

The complexity and composition of any CCO governance structure is significant.
For the 30 treatments and provider types listed above, there could be 30 or more
organizations that partnered through a CCO to ensure individuals covered under the
Oregon Health Plan (OHP) are able to access comprehensive and integrated care services
across the care continuum. Newly established CCOs had to adopt and modify, as needed,
governance structures and functions that support it and its potentially large number of
sub-organizations. After participants in a CCO were selected and the entity was formed,
relationships among the partnering organizations need to be effectively managed through
the adopted governance structure.
Governance and organizational relationships. Multiple factors contribute to the
complexity of a CCO’s governance and organizational relationships as specified in House
Bill 3650 (2011). As expressly stated in House Bill 3650, a CCO’s governing board and
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organizational structure is required to sufficiently meet “the needs of the communities
they will serve.” According to the Oregon Health Policy Board and the OHA, the
underlying premise is that “there is no single governance solution, and there is risk in
being too prescriptive beyond the statutory definition of a CCO governing board”
(OHPB, 2012, p. 15). The measure of success in terms of an effective “governing board”
is set by the OHA as an organization that supports the Triple Aim.
A governing board is responsible for specifying the organization’s vision,
mission, and goals and ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of governance
(Alexander, Zuckerman, & Pointer, 1995). Of interest was whether an adopted
governance structure serves as a facilitator or a barrier to achieving integration of
organizations and service delivery within a CCO (Pointer, Alexander, & Zuckerman,
1995). Prior to this study, what was not understood is how a model of collaborative
governance within CCOs will “facilitate or impede the formation, development, and
performance of integrated systems” (Pointer et al., 1995, p. 4).
Organizational relationships within a CCO likely influence the effectiveness of
the governance structure and process. Among the 14 CCO applications submitted in April
2012, the number of partnering organizations within each CCO ranged from 2 to a high
of 30 (OHA, 2012 unpublished). Understanding the relationship between CCO
governance boards and existing boards of the partnering organizations was important
because “governance structures and processes suited to one type of organization will not
work equally well in others” (Alexander et al., 1995, p. 79). Effective governance of a
large multistate hospital system will not necessarily translate to effective governance of a
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nonprofit regional mental health organization, nor should it. The underlying premise is
that there is no definitive governance model. Rather, ongoing experimentation is needed
to develop an effective governance structure that clarifies roles and responsibilities. This
may vary region to region or by the composition of the partnership.
Dimensions of governance. In the health administration literature, four
dimensions of governance are often cited for integrated delivery systems or networks:
control, structure, composition, and functioning (Pointer, Alexander, & Zuckerman,
1995; Savage, Taylor, Rotarius, & Buesseler, 1997). These were adopted with some
modification as the key constructs for examining the governance structure of a CCO.
When combined, the four dimensions construct a governance model. Operationalizing
these key dimensions or concepts can help identify important factors of a collaborative
governance model, which can then be assessed in terms of effectiveness as well as
limitations. Developing an understanding of these four governance dimensions can lead
to understanding important issues ranging from the level of governance, system
complexity, functions of governance, and board composition (Savage et al., 1997, p. 12).
These dimensions affect an organization’s ability to effectively manage issues and
challenges faced by a CCO.
Control refers to layers of governance and the number of boards needed to
effectively govern the system (Pointer, 1995). More broadly, control focuses on the
governance of the system, or CCO, and its parts, the organizations that form the system
(Pointer et al., 1995, p. 17). There are two main approaches in control, centralized or
decentralized. In a centralized model, the governance board is a single entity in which the
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decision-making function and authority are centralized. The governance system of a CCO
may consist of a single board with advisory entities (Pointer et al., 1995, p. 16). However,
the advisory entities are not decision-making bodies, but rather serve at the discretion of
the governance board.
In contrast, the decentralized approach has multiple layers of subordinate boards
that share decision-making functions and authority. This approach is more often found in
community-based organizations, whereas centralized approaches are found in
corporations. For the purposes of this study, it is important to assess which approach is
more consistent with the characteristics of the system or CCO. Within a single CCO, both
centralized and decentralized governing boards can exist, although that is not likely. The
issue is to determine which arrangement facilitates overall governance. This study
assessed which model or combination of models (1) facilitate effective governance and
(2) ensure that the principles of structure and representation outlined in HB 1580 are best
supported.
Structure refers to how the board, subordinate boards, and/or advisory entities are
arranged. A key concern of the study was to assess which parts of a CCO are governed by
which boards and the degree of integration among the diverse CCO partnering
organizations and possible subordinate boards within or across the system (Pointer et al.,
1995, p. 13). An underlying question is gauging how much autonomy the partnering
organizations retain in relationship to the CCO.
Any CCO governance structure may be relatively complex. For example, if each
partnering organization has a governing board and 1-2 subordinate boards, multiplied by
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8-10 partnering organizations and their respective boards, there could plausibly be 20
different boards in total. This could be further complicated if a CCO decides to create a
governance structure that includes boards by region and/or service type. The greater the
number of boards and subordinate boards within a CCO, the greater the complexity in
terms of decision-making and diffused authority across the entity.
The challenge for CCOs is to determine which boards at which levels “should
perform particular functions” to minimize duplication of efforts and internal conflicts
(Pointer et al., 1995, p. 8). There is also the question of the amount of authority necessary
for individual subordinate boards to function effectively, yet not transcend the authority
of the main governing board. This configuration is critical to the structure, decisionmaking, and authority structure of the governance model.
Composition pertains to whether members of a CCO board and any subordinate
boards consist of representatives, non-representative members, or a combination of both
(Pointer et al., 1995). There are two important components of composition, board size
and member characteristics (Pointer et al., 1995). The distinguishing feature between
representatives and non-representatives is whether a board member has a direct
relationship with any of the partnering organizations in a CCO. There are several
important issues within this construct. First, who should participate in the governance
structure? Second, what partnering organizations should be represented in the governance
model? Third, what competencies should individual board members have? In essence,
according to Pointer et al. (1995), the issues are identifying the correct mix of
characteristics, skills, knowledge, experience and perspective needed for the board (p.
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10). Given the range of distinctive partners within any given CCO, the demands of a
CCO governance board are different than those in governing boards of hospitals, clinics,
or any businesses within the health delivery system. The composition of board members
will be an important governance dimension, especially since the enabling legislation
requires a CCO governance structure to include non-representative members on the
board.
Functioning refers to roles and responsibilities within the governance structure. In
other words, how governance functions within the system, including what issues a board
should address and how it should govern. Function pertains to how roles and
responsibilities are fulfilled by the governing board (Pointer et al., 1996, p. 13). A
governing board should perform three core roles: policy formulation, decision-making,
and oversight (Pointer et al., 1995, p. 26). This includes organizational policy formulation
and direction, direct oversight including financial controls, decision-making through
formal authority or delegating decision-making to subordinate boards or internal
management structure(s), and active monitoring and oversight of the decision-making
processes. In addition to roles among the board, a board also has responsibilities.
According to Pointer et al. (1995), there are five key responsibilities: (1) formulating the
mission, vision, and goals of the organization; (2) ensuring organizational performance
including executive management; (3) ensuring financial health of the entity; (4) assuring
the quality of health services; and (5) assuming responsibility for accountability to itself
and the board as well as accountability among the partnering organizations to the main
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governing board (Pointer et al., 1995, p. 25). All four dimensions of a governing structure
were operationalized including key indicators in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Governance Structure
Concepts
Control
Structure

Composition

Functioning

Operational Definition
Presence of centralized or
decentralized governance
system
Configuration and
relationships among the
system board, subordinate
boards, and/or advisory
boards
Membership of the system
board, subordinate boards,
or a combination thereof
and relationship to the
system
The work of the system
and the way it is
performed

Indicators
Single board;
Multiple subordinate boards;
Advisory bodies
Number and arrangement of boards;
Bylaws and decision-making processes divested
among the board, subordinate boards, and
advisory entities in relation to one another
Board size;
Representation (representative or nonrepresentative);
Member characteristics
Clearly defined roles;
Explicit set of responsibilities;
Execution of decision-making;

One challenge for CCO governing boards is determining how effectively they can
fulfill “an expanded and different mix of governance responsibilities” (Pointer, 1995, p.
9). Each CCO is accountable for the health and well-being of a defined population group,
including coordination and integration among a continuum of services within its
community. There are a considerable number of components that comprise a CCO. The
board must ensure that all components work collaboratively, and that individual
components and sub-organizations are accountable to one another based upon their
individual performances as well as the overall performance of the CCO.
There are numerous combinations among these four dimensions, which result in a
number of different governance forms. Two important considerations in the context of
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the CCO governance model are that not all forms are “equally effective” and that the
effectiveness of one form over another is likely situational in nature (Pointer et al., 1995).
Operationalizing the structural dimensions of governance may help facilitate
collaborative processes. Having operationalized the conceptual definition of the
governance structure, the chapter now turns to describing the concepts of collaborative
governance.
Model of collaborative governance. This study adopted Ansell & Gash’s (2007)
definition of collaborative governance as “a governing arrangement where one or more
public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making
process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or
implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (p. 544). Ansell and Gash
(2007) developed this definition and analytic framework based on a meta-analysis of 137
studies of collaborative governance that spanned a wide range of policy areas. This study
sought to build on and incorporate variables from Ansell and Gash’s analytic framework
in order to learn which variables or concepts facilitate successful collaboration through
CCO governance arrangements.
Adopting this working definition, the next step was to develop a model of
collaborative governance that included four key concepts: starting conditions,
institutional design, leadership, and collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2007, p. 549).
These concepts are a contribution “to or context for” a collaborative process for any
system (Ansell & Gash, 2007, p. 550).
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Understanding the history and context of the starting conditions of any
collaborative may serve to facilitate or deter cooperation among the partners. The three
concepts which form the starting conditions are (1) presence of any imbalances between
resources or power among the various partners, (2) presence of incentives to collaborate,
and (3) history of conflict or cooperation, which will hinder or facilitate collaboration
(Ansell & Gash, 2007, pp. 550-551).
The institutional design, another import element in the collaborative governance
model, refers to the guidelines and ground rules that exist for collaboration, which are
designed to create an open, transparent, and inclusive environment for stakeholders
(Ansell & Gash, 2007, p. 555). This can be achieved through the formalization of a
governance structure. CCOs will need to determine to what degree the collaborative is
inclusive or exclusive with stakeholder participation.
Leadership is a key for any governance system. For collaborative governance,
leadership will play a vital factor in a CCO’s ability to bring stakeholders together and
engage in the collaborative (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Ansell & Gash (2007) state that
leadership is “crucial for setting and maintaining clear ground rules, building trust,
facilitating dialogue, and exploring mutual gains” (p. 554). Leadership can also help
balance power when power and resources among the stakeholders are asymmetrical.
The collaborative process is an iterative cycle that builds on communication,
mutual trust, increased commitment to the process, enhanced and shared understanding,
and mutually beneficial outcomes (or not); then the cycle starts over (Ansell & Gash,
2007). The first step in this process is communication or dialogue between stakeholders,
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which is face-to-face (Ansell & Gash, 2007). The notion of having stakeholders interact
in person is important but not “necessary” for effective collaboration to transpire (Ansell
& Gash, 2007, p. 558). Face-to-face dialogue can break down existing stereotypes and
provide stakeholders a direct forum for identifying opportunities for mutual gain
achieved through the collaboration.
The collaborative process seeks to build trust, often among a group of
stakeholders where mistrust is present. Trust building is a time intensive process, one best
supported by a prolonged period in which stakeholders are able to interact with one
another. An effective collaborative process requires stakeholders to engage in a level of
commitment; one study found member commitment as the “most important factor
facilitating collaboration” (Margerum, 2002, p. 247). For CCOs, commitment requires
stakeholders to develop trust and a shared understanding that the CCO is the best way to
achieve the policy outcomes established by Oregon’s health system transformation
initiative. Over time, this process can result in “mutual recognition” or “joint
appreciation” that the policy objectives for CCOs are only achievable through the
collaboration. Any collaborative process must include ongoing deliberation and
negotiation efforts and be transparent and consensus-oriented, with stakeholders sharing a
sense of shared responsibility for the process (Ansell & Gash, 2007). This is true with
“mandated” forms of collaboration such as CCOs.
Another important factor in the collaborative process is “shared understanding.”
This refers to the collaborative having a clear mission, a common and shared definition of
the problem, and an identification of common values across the stakeholders in the
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collaborative. The final concept in a collaborative governance model is outcome, which is
not within the scope of this study. Four of the five concepts that construct a model of
collaborative governance were operationalized below in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Model of Collaborative Governance
Concepts
Starting
Conditions
Institutional
Design

Operational Definition
Basic level of trust, conflict, and
social capital that become
resources or liabilities during
collaboration
Basic ground rules under which
collaboration takes place

Facilitative
Leadership

Facilitation, engagement and
empowerment of stakeholders

Collaborative
Process

An iterative cycle that builds on
communication, mutual trust,
commitment to the process, shared
understanding, and mutually
beneficial outcomes

Indicators/Variables
Power-resource imbalance;
Incentives for and constraints on
participation;
History of conflict or cooperation
Participatory
inclusiveness/exclusiveness;
Guidelines and rules for participation;
Open, transparent, and inclusive
process
Facilitation;
Engagement;
Empowerment;
Face-to-face dialogue;
Trust building;
Commitment to process;
Shared understanding;
Intermediate outcomes;

The conceptual framework for studying CCO collaborative governance was
constructed from the four dimensions of governance from Pointer et al. (1995) and Ansell
and Gash’s (2007) four concepts of collaborative governance.
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework for CCO Collaborative Governance

Selection of Participants
The unit of analysis for this study was the CCO, specifically its governance
structure and organizational relationships. As of April 30, 2012, fourteen entities had
submitted applications as part of OHA’s initial wave to become certified as local CCOs.
According to the Oregon Health Authority, as of August 2012, 14 of the 16 applicants
had been provisionally certified during the initial wave. For CCOs, the organizational
size, structure, and composition are critically important.
Inclusion and exclusion criteria. The inclusion criteria consisted of whether an
organization was certified as a CCO by the Oregon Health Authority. The exclusion
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criteria were any organizations not certified as CCOs, specifically any managed care
organizations that continue to operate outside of a certified CCO. The study initially
selected four CCOs. However, because of limitations in resources necessary to support a
study of this size and scope, three organizations were included using the selection criteria
developed below in Table 3.3, adapted from the CCO application requirements (OHA
RFA, 2012, p.15).
Table 3.3: CCO Selection Criteria
Criteria
Coverage Area
Size
Organizational Structure

Prior History
Existing OHA
Relationship(s)
Prior
Coordination/Integration
of Services
Composition
Linkages

Definition of Criteria
Geographic service area of a CCO defined by county and zip
code, including urban, suburban, or rural regions
Size of the defined Medicaid population
Single corporate structure or a network of providers organized
through contractual relationships such as fully capitated health
plan (FCHP), physician care organization (PCO), mental health
organization (MCO), and dental care organization (DCO)
Whether CCO is currently an MCO (e.g. hospital system, new
legal entity, etc.) and prior history as an MCO
Whether CCO covers identical service area already under contract
with OHA, and/or past experience in covering Medicaid
population
Experience in coordinating physical health care, mental health,
and chemical dependency services, or oral health care
Core components and presence of organizations required to
establish an integrated and coordinated delivery system
Involvement with local governments in governance and delivery
of services

The final set of CCOs was selected in an effort to generalize to other CCOs, and
potentially to other community-based or governance organizations, such as Accountable
Care Organizations (ACO), working towards care integration and coordination for a
defined population. Further research would be required to achieve any generalization of
findings beyond CCOs.
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Instrumentation
A list of thematic questions informed by the literature was used to construct a
semi-structured interview protocol. This allowed the researcher to pursue lines of
questioning with the respondents, clarify answers, and capture additional information that
emerged during the interview process. The interview protocol was designed to elicit
discussion and information about participants’ experience in governance of CCOs.
Topical areas were selected and questions were developed to guide the researcher and the
participants in building answers to the research questions. The final list of topical
questions was designed to focus discussion on governance and decision-making, and to
serve as a checklist for the researcher to ensure coverage of the topics of interest. A
potential list of topical areas and related questions covered during the interviews are
provided in (see IRB Application, Appendix A).
In October 2012, the research study received approval (#122343) by the Portland
State University Human Subjects Research Review Committee (HSRRC), also referred to
as the Institutional Review Board (IRB) (see Appendix A). This study fell in the exempt
review category as the study did not present risk to study participants, anonymity was
safeguarded through the data collection and analysis phases of the study, and
confidentiality of all study participants and any responses provided during the interview
process has been kept private and not revealed to anyone except the researcher. All study
participants were adults and therefore not considered vulnerable subjects and were able to
provide informed consent.
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Research Approach and Assumptions
Qualitative research is many things to many people. (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p.
8)
The multi-case research study was adopted to explore CCOs to understand the
process and conditions in which participation and decision-making among stakeholders is
facilitated or impeded through a collaborative governance model. The goal is to replicate
findings across cases. Because comparisons are made, the cases were chosen carefully so
the researcher can predict similar or contrasting results based on a theory (Yin, 2003).
Three individual cases were selected to establish a clear and definitive pathway to
recommend future research on CCOs in Oregon. The selection of multiple sites is more
likely to provide conclusions for future in-depth analyses to build a body of empirical
knowledge about collaborative governance in the context of transforming regional health
delivery systems. A small sampling of multiple sites enabled the researcher to compare
common themes across variables such as organization size, type of services delivered,
and the organization’s financial status. At the same time, the researcher was able to
compare themes within organizations that are not completely heterogeneous but are
similar in regard to governance structure and approaches to collaborative governance.
This approach may increase the scholarly value of the study (Creswell, 2009).
A multiple or collective case study allows the researcher to analyze within each
setting and across CCO settings. Yin (2003) describes that using multiple case studies
either “(a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results
but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication)” (p. 47). In addition to identifying
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the “case” and the specific “type” of case study to be conducted, researchers must
consider whether it is more prudent to conduct a single case study or if a better
understanding of the phenomenon will be gained through a multiple case study.
Data Collection
Data for this study were collected using two techniques: semi-structured in-depth
interviews and qualitative document analysis (McNabb, 2002). Semi-structured
interviews were conducted with board members of CCOs, members of the CCO
Community Advisory Committees, and policy experts and administrators from Oregon’s
executive branches. Interviews were conducted to understand CCO board members’
perceptions about the role and influence of the early formation process, including the
perceived roles for stakeholders and their power to collaborate in the community and
within their delivery system. Qualitative document analysis (QDA) was employed to
corroborate findings. QDA was completed on key documents, including operational
documents and state-mandated transformation plans from each CCO. These documents
were chosen to better understand the structure, function, and intermediate outcomes for
stakeholders within each CCO and to what extent, if any, organizational composition
influenced a CCO’s ability to engage in decision-making. The following section
describes the methods employed in semi-structured in-depth interviewing and qualitative
document analysis.
Semi-structured in-depth interviews. Semi-structured in-depth interviews show
how the subject frames their understanding of an experience (Kvale & Brinkman, 2009,
p. 124). Marshall and Rossman (2006) further define the semi-structured interview as
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“much more like conversations than formal, structured interviews. The researcher
explores several general topics to help uncover the participant’s perspective, but
otherwise respects how the participant frames and structures the responses” (p. 82). Semistructured in-depth interviews are guided by a predetermined theme and questions. One
of the advantages in deploying this data collection tool is the flexible order or form of
questions, which can help encourage respondents to reveal deeper insight into their
experiences (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).
All interviews were conducted with an interview protocol that contained questions
constructed according to the theoretical framework. Interview questions primarily
focused on gathering respondents’ perspectives about the early development and
implementation of their CCOs in order to learn about the governance structure, identify
existing factors including board members’ perceived influence on setting priorities for the
CCO, and articulate factors that facilitated or impeded achievement of the organization’s
goals. In general, the protocol was used to understand respondents’ perceived utility of
collaborative governance as the “adopted governance” mechanism for solving problems
for those served by Medicaid in their community (see Appendix A for the IRB
application, including the two interview guides).
Questions were designed to explore themes emerging from in-depth interviews
with CCO board members and staff, learn about the history of the CCO, assess the early
starting conditions, determine governance structure, and understand overall perceptions
of collaborative governance and its potential to support CCOs. The intent with this line of
questioning was to determine if board members could conceptualize a need for
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collaborative governance, if they had identified barriers to collaborative governance, and
if they had identified strategies to overcome those barriers. The interviews for this study
were conducted in two phases: The first phase consisted of six exploratory interviews
with state officials, and the second phase consisted of 22 in-depth interviews with CCO
board members and executive staff.
Interviews are recognized as the most suitable approach when seeking rich data
illuminating individuals’ experiences and attitudes, and they can provide insight
unavailable to researchers working with large survey samples (Singleton & Straights,
2005). On the other hand, interviews are very time-consuming to conduct and analyze.
The questions for both interviews were based on constructs from the literature, previously
presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 (see Table 3.4 for more detail). The questions were asked
in a non-directive manner (to the extent possible) to meet the study’s principal aim of
learning about the interviewees’ perceptions.
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Table 3.4: Interview Protocol: Conceptual Collaborative Governance Framework
Concepts

Protocol Question

Starting
Conditions;
Facilitative
Leadership

1. I would like you to think back to the events that led up to the creation of the
[insert CCO name]. Please describe the key events that occurred,
identifying what occurred, who were the key players, and when these
events occurred. Also, were there any organizations excluded from
participating or any that opted out? If so, why? Please try to do this in
chronological order, but we can skip around if necessary.

Control;
Structure;
Composition;
Institutional
Design

2. Please describe the existing partnership, organizational structure, and prior
relationship among the key players within [insert CCO name]. For
example, does your CCO have a formal agreement between partner
organizations or any guidelines or rules that govern activities, including
how decisions are made by the CCO board?

Functioning;
Collaborative
Process

3. How does your organization set priorities and problem-solve through its
existing governance structure? For example, does your CCO use standard
operational procedures such as formal rules, policies, and committees, or
do you have an open, transparent, and inclusive process?

Functioning;
Collaborative
Process

4. What arrangements do you think work well in your CCO’s decisionmaking process? For example, is there mutual recognition of
interdependence within your community, a shared purpose, common
problem definition, or shared mission and set of values? Alternatively,
what arrangements do you think have not been helpful for your
organization to date?

Composition;
Functioning;
Collaborative
Process

5. Have there been any events or incidents that have created barriers or
challenges to decision-making or establishing an effective governance
structure? What arrangements would you suggest as helpful to improve the
governance structure or decision-making processes of your CCO?

Interview process. The researcher asked participants structured open-ended
questions. This open-ended interview technique provided the flexibility required for
study participants to provide rich and extensive information in response to interview
questions (Yin, 2003). The main research questions were addressed in these questions.
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Each participant was informed of the nature of the study, the voluntary status of
participation in the study, and that results of the study will be shared with the study
participants prior to publishing results. The study participants were informed of the
confidential nature of the study, including that no names would be used. The study
participants’ names were coded using a special organization identifier: a two-digit
identifier for each participant. The final selection of case study participants was
contingent upon their agreement to participate via an email, which also served as
informed consent. Prior to conducting each interview, the participants were again notified
about their rights and confidentiality.
The majority of study participants were interviewed at their parent or host
organizations for their convenience. Three CCO participants were interviewed via the
phone. Digital audio recordings were utilized to support the accuracy of transcription.
Data collection began in August 2013 and concluded in February 2014, lasting
approximately 180 days. Interviews were transcribed usually within 2-3 days of
completing the interview. Text from the transcribed interviews was entered into
Microsoft Office software, and word count applications were used for initial tabulation
and theme construction. All recordings and data were accessible only by the researcher,
and were stored on a password, protected computer.
Data Analysis Overview
The central task of the data analysis of the interviews was to elaborate and flesh
out the interworking of collaborative governance as a model for effective integration of
regional health systems in Oregon as identified in the research propositions. The majority
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of this analysis occurred through the coding process as empirical instances of
collaboration are put into the conceptual “boxes” of the primary codes, with concepts
defined to support these codes. Beyond categorizing, the researcher used empirical
examples to illuminate essential aspects of the primary codes. For instance, an in-depth
analysis of key facets of the model for collaborative governance could reveal that starting
conditions, including prior history among organizations within a CCO, may influence the
functions and ability of the new organization. This empirical work is combined with
conceptual development through review, recoding, and consultation with the literature.
The process adopted for analysis and interpretation follows the case study
approach. According to Creswell (2009), there are six steps: (1) create and organize the
data; (2) read through text, make notes, and form initial codes; (3) describe the case and
context; (4) use categorical aggregation to establish themes or patterns; (5) use direct
interpretation and develop naturalistic generalizations; and (6) offer an in-depth depiction
of the case(s) (pp. 156-157). Drawing upon the existing literature and theoretical concepts
identified in Chapter 2, the researcher initially developed a list of codes based on the key
constructs previously developed for both “governance structure” and “collaborative
governance” (see Table 3.5).
For each category or concept in the model, the researcher developed a list of
“prefigured” codes using an a priori method, again by drawing upon the theoretical
literature (Creswell, 2009, p. 151). For the governance structure, four categories or
concepts were operationalized, with each category assigned a set of codes. Similarly, for
the model of collaborative governance, five concepts or constructs were operationalized,
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again with each category assigned a set of codes. The fifth concept, outcomes, was not
coded as it was beyond the parameters of the present study.
The second data analysis task was to describe the external environment and
context(s) in which CCOs were formed. Examining which secondary codes concur with
the primary codes provided information regarding when, where, and how collaboration
was most likely to occur for each CCO. These relationships were explored using
qualitative analysis software. This type of analysis, for instance, showed whether “history
of conflict” happened most often through voluntary, independent coordination or via a
coordinating organization. From these data, the researcher could make predictions (which
would require further testing) regarding which kind of forum was most conducive to
achieving “effective” collaborative governance.
Data analysis procedures. An Excel spreadsheet was used to track the
documentation from the researcher’s face-to-face interviews and journaling as well as
other case study documents (Yin, 2003). The researcher’s journaling provided another
method of consistency for examining process and logic throughout the study (Creswell,
2009). This was particularly important due to the lack of availability of board meeting
minutes and other CCO-specific documents for review.
The interviews were transcribed using Microsoft Word, then, the document was
assigned a case ID. The individual transcripts were organized by CCO with the exception
of the transcripts from the six interviews with state officials, which were organized into a
single file. After each transcription was completed, the contents were reviewed. Upon
completion of the interview process, all transcripts were reformatted with a two-inch
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margin on the right hand side of the document. The printed transcripts of each individual
case were then carefully reviewed several times. The first review helped the researcher to
identify major organizing ideas (Creswell, 2009, p. 151). During subsequent reviews, the
researcher noted key words, concepts, codes, and quotes in the margins of the transcripts.
The manual process served as a valuable process for developing a richer and more indepth understanding of the individual cases.
Coding process. There are multiple approaches to begin coding (Yin, 2003).
According to Yin (2003), it is possible to start coding with themes identified from a
priori ideas such as pre-existing theories. Alternatively, researchers can develop codes
that emerge from the data set as it is reviewed, which is referred to as grounded theory
(Yin, 2003). For this study, the researcher adopted a priori codes that were identified
from the following sources, in order of priority: (1) existing research and theory, (2)
research questions the study addressed, (3) topics that emerged from the interviews, and
(4) topics of interest or ideas that emerged during the data collection process.
A total of 287 pages of interview transcripts were read and coded manually, with
notes and reflections written in the margins of the transcripts. In addition, the researcher
also created and referred to a reflection journal from the face-to-face interviews to
determine if additional themes or key words should be added to the transcripts. The
documents were reviewed for content, key words, and short phrases (for example
“transparency” or “structure”) for each interview transcript, which were then circled and
recorded using NVivo (see next section). For each transcript, approximately 50-70 key
words and phrases were recorded. As the transcriptions were classified and interpreted,
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the codes were sorted into existing and newly created categories based on emerging
themes for unexpected information, including “conceptually interesting,” which often
helped provide additional context for the experiences of the interviewees (Creswell,
2009, p. 153).
According to Saldana (2012), “A code in qualitative inquiry is most often a word
or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, or
evocative attribute to a portion of language-based or visual data” (p. 3). For this study,
the data consisted of interview transcripts. In the first phase of coding, the researcher
coded the interview transcripts looking for single words, full sentences, and passages of
text. In the second phase, the identified words and sentences of passages were then
coded.
The central task with the coding process was to apply “primary codes” to the data,
representing the five concepts of governance that were previously conceptualized. For a
primary code to be applied, the benefit represented by that code (e.g. presence of conflict,
face-to-face dialogue, or inclusiveness) had to be clear from the passage text. The next
step was to classify the data into secondary codes related to the two models: governance
structure and collaborative governance. Each model was constructed with themes or
constructs/concepts from the literature. Each set of interview transcripts by CCO was
reviewed for themes based on previous coding. The next step was to interpret the data or
“make sense of the data” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, as cited in Creswell, 2009). The
researcher opted to transcribe the data to initiate a process of immersion into the data to
identify themes (Creswell, 2009).
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Table 3.5: Primary Codes Applied to the Data
Primary Codes/Themes
Starting Conditions

Institution Design

Facilitative Leadership

Collaborative Process

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Secondary Codes
Power-resource imbalance
Incentives for and constraints on participation
History of conflict or cooperation
Participatory inclusiveness/exclusiveness
Guidelines and rules for participation
Open, transparent, and inclusive process
Facilitation
Engagement
Empowerment
Face-to-face dialogue
Trust building
Commitment to process
Shared understanding
Intermediate outcomes

Prior to coding the two sets of interview transcripts with the help of NVivo (see
next section), a more traditional approach to the analysis of interviews was deployed.
First, the researcher worked through each of the transcripts and used line-by-line coding
to note themes and phenomena in the margins. Keywords and phrases were noted using
differently colored highlighters. This system of confirming an a priori set of primary and
secondary codes, combined with reflection, was maintained for coding all interviews.
During the coding process, the researcher looked for word repetitions and key terms in
context, which entailed identifying phrases and sentences in context.
The Microsoft Word computer software program was used to organize data. As
data analysis progressed, the researcher matched the information being reviewed with
existing codes. At the same time, other codes were added to the template as required. The
codes were then captured in broad themes of structure, function, composition, control,
starting conditions, institutional design, facilitative leadership, and collaborative process.

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS 117
The researcher examined these themes for their response to the central research question,
secondary research questions, propositions and assumptions posed by the researcher, and
the outcome of data analysis as related to the theoretical model presented by the
researcher for the study.
Use of software for data management and analysis. Computer assisted
qualitative data analysis software has become a common tool for the qualitative
researcher. Weitzman (2000) suggests the following benefits of using software in
research projects: writing up, editing, coding, storage, search and retrieval, data linking,
content analysis, data display, and graphic mapping. Weitzman (2000) also recognizes
that qualitative software programs are not able to conduct the analysis process for the
researcher. The utility of the software is to support the research process; ideas and
intellectual efforts need to come from the researcher conducting the analysis.
Still, there are several advantages in using qualitative software programs.
Primarily, coding helps minimize challenging and time-consuming tasks such as printing,
highlighting, and writing marginal notes; cutting and pasting can be automated using
such programs. Another advantage of using computer software is the ability to code
multiple categories, support complex code structures, and construct searchable memos
and annotations. There are also limitations with using qualitative software programs. For
instance, Bringer, Johnston, and Brackenridge (2004) suggest that the ability to conduct
frequency counts disregards the opportunity for contextual analysis presented by the data,
which can unintentionally lead to an inappropriate quantification of the research study.
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Similarly, the ability to easily code and retrieve can result in a fragmentation of the data,
which loses the narrative flow (Bryman & Bell, 2007).
For this study, the processing software Microsoft Word and the qualitative
analysis software NVivo were used to support the analysis and help manage the interview
data. NVivo was utilized to efficiently and significantly facilitate the process of
organizing, rearranging, and managing the considerable amount of data. The interview
transcripts were formatted in Microsoft Word to facilitate importing them into NVivo,
which resulted in the questions being displayed in the content panel in the NVivo
explorer. Hence when selecting a question, it was possible to jump to this section in the
interview transcript. After coding the interviews in NVivo, all passages were assigned a
specific code that could be viewed on the screen and printed. In the same manner,
searches for specific text strings could be conducted across all interviews, and relevant
paragraphs containing the search string could be compared on-screen or printed.
As noted above, a preliminary set of primary codes was established prior to
analysis, based on the theoretical framework, the research aim and research questions,
and the key concepts drawn from the literature. These informed the initial structure of the
NVivo 10 “project,” as they did for the interview themes. The qualitative software tool
aided the researcher in storing the data in categories (nodes, as they are named in NVivo
10) and in developing themes. It also allowed the researcher to “lay out” the data to
visualize potential patterns as they emerged.
Throughout the study, written materials retrieved online were accessed and stored
as PDFs. Each of the CCO’s transformation plans, including additional background
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documentation from public committees, hearings, and internal documents, were reviewed
to provide clarification or augment key findings from the interviews. The primary
documents reviewed for the study were individual CCO transformation plans submitted
and approved by the Oregon Health Authority in 2012.13
Revised Case Study Selection Process
Based on the pre-constructed selection criteria and information shared by the
initial set of interview participants, four CCOs were initially selected for the study. These
four organizations provided diversity across organizational size and structure, geographic
coverage area, prior organizational history and starting conditions, and number of
partnering organizations within a CCO. The four CCOs initially selected prior to
conducting any data collection were Health Share of Oregon, PacificSource Community
Solutions (central Oregon), Umpqua Health Alliance, and Willamette Valley Community
Health. See Appendix B for the selection criteria matrix that was developed in September
2012 and used to select the initial set of cases for inclusion in the study.
After completing the first round of interviews with state officials, one of the
originally selected CCOs, Umpqua Health Alliance, was removed from the list and
replaced by Yamhill CCO. Furthermore, after completing more than 12 interviews among
individuals from three of the CCOs, the researcher decided to drop PacificSource
Community Solutions due to two factors: (1) limited time and resources available after
more than six months of conducting interviews as well as the unanticipated time and
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http://www.oregon.gov/oha/OHPB/Pages/health-reform/certification/Oregon-CCO-TransformationPlans.aspx
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effort to schedule interviews with executives from health plans, hospitals, and managed
care organizations, among other senior level staff from CCOs; and (2) determination that
there was sufficient information from the three CCOs to address the central research
question after reviewing the transcripts as the interviews were transcribed. At that point
the researcher verified that conducting another 6-8 interviews with representatives of the
three remaining CCOs would suffice to ensure a final set of 22 interviews were
conducted. The final three cases were Health Share, Willamette Valley Community
Health, and Yamhill County CCOs. The identity of the individual board members and
staff from the three CCOs has been blinded throughout the presentation of findings and
discussion in order to ensure confidentiality of the study participants.
The individual CCOs and interview participants were assigned alphanumeric
codes to maintain the confidentiality of the sites and individuals interviewed. The various
quotes highlighted in the chapter four have been labeled by a citation, including an
alphanumeric code to assure equal representation from different sites and interview
participants, indicating if the quote came from a state official or board member. Table 3.6
provides the distribution of board members and staff interviewed for each case. The
initial set of interviews with state officials was labeled as Case ID 1. In total 28
individuals were interviewed with 22 participants from the three selected CCOs.
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Table 3.6: Categories of Interviewees
Case ID
1-6

State
Officials
6

Board
Members
-

Senior
Staff
-

Total Number
of Interviews
6

7-15

-

5

4

9

16-21

-

4

2

6

22-28

-

5

2

7

Total

6

14

8

28

Conclusion
The research study design and proposed methodology provided an opportunity to
explore governance structure and the collective governance process among CCOs in
Oregon. Methods were selected to sufficiently collect relevant information that would
address the principal research question: “What are the key factors of collaborative
governance that facilitate or impede the ability of CCOs to implement health care
reform?” The study sought to also address “to what extent, and in what way, does
governance enhance system integration and effectiveness” due to different arrangements
of governance across CCOs as well as learn from experiences of CCO board members
with respect to governing a CCO. The objectives of the study were to (1) describe the
governance structure or arrangements in CCOs, (2) describe the collaborative decisionmaking governance process with respect to CCOs, and (3) draw upon the theory of
collaborative governance to inform models of governance among CCOs and other models
of community-based health reform such as Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs).
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This chapter provided an overview and justification for the research design; a
review of the guiding research questions; and description of study population and
selection criteria, working definitions, key concepts, and conceptual variables, methods
for data collection and analysis, and conclusion. By adopting a case study approach,
different forms of collaborative governance models among Oregon’s coordinated care
organizations (CCOs) were simultaneously studied, which helped to develop a better
understanding of this contemporary governance phenomenon (McNabb, 2002, p. 287).
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Chapter 4: Presentation and Analysis of Findings
The governance is more than just the Board. (ID 4)
The purpose of this study was to explore CCOs and understand the processes and
conditions in which a collaborative governance model facilitates or impedes decisionmaking among stakeholders. A secondary purpose of this study was to examine CCO
board members’ perceptions of the relevance of collaborative governance to the overall
interests of their communities and to the long-term viability of these nascent
organizations in Oregon. Obtaining perceptions from CCO board members helped
identify mutual goals and objectives, which can be realized through collaborative
governance as a realistic model to form new partnerships among for-profit, nonprofit, and
public organizations to integrate new models of community-based health services.
Collaborative governance is emerging in the United States in response to changes
in public policy, the need for efficient use of both public and private resources, and the
need for consensus-based decision-making among stakeholders in nongovernmental and
governmental organizations (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Identifying barriers to engagement in
collaborative governance and external environmental factors that are conducive to
collaborative governance may contribute to the better use of collaborative governance
structures—in this study, the reform of Oregon’s Medicaid system through collaborative
governance at a regional level by coordinated care organization (CCOs). However, there
is a knowledge gap about newly formed CCO governing models and board members’
perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of collaborative governance as a tool for
building organizational capacity and increasing public value.
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The research question. The central research question guiding this study was the
following: “What are the key factors of collaborative governance that facilitate or impede
the ability of CCOs to implement health care reform?” The challenge is determining
which governance structure(s) and processes are more effective in integrating
components of a health system that has historically been fragmented and disorganized.
The discussion of findings in this chapter is organized into three sections. The
first section highlights findings from initial interviews with state officials about key
external factors that affected early CCO formation and implementation across the 16
CCOs in Oregon, focusing on initial conditions and prior history within the CCOs
selected for study. The second section provides an in-depth description of the governance
structure from each individual case studied here. The third and final section presents
findings related to the conceptual model of collaborative governance as demonstrated in
this chapter by individual cases. The chapter concludes with the identification of the
principal differences among the CCOs regarding what constitutes collaborative
governance.
Findings
The whole basis of a CCO has been about local governance. The whole notion of
CCOs is based on the notion that all health care is local. (ID 3)
The findings inform the research question addressing whether collaborative
governance serves as a promising model for supporting health care reform in Oregon.
The findings also indicate which facets of collaborative governance are important to
successfully govern these new locally controlled organizations. As observed by Merriam
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(1988), “There is no standard format for reporting case study research” (p. 193). This
section provides an in-depth description of each individual case based on information
collected during the interviews as well as review of secondary data. Next, the cross-case
comparison, including similarities and differences, is presented to illustrate key findings
related to the question of whether collaborative governance is an effective model to
support health reform for Oregon’s Medicaid program.
The tables on the following pages provide summaries of the cases and concepts to
visualize and assess the results of the individual cases. The details of each CCO case
study are presented, including sub-sections for each individual collaborative governance
concept. Three cases were used to view events through the lens of the conceptual model
and primary variables: starting conditions, institutional design, facilitative leadership, and
collaborative process. Each section (where appropriate) is organized to address the four
key constructs in that order. Before providing an in-depth description of each case and
relevant findings, the findings from the interviews with state officials are summarized
below and offer important historical context and policy perspective to understand the
formation of CCOs, including key legislation.
State officials.
Across Oregon, unprecedented collaboration. – Tina Edlund, Deputy Director,
OHA14
Historical context. The first set of interviewees were key informants employed by
the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) and the Governor’s Office, as well as senior OHA
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http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/outreach/oregon-rural-health/about/rural-health-conference/upload/Thu-TinaEdlund.pdf
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leadership and policy advisors. The purpose of this initial set of interviews was to gather
insights and background information from key public officials who led Oregon’s effort to
establish CCOs through passage of legislation in 2011 and 2012. The intent was to seek
guidance and/or verification from those most familiar with the relatively new CCOs in
order to assist in the selection of relevant and robust cases for this dissertation research.
The first wave of interviews informed the CCO selection process, given the indepth knowledge of these individuals. The state officials interviewed were uniquely
positioned, and they offered historical local context and unpublished information about
key environmental factors that affected early CCO formation and implementation efforts
across the 16 CCOs in Oregon, particularly regarding initial starting conditions and prior
organizational history. Through the interviews, the researcher invited state officials to
reflect on historical and environmental factors unique to individual CCOs and verify the
presence of facilitative leadership among the CCOs selected for the study. Interestingly,
five of the six participants recommended at least one alternative CCO to the list of four
CCOs initially selected by the researcher (using the selection criteria created based on the
available literature), offering a compelling rationale for inclusion.
One unique aspect and important observation shared by several of the state
officials is that CCOs are “local.” They are governed locally and controlled by
community organizations. All 16 new organizations were formed under guidelines for
coordinated care organizations established by the Oregon Legislature in 2011, when it
enacted House Bill 3650, which established the initial framework for the creation of
coordinated care organizations (CCOs) with the State of Oregon through the Oregon
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Health Authority. Section 26 of HB 3650 specified that CCOs are responsible and will be
held accountable for “providing fully integrated physical health services, chemical
dependency and mental health services, and dental health services” (with services phased
in over a two year period). In 2012, the Oregon Legislature passed Senate Bills 1509 and
1580, which provided legislative approval of OHA’s proposals for CCOs and made
modifications to the provisions in HB 3560.
The legislation essentially specified the basic governance framework for creating
CCOs before being certified by the Oregon Health Authority. Furthermore, each CCO is
statutorily required to establish a community advisory council. The majority of members
must be consumers (i.e. OHP members), including representatives from each county
government in the service area(s) with the explicit responsibility of conducting the
community health assessment (CHA) and corresponding community health improvement
plan (CHIP). Each CCO was required to meet the specifications listed above. The extent
to which the final composition of partners that were organized to form a CCO was
inclusive or exclusive varies from region to region. Some of the variation in types of
governing boards and participating organizations can be attributed to the starting
conditions in each community where CCOs were formed.
Starting conditions.
We understood that governance was going to be really key. (ID 3)
The initial set of questions posed to the state officials inquired about the historical
and environmental factors unique to the creation of CCOs in Oregon. A number of
valuable insights emerged. Several of the most salient insights related to the early
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formation of Oregon’s CCOs as well as perspectives on different emerging governance
models. By and large, the majority of respondents stated that the three selected CCOs
offered “very different perspectives” on how various communities in Oregon are
approaching the question of governance. There are multiple perspectives on “shared
governance” models among Oregon’s 16 certified CCOs. The differences were attributed
to distinct historical conditions, dissimilar cultures, and varying approaches in
establishing a CCO, with all CCOs having unique and different starting conditions.
An important historical aspect to the creation of CCOs in Oregon dates back
several decades and was emphasized by some of the state officials. Approximately 20
years ago, a number of large regional health plans served individuals in the Oregon
Health Plan (OHP). However, these larger managed care entities abruptly exited Oregon
and stopped serving the state’s Medicaid market. As a result of a number of commercial
health plans exiting the market, smaller local community-based organizations
“spontaneously” opted to enter the Medicaid market. A number of these organizations,
including hospitals and local providers (frequently IPAs), became the prevailing “home
grown” health plans that evolved over time to serve the vast majority of OHP members in
Oregon. The notion of local control and autonomy among communities that formed
CCOs has roots that stem back to these historic events in Oregon’s Medicaid history.
A coordinated care model requires relationships with the local mental health
authority, the local public health authority, area hospitals, and providers. It also requires
social support and services from a traditional human services realm, which are often not
connected in a traditional medical model. There was “intentionality” in designing
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legislation that specified the governance framework but was flexible enough to recognize
that local area needs will vary. Oregon’s policymakers were concerned with specifying
the composition of partners and creating a flexible structure in which work could be
adapted to meet the needs of individual communities.
In order to be a successful coordinated care model you have to move away from a
purely medical model and move into a social model…. There was a very explicit
conversation about putting in those requirements to force some of the
partnerships. (ID 4)
Another important historical event was the state’s 2011 fiscal crisis during that
legislative session. Oregon’s Medicaid program had already experienced considerable
cuts in terms of provider reimbursements, and it was likely to experience another 10-15%
cut across the board. A majority of organizations that served or participated in Oregon’s
Medicaid community at that time recognized that financing Medicaid services was
increasing at an unsustainable rate in the state. Consequently, a “sense of urgency”
emerged and served as a catalyst to encourage organizations within and across Oregon’s
rural and urban communities to consider addressing the unsustainable growth of health
care costs with a novel approach: the creation of CCOs. As stated by one official,
“Everyone recognized that we can’t keep going down the same old path” (ID 4). The
perception among health care leaders and organizations in Oregon that served Medicaid
was the following: “At a community level it was change, or be changed” (ID 3).
The concept of “incentives to participate” was often identified as an important
starting condition, specifically the legislative role in creating governance conditions that
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required community organizations to learn how to “partner” to meet the requirements for
CCO certification. The legislation was viewed as creating the “incentives” or “necessary
conditions” for organizations to partner and work together under the auspices of
becoming a CCO. In other words, the state created the conditions or “incentives to
participate” in communities across Oregon. The legislation also created financial
incentives. Through a CCO, partnering organizations could receive additional funds. As
stated by one official, “What the composition looked like was a balance between the
people with the money and the people who care about the community…. The statute
(HB) was trying to balance that” (ID 5).
The theme of local control emerged throughout the interviews. A fundamental
premise of CCO governance is fostering local community health governance by key
stakeholders. As described in the interview process, Oregon’s CCO legislation was
designed to “push authority” down from the state and into the local communities. One
state official described it this way: “We don’t need to be making all the decisions in
Salem,” (ID 1) regarding the creation of new models of coordinated care or legislating
“overly prescribed” models of governance. Another state official stated, “The other
beauty of how the legislation was constructed was everything was about pushing
authority down and into the local communities” (ID 4). It was crucial to create a
governing framework that would allow for “local control” among community partners.
Part of the notion of “local control” was for newly formed organizations to have
community input, which resulted in the legislative mandate for community advisory
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councils as part of the governance structure and to serve as an accountability mechanism
by influencing resource allocation decisions.
From a state perspective, what was in the legislation was very broad and as least
prescriptive as possible…so that communities really have the flexibility to figure
out. (ID 1)
Each community’s history was likely to influence the pace at which each
individual CCO would have a working or “functioning” board. The history of
“cooperation” or “conflict” among multiple organizations that historically have been
competitors, but recently agreed to “share responsibility,” likely influenced the level of
trust for any one CCO governing board. For one of the CCOs, key partners that formed
the organization had a “long history of working together,” bringing together partners on
specific projects. In contrast, another CCO was described as having a history of conflict,
which influenced its overall structure. The result was that a dominant local IPA took the
lead in establishing the CCO board. Oregon’s history of managed care at the local level
was important as an initial starting condition of CCOs.
The most important element is where there has been historical tension, frankly.
The beauty of requiring certain kinds of partnerships in the legislation is it has
forced this; it forces partnership. (ID 4)
The legislative intent of creating community advisory councils (CACs) was to
provide the community with leverage by assigning responsibility for conducting the
community health assessment and creating the health improvement plans. The CCOs are
required to address the community health improvement plans. State officials described
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the CACs as an important and distinct feature of a “shared” model of community
governance. State officials perceive the CACs as a critical component of the proposed
governance model and should be understood as a key “nexus” for input into any
governance framework. In the first one to two years of CCO formation, state officials
considered whether consumers were involved in the governance decision-making process
in a meaningful way as intended by the enabling legislation, which is still largely
unknown. The interviewees described CACs as an “essential” aspect of the governance
framework and that they should be considered a key component of any CCO governance
model.
CACs are valuable to the overall governance…. Their value is giving, allowing a
consumer voice, a person with low income to express their news, their worldview
to a health care delivery system that has not traditionally heard that voice. (ID 5)
CCO governance: Emerging model.
Collaborative governance, it does vary by every community. You are going to
have different players and stakeholders that want to have a part in that governing
process. (ID 1)
Based on the state officials’ perspectives, several important factors of
collaborative governance within a CCO were identified. First, a CCO governing board
should engage their community advisory council (CAC) in an “open and transparent”
manner. A number of CCO board members have spent their professional careers in the
private sector, which has a different culture than public sector organizations. Therefore,
the notions of “transparency” and public accountability are relatively new concepts. This
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may present an issue for senior executives from partnering organizations in the private
sector. Also, having “broad representation” of communities served by a CCO is an
important aspect to collaborative governance.
What is interesting…is how they [CCOs] drove conversations within the
communities themselves and how they kind of adjusted and adapted to pull in
particular community members and built on that to create this governance
structure…. It speaks to some of the reasons why we are seeing some of the early
successes. (ID 5)
Another theme is the notion of CCOs accepting responsibility at a population
level for community health. The concept is “responsibility” for the Triple Aim, the
framework to which these newly formed organizations will be held accountable. CCOs
will need to show evidence of effective governance through clarity of vision,
identification of their community’s needs and understanding of their population,
expectations for the board, the ability to develop new capabilities and capacities, and
management of their resources (i.e. within a global budget).
The big issue…is governance. When asked how are CCOs different than managed
care there are two key pieces: one is governance and the other is managing
outcomes—accountability. (ID 3)
Another important finding pertains to the importance of leadership and its role in
CCOs. Effective leadership is the means to build trust among CCO governing boards.
State officials also perceive leadership as engaging the community and a broad set of
stakeholders. Leadership among the governing board will require such individuals to
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build relationships with communities and create feedback loops. As one official stated,
“Building of trust…really engenders how to move the organization forward” (ID 2). The
concept of goal setting was a recurring theme. Officials described the need for senior or
executive leaders serving on the governing boards to ensure CCOs are able to effectively
prioritize and set goals for the board. This includes being able to effectively set and
achieve benchmarks, milestones, and targets put forth in the transformation plans
submitted by the individual CCOs. A third theme emerged related to the governing
process. Effective governing in a collaborative model requires decision-making with an
agreed-upon framework and with equal decision-making authority. One official stated,
“Within the community, the CCO definitely needs a powerful leadership, a charismatic
leader with a vision that can help facilitate and bring together the distinct groups” (ID 5).
The last theme that emerged was the leadership of Governor Kitzhaber. Officials
repeatedly referred to the governor’s “visionary” leadership and “hands on” approach
throughout the legislative process and early formation of the new organizations. Through
facilitative leadership, the governor was able to convince organizations of the need to
partner and create new models for the state’s Medicaid system.
Summary of findings. From a state perspective, key precipitating factors that
helped to foster support for the CCO legislation were the looming budget crisis of the
“Great Recession,” recognition and acknowledgement of unsustainable growth in health
care, a general “sense of urgency,” particularly the impact of Medicaid expenditures on
Oregon’s biannual budget, and an opportunity to achieve broad health reform in Oregon.
These factors contributed to bipartisan support, along with Governor Kitzhaber’s

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS 135
leadership, creating an unprecedented effort to transform Oregon’s health care system,
starting with the Oregon Health Plan.
Based on information shared by the state officials, it was evident that the initial
starting conditions, primarily the history of conflict or cooperation, serve as significant
factors in influencing the initial “success” in terms of establishing new partnerships in the
early formation of CCOs. From a state policy standpoint, the intent of the CCO
legislation was to develop a model by which to reform the state’s Medicaid program
through localized control and by fostering accountability among communities across
Oregon. The notion of collaborative governance as the preferred model was adopted, as it
allows for “local control” among community partners, which resonates with Oregon’s
culture of public participation and preference for local flexibility. Furthermore, state
officials perceived the level of consumer involvement in the CCO governance decisionmaking process, specifically through the CACs, as an unanswered but pivotal issue as it
relates to local accountability. The question is whether consumer input through the CCO
governance structure occurs as intended by the enabling legislation. Two other emerging
themes were responsibility by the CCOs for their community’s health and the importance
of leadership across all 16 CCOs.
In sum, it is clear that initial starting conditions and prior organizational history
affected early CCO formation with leadership as a considerable factor in the successful
implementation in the majority of the still nascent newly formed CCOs. Based on the
information shared by five of the six state officials and recommendations to include at
least one alternative case from the initial list of CCOs selected by the researcher, one
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CCO was removed from the inclusion list, Umpqua Health Alliance, and a new CCO was
added, Yamhill County CCO. State officials considered Umpqua as similar to Willamette
Valley Health Authority in that prior to the creation of CCOs the organizations were
Independent Practice Associations. In contrast, Yamhill County CCO was the only CCO
that did not originate from an IPA, managed care organization, hospital system, or other
previously existing Medicaid health financing or delivery organization.
Findings from the Individual Cases
The next section provides a description of each case presented with findings on
the governance structure and model of collaborative governance. The governance
structure for each case study is based on the definitions adopted in Chapter 3: control,
structure, composition, and functioning (Pointer et al., 1995; see Table 3.1 in previous
chapter). Next, findings related to the conceptual framework for collaborative governance
are described in-depth by individual case study (Ansell & Gash, 2007). The four concepts
of collaborative governance are starting conditions, institution design, facilitative
leadership, and collaborative process. The fifth concept, outcomes, was not included
because the researcher viewed any outcome-related variables as beyond the scope of the
study. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the individual cases.
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Table 4.1: CCO Collaborative Governance Matrix (as of Feb. 2014)15
CCO

Organizational
Size
Service
Area (by
County)

Health
Share

Willamette

Yamhill

Clackamas,
Multnomah,
&
Washington
counties (3)
Marion
County,
parts of Polk
and Yamhill
counties (3)
Yamhill,
parts of
Clackamas,
Washington,
Polk,
Marion, &
Tillamook
counties (6)

Number
of OHP
Members

Facilitative
Leadership
(High,
Medium,
or Low)

Starting
Conditions

Org.
Structure

Composition

Prior Org.
History:
Yes, Some,
No

New/
Existing
Org.

Number of
Partnering
Orgs.
11 private
and public
affiliates

High

188,000

Yes

New:
Public
benefit
corp.

81,000

Some
history:
1 MCO,
MHO, and
DCO16

New: LLC

13 private/
public
affiliates

Low

New:
501(c)3

14 private/
public
affiliates

High

18,000

No

Case One: Health Share
Noah’s ark of health care. (ID 9)
Health Share is the largest CCO in Oregon in terms of organizational size,
complexity, and number of covered lives in the Oregon Health Plan (OHP). The
organization is comprised of public and not-for-profit organizations across the three
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OHA CCO enrollment report, February 2014.
MCO refers to managed care organization; MHO refers to mental health organization; and DCO refers to
dental care organization. In Oregon all three organizations are examples of managed care by physical,
mental, and oral health.
16
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counties that comprise the Portland Metropolitan Area: Multnomah, Clackamas, and
Washington. According to the organization’s transformation plan, their goal is to “create
a regional system of self-regulating and aligned service providers (physical, behavioral,
addictions, oral and social service) who are committed to achieving the same Triple Aim
measureable targets, but provide flexibility to achieve those targets based on creativity
and knowledge of the needs of the members in their community” (Health Share, March
2013, p. 1).
Composition. Health Share consists of 11 “member organizations” listed in
alphabetical order: Adventist Health, CareOregon, Central City Concern, Clackamas
County, Kaiser Permanente, Legacy Health, Multnomah County, Oregon Health &
Science University, Providence Health & Services, Tuality Healthcare, and Washington
County. The size of the board is 20 individuals who are both representative and nonrepresentative (described in the section below titled “Functioning”). The members are
executives from nonprofit hospital systems, local public health agencies, health plans,
and social services organizations. Eleven member organizations are considered
“founding members” that have permanent seats. The remaining nine members are elected
positions that represent partners of Health Share.
The CEOs of the large health plans and area hospital systems serve on the Health
Share Board. These organizations have historically competed for the commercial health
plan market in Oregon. The chair of the CAC also serves as a full member of the board of
directors. The competency of the individual board members is notable in that there are
primarily senior level executives with decades of experience; they are highly trained,
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educated, and skilled in the health care arena. The other members of the board are health
care professionals, primarily clinicians. As one board member explained, “The Board is
very different than what it would have been before CCOs. And that changes the
conversation very much; it changes the dynamics of the business very much” (ID 9). The
dynamic is that having providers, dentists, specialists, and mental health and addictions
providers all serving on a board significantly changes the conversation compared to the
board of a traditional health plan or hospital system.
Structure. The board has chartered advisory councils, including the community
advisory council (CAC), clinical advisory panel (CAP), and a finance committee. The
primary role of the advisory councils is to provide “strategic direction” to the board of
directors. The CAC is comprised of nine Medicaid consumer members and eight
community members, including an appointed representative from each county (Health
Share Transformation Plan, 2013, p. 14). In addition to the standing advisory entities, the
organization also has chartered five workgroups: Chief Medical Officer Workgroup,
Information Technology Workgroup, Care Management Workgroup, Quality Assessment
and Performance Improvement Workgroup, and Cultural Competence Workgroup
(Health Share Transformation Plan, 2013, p. 49). 17
When the CCOs were created, we were charged with making sure that the people
on our board were the people who were taking risk with serving the population,
and that really changed the dynamics. (ID 10)
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http://healthshareoregon.org/members/member-newsletter/
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Control. The organization is governed by the board of directors. The two
chartered advisory councils share decision-making functions and authority with the board
of directors. For Health Share, the issue of control is directly related to the risk-accepting
entities. As shared by a participant, “Governance ultimately comes down to how do you
divide up the money and who gets to decide how you divide up the money” (ID 12). The
board of directors is responsible for making decisions. The board oversees advisory
entities. The board has clear decision-making authority, oversight, and responsibility to
the partnering organizations. Board members are responsible for formulating the mission
and vision of the organization as well as the financial health of the CCO. For the first 12
months after establishing the CCO, the board was very “hands on” and served as
executive staff and sought to manage the day-to-day operations of the new organization.
The multiple organizations that comprise the board control the decision-making
related to the finances of the organization. The board does provide some direct decisionmaking to the advisory councils previously identified.
You can’t take independent organizations and meld them into one; that’s not
going to happen and it’s not in our best interest, and it’s not in the best interest of
the community. However, we will cooperate, and I think we’ve done that. We’ve
got good governance, and I think people are aligned and there’s a strong sense of
trust. (ID 7)
Functioning. Health Share’s functioning is unique as described by the board
members. According to the interviewees, the “founding members” make all the executive
decisions, which create a governance structure and function unique to Health Share’s
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governance arrangement. The founding members are the initial partner organizations,
which are also the “risk-accepting entities” (RAEs). Health Share RAEs are required to
monitor availability and access to health care as well as quality of care measures through
routine reports (Health Share, Transformation Plan, p. 49). The founding members are
able to veto any decision made by the full board of directors that consists of nonrepresentative members, including community-at-large members, the chair of the CAC,
or health care professionals. Non-representative members are selected by a nomination
and selection process, which is overseen by the founding members. When consensus is
not achieved among the founding members, a simple majority is required for decisionmaking.
The size of the Health Share board requires additional resources from a staffing
perspective. A challenge is to make sure that all 20 board members are engaged,
informed, and understand the multiple moving pieces of Health Share in the rapidly
changing environment of health reform. Another issue that stems from the size of the
board is the sheer number of organizations represented. By having the major players of
the metro Portland Medicaid delivery system involved, there is an inherent conflict
within the governing board. Any number of decisions brought to the board likely result in
one or more of a board member’s parent organizations experiencing a negative financial
impact. Board members are required by the bylaws to make decisions solely in the
interest of Health Share and not consider the potential impact on their parent
organizations.
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This complexity presents a challenging governing situation. Members of the
board have responsibilities to Health Share and also fiduciary responsibilities to the
board(s) of their parent organization(s). The CEOs of local hospitals, serving as members
of Health Share, also have governing boards to whom they are accountable. When
serving on Health Share, however, these CEOs are required to represent the needs and
interests of the CCO and set aside any financial or other conflicts between Health Share
and their parent organizations. As one interviewee described, “That with almost every
single conversation they [the board] have, there’s always someone at the table who has a
conflict, which from a governing or board perspective is a really big deal” (ID 11). The
issue of inherent conflict among members of the board and their partner organizations
was repeatedly mentioned among the interviewees.
The CEOs—who are they really responsible to? They’re responsible to their
boards. They’re responsible to their boards for the success of their
organizations…. If something Health Share wants to do is significantly
detrimental to the success of the organization, they’re going to have to think long
and hard about taking that step. (ID 13)
Aspects of the inherent conflict have been lessened as a result of a socialization
process that has occurred among the board. The socialization was described as the
recognition and commitment that “working together is more important than my
principled point on this particular issue” (ID 12).
The board has defined objectives, strategies, and tactics that it has agreed upon.
The role of the CAC in the governing structure in terms of responsibilities to the board
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has evolved over time. A challenge, however, is that the notion of a community advisory
council is new to many of the founding members of Health Share. The board receives
monthly updates from the CAC. As with all three of the CCOs, the role of the CAC was
specified in the CCO enabling legislation. However, Health Share’s CAC continues to
define its exact role in relation to the board. The staff of Health Share has invested
considerable time, resources, and expertise in working to engage and educate members
that serve on the CAC. Members of the board are still somewhat reluctant to receive input
from the CAC while acknowledging that the chair of their CAC is an engaged and wellrespected consumer advocate.
It’s a learning process…. We’ve had to do a lot of skill building to get them
[CAC]…. And then you have the board who gets a little suspect about saying,
“What do you mean, these consumers are going to tell us? Wait a minute.” (ID
12)
Members of the board are skeptical about the role of the CAC and more broadly
with consumers advising a board comprised of highly trained professional executives.
The community advisory council. It’s a unique position for a consumer to be
sitting at the table of a board that has the presidents of all these partner
organizations and CEOs…like a CEO of Providence at this table and then you
have a consumer member that’s on the board. (ID 14)
Collaborative governance.
CCOs were very much initially about forced adaptive change. (ID 12)
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Starting conditions. A critical important starting condition for Health Share was
the presence of collaboration among the local community health leaders in the Portland
Metro region. The health care executives from the region had been actively engaging and
cooperating with one another. For example, Legacy and OHSU played an important role
in establishing CareOregon 20 years prior to the creation of Health Share.
Historically, the large health plans and hospitals were “fierce competitors.” These
competitors, however, agreed to collaborate through Health Share. Larger hospital
systems, health plans, and provider networks, which often are competing for the same
finite resource pool of funding, agreed to set aside their prior history of conflict and
power imbalance(s). Health plans and hospitals are often in conflict over rate settings, as
are health plans and provider networks over reimbursement fees.
The hospital systems absolutely are competitors and to get them all, us and them,
together, and there’s traditionally been tension between delivery systems and
health plans, too, so it’s not just the apples competing with the apples, and the
oranges with the oranges, you know, there was some tension between the payer
and the provider about rates, historically. (ID 9)
Prior to Health Share and dating back to before the creation of the Health
Leadership Council (described below), the Portland Metro region was a contentious
environment among the local area health care organizations with “deep mistrust” of each
other. In 2008, the HLC was formed as “collaborative organization” aimed to identify
potential solutions to address the issues of cost and quality of health care in Oregon.18
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See: http://www.orhealthleadershipcouncil.org/about-us
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The HLC is comprised of large health plans, medical groups, hospitals and health
systems, and state representatives. In 2011, building on the work of the HLC, a subset of
hospitals and health plans in the Portland Metro region created the Tri-County Medicaid
Collaborative. The CEOs of six large health plans and hospitals agreed to convene and
consider how to “create an integrated community delivery system that will achieve better
community health for the Medicaid and high-risk population in the Tri-County
community.”19 The collaborative met weekly for months. The purpose of these meetings
was to explore what a CCO could look like in the region. The result of these meetings
was a commitment in response to Governor Kitzhaber’s challenge to design a “new
paradigm of how we might do business” for Medicaid, which eventually lead to the
creation of a new organization. Six regional hospital systems and five health plans all
participated in the collaborative. Through ongoing and frequent face-to-face meetings,
the principals of these organizations engaged with one another and started to establish
trust.
The next event was a federal grant opportunity through the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI). In the winter of 2011, CareOregon, Providence, and
Kaiser decided to pursue the CMMI challenge grant. During the process of preparing the
grant, the three organizations engaged the three county health departments, OHSU, and a
number of community organizations in an effort to “make the grant a more viable
opportunity” (ID 9). In July 2012, the newly formed organization received the largest
CMMI grant awarded in the first round of funding: $17 million. The partnerships that
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Page 2 (2012): http://www.oregon.gov/oha/OHPB/meetings/2012/2012-0110-tri-county.pdf
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were developed as part of the grant application process served as a springboard for the
creation of Health Share.
In February 2012, the Oregon Health Policy Board issued the state’s CCO
implementation plan. At the time of receipt of the CCMI grant, the state was facing a
budget crisis in which cuts to Medicaid were under consideration. According to one
board member, “Each organization has slightly different motivations; the motivation of
the budget shortfall cannot be underestimated” (ID 9).
The next key date in the creation of Health Share was March 2012 when Dr.
Bruce Goldberg, Director of the OHA, convened the physical health managed care plans
that operated in the Portland Metro Medicaid market, which included primarily members
of the Tri-County Medicaid Collaborative. The executives of the large area health plans
engaged in a series of meetings to explore whether the area benefited by having multiple
health plans in the tri-county region. A consensus was achieved among the executives of
the large health plans that there was an opportunity to integrate the existing fragmented
networks in the region. The Tri-County Medicaid Collaborative hired a consultant to
assess the possible options. Approximately seven to eight months after the initial meeting
with OHA, the consultant submitted a report, which was not well received by the
majority of the stakeholders.
In April of 2012, four of the five Medicaid health plans (MCOs) that were
participating in the Tri-County Medicaid Collaborative agreed to incorporate as Health
Share and submit a letter of intent to the OHA to apply to become a CCO. The fifth
health plan, Family Care, opted not to join and created a separate CCO that also serves
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the Portland Metro area. Health Share is the only example of the 16 CCOs where multiple
health plans engaged and cooperated with one another; this was an unprecedented turn of
events both for the largest city in Oregon as well as for other parts of the state.
With federal health reform and the pending changes in the commercial market,
the participants in Health Share recognized that a significant change was on the
immediate horizon: They would no longer be able to shift costs from Medicaid to the
commercial insurers. The recognition was that the historic cost-shifting model in health
care was no longer sustainable in Oregon. Furthering this was the awareness that an
estimated 200,000 Oregonians would be enrolled in Oregon’s Medicaid program starting
in January 2014. The number of soon-to-be eligible OHP members could not be absorbed
by Oregon’s commercial marketplace through any means of cost-shifting. The member
organizations opted to address the collective resource management issue that was being
faced by the entire Portland Medicaid delivery network. The hospitals and health plans
had made the conclusion that there was “not a future” in Medicaid managed care in
Oregon. There was an incentive to collaborate and form Health Share. The only
exception that was raised during the interviews was the slight tension between
Providence Oregon and Providence corporate headquarters, which is located in Seattle,
Washington. The leaders of Providence Oregon were very collaborative and supportive of
Health Share. The challenge with Providence is that it is one of only two organizations
not solely located in Oregon (Kaiser is the second one). Members of Health Share
perceived tension between the Providence leadership in Oregon and the corporate
headquarters. One board commented that “CCOs were to be regional and the major
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players had a vested stake in seeing that there was a regional solution…that helped to
bring them together” (ID 8).
A third event was the passage of the CCO legislation in 2012.20 The large health
plans in Portland, principally CareOregon, Providence, and Kaiser, recognized that their
organizations would be affected from a business standpoint by this legislation. It
incentivized these organizations to explore financial options that would create savings
and administrative simplifications.
There is evidence of a power imbalance among the founding partners, based on
the interviews conducted. Although all of the founding partners are nonprofit
organizations, not all the organizations operate an insurance plan. In other words, a
hospital system such as Legacy does not own or operate a health plan, as compared to
Providence or Kaiser. The latter two organizations have the ability to better manage risk
than the former. This dynamic creates a power imbalance among the founding members.
Organizations that can manage member premiums, especially from commercial
lines of business that have relatively higher profit margins than premiums for OHP
members, have the ability to spread risk across multiple lines of business. Medicaid
reimbursement from the state historically has been, on average, 30% less than the rates in
the commercial marketplace. For example, OHA provides Health Share with a global
budget for all Medicaid funding. Health Share then allocates these resources to the riskaccepting entities, which then pay for services rendered. If the risk-accepting entity is
also the service provider, such as Providence or Kaiser, there is one less organizational
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Reference to Senate Bill 1580 referred to as the CCO implementation legislation.
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layer involved and thus lower direct costs incurred and potentially more profit. As one
board member pointedly commented, “It is very definitely from a purely financial
perspective a losing proposition for those that don’t have health plans…. This has been
the elephant in the room for the governance of Health Share” (ID 10).
A related issue is the percentage of Medicaid lives served by a hospital or health
plan. The issue within Health Share is which organizations disproportionately care for
higher volumes of Medicaid members in the Metro region. Several of the hospitals and
health systems in Health Share are located in the Metro region and see a higher
percentage of those enrolled in OHP. The challenge in Health Share is “how do you make
this a level playing field for everybody from that perspective” (ID 9). The issue of
inherent greater exposure to risk from seeing a higher portion of Health Share’s covered
lives has yet to be resolved.
Institutional design. The level of participation and the extent to which competing
organizations partnered to form Health Share is a key aspect of the CCO’s institutional
design. Key to Health Share’s design is that all of the participant organizations are
nonprofits. The notion of transparency and openness, however, required cultural change
for several board members, including individuals serving on the CAC. Staff with the new
CCO was intentional in making sure that the CAC meetings were facilitated in an open
and transparent environment. The monthly CAC meetings are open to the public for the
first portion of each meeting. Afterward the council enters into executive session, in
which members of the public are not allowed.
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Facilitative leadership. Facilitative leadership was an important concept in both
creating Health Share and establishing the board, committees, decision-making processes,
bylaws, and governance structure. The engagement of the future leaders of Health Share
dates back to the founding of the Health Leadership Council. Through the HLC,
competitors were able to develop relationships, understand the different aspects of the
industry, learn about the insurance companies’ challenges, and develop a broader
understanding about the challenges in the health care system. The socialization of the
future members of Health Share started with the HLC. A key facet of the socialization
process was developing an understanding that the hospitals and health plans were
“interdependent.”
The CEOs of the member hospitals and health plans are well known leaders
within the health care community. The number of regional leaders is notable. The leaders
were able to engage with one another and through consensus building, adopt a
governance structure that was acceptable to the board.
There are some barriers and some obstacles, but I think well-intentioned people
sitting around the table and trying to do the right thing, and that’s what you have
in Health Share. These are really good, very smart people who are trying to make
this work. (ID 10)
Collaborative process. Starting with the Health Leadership Council in 2008 and
continuing with the Tri-County Medicaid Collaborative in 2011, the historical mistrust
among the area hospital systems, health plans, and provider groups gradually diminished.
One of the causal factors for the erosion of mistrust was the result of transparency among
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the participating organizations, mainly the health plans and hospitals. The creation of
Health Share provided a concerted and intentional opportunity for these organizations to
be transparent about financing and cost of services as well as working towards
developing a budget and making decisions about how to allocate funding across the
partnering organizations. In order to engage in decision-making, the financial figures
needed to be transparent and shared among the entire board. Historically, the financing
and reimbursement models and formulas between hospitals and health plans were
proprietary and closely guarded secrets.
The transformation funds 21 created an opportunity for the board to engage in
priority setting and to facilitate collective decision-making. The Oregon Legislature
allocated $30 million as “Transformation Funds” to support CCOs with investing in an
array of projects through a grant program. The priority-setting also helped the board
develop collective values. One executive staff member commented that, “The
transformation funds have been a really good thing…an opportunity for the boards to
figure out who they are and what they want to be” (ID 7).
The commitment among the executives of the large hospitals and health systems
was key in the collaborative process. These individuals invested many hours. The shared
understanding created through the face-to-face dialogue and enhanced trust among the
board members has been beneficial to the board in its ability to engage in collective
decision-making on behalf of the CCO, in an open and transparent process.
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https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2014R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/34299
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Dialogue improved their understanding of each other’s operations in many ways
beyond just this relations and whether and where they’re coming from. They’re
still competitors but there’s a better appreciation and trust—I mean, you talk to
people face-to-face regularly, you develop trust. (ID 11)
One of the coolest things I’ve seen from a governance perspective is when you
see health plans talking like members and members talking like providers, and
providers talking like health plans, all around the table. (ID 13)
As Oregon’s largest CCO by number of OHP enrollees, Health Share offers a
number of insights about key factors that contribute and impede the ability of these newly
formed organizations to effectively engage in collaborative governance. The founding
members may influence the decision-making process, particularly the allocation of
resources in the coming years. The founding members also serve as the risk-accepting
entities (RAEs), which have direct control over Health Share through executive decisionmaking. This governance arrangement is unique to Health Share. One of the challenges
or impeding factors identified among participants is ensuring that all 20 board members
are well informed and engaged. This challenge is partially the result of the technical
sophistication and expertise required to operate and oversee an organization with this
level of complexity in a rapidly changing and growing organization.
Another potentially impeding factor is the inherent conflict among board
members and their partner organizations. Members of the board are responsible to both
Health Share and the boards of their “home” organizations, which could present a
challenge in terms of dual accountability when the interests of Health Share are in
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conflict with one or more of the partner organizations, especially those of the “founding
members.” In terms of functioning, the board has evolved over the past 12-18 months. It
is no longer as directly involved in the immediate oversight of the operations of Health
Share and has defined the board’s relationship with the various advisory entities.
The starting conditions of Health Share significantly influenced the early
formation of the CCO. The prior history with the Health Leadership Council and the TriCounty Medicaid Collaborative served to help the partners of Health Share develop
relationships, understand different aspects of the health industry, and most notably, do
away with historical mistrust by establishing relationships among the regional leaders in
the Portland Metro area.
Case Two: Willamette Valley Community Health
The Willamette Valley Community Health (WVCH) CCO is located in the Salem
area with the majority of OHP members in Marion and then Polk counties, respectively.
The CCO was formed as a limited liability company (LLC) as it “provides the greatest
degree of flexibility” (unpublished operating agreement, p. 2). Specifically, an LLC
allowed for local governmental entities, nonprofit hospitals, and for-profit organizations
to participate without violating state or federal regulations.
Composition. The organization is comprised of 13 public and private
organizations or “member organizations” and are listed in alphabetical order: ATRIO
Health Plans, Capitol Dental Care, Marion County, Mid-Valley Behavioral Care
Network, WVP Health Authority, Northwest Human Services, Polk County, Salem
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Clinic, P.C., Salem Health/Salem Hospital, Santiam Memorial Hospital, Silverton Health,
West Valley Hospital, and Yakima Valley Farm Workers Clinic.
Another important aspect to composition is the size of the governing board or
“board of directors.” WVCH consists of 19 individuals who are executives from
nonprofit and for-profit hospital systems, local public health agencies, health plans, and
social service based organizations. As with Health Share and in accordance with
legislation, the chair of the CAC also serves as a full member of the WVCH governing
board. The individual board members’ competency consists of primary senior level
executives who are highly trained, educated, and skilled in the financing and delivery of
health care services. Similar to Health Share, WVCH’s clinicians make up the remaining
composition of the board. Members of the board are CEOs and executive directors of
partnering organizations with years of experience providing physical and mental health
services, operating health plans, and managing risk.
Structure. The structure of WVCH consists of a governing board referred to as
the “board of directors.” The board has established two advisory councils and one
committee: the community advisory committee (CAC), clinical advisory panel (CAP),
and the Health IT Committee. The primary role of the CAC is to “ensure that the health
care needs of the consumers and the community are being addressed, provide strategic
direction to the governing body, and to develop recommendations to WVCH.” The CAC
is comprised of 18 members.22 In addition to the standing advisory entities, the
organization has also established three sub-boards: finance, audit, and provider contract
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CAC Roster: http://wvchealth.org/images/pdf/CAC_Roster.pdf
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committees. The structure is somewhat complex, but more importantly, the advisory
panels and sub-boards have undefined responsibilities in relation to the board. Initially,
the CAP was comprised of approximately 20-30 members, a large advisory group that
gradually scaled down to a more manageable number (less than 20 members).
Control. The WVCH is largely controlled by the WVP Health Authority,
formerly the Mid Valley Independent Physician Association (MVIPA), which still
represents over 500 providers, mainly primary and specialty providers but now also four
community hospitals across Marion and Polk counties.23 The WVP Health Authority is
governed by a 15 member board comprised entirely of physicians.24 The WVP Health
Authority is an Independent Physicians Association (IPA) that has contracts with
behavioral health providers, community hospitals, and specialty providers in Marion and
Polk counties. The WVCH board is staffed by the WVP Health Authority with a
centralized model: The board has all decision-making authority. The advisory subgroups
serve as advisory entities to the board but do not have decision-making authority.
Members indicated that the board does not have a change strategy and were unable to act
upon recommendations from either the CAC or CAP.
There are 13 organizations who know how to do this but you need one
organization and I don’t mean pick one of the 13; the 13 have to become one.
Legally they’re one. (ID17)
I know across the state that typically an IPA or a hospital system has been the
dominant character. And in Salem, it’s been a firefight. It’s calming down and
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http://www.wvphealthauthority.org/
http://www.wvphealthauthority.org/board-members
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starting to become more functional, but in the beginning it was like, who’s going
to own this thing? (ID 16).
The CCO has agreements with the local mental health and public health
authorities (LMHA and LPHA) in Marion County.25 One issue that emerged during the
interviews relates to responsibility and accountability by the LMHAs and LPHAs within
the WVCH CCO. Specifically, public officials have stated that the LMHAs and LPHAs
are responsible and accountable, as specified in legislation and statutorily required, to
ensure the overall health and safety of Oregon’s communities.26 A number of respondents
repeatedly referenced the issue of “shared responsibility.” To resolve the issue of “shared
responsibility,” Marion County required WVCH CCO to enter into an agreement that
specified the responsibilities between the local health authority and the WVCH board.
Specifically, the LMHA has the authority to advise WVCH on adult behavioral health,
children’s systems of care, public health, and cross-system coordination for all publicly
funded and mandated community-based services in Marion County.
The agreement also specified that WVCH is responsible for the following
functions: maintaining sufficient funding for mental health services; maintaining existing
levels of support for addiction treatment services for OHP members; ensuring long-term
follow-up care; supporting the use of non-traditional health workers; coordinating with
emergency medical services (EMS) agencies; providing health data to public health
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http://www.co.marion.or.us/NR/rdonlyres/88712ECB-F183-4607-AE38F9543C73733F/45557/2012CCOAgreement1.pdf
26
The Local Mental Health Authority has statutory authority under ORS 430.620 to operate a community
health programs. ORS 431.412 statutory requires that the LPHA provide public health services. ORS
414.153 directs that there be a written agreement between all 16 CCOs and the local health authority in
areas served by the CCO.
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agencies; supporting transparent governance, including information sharing and
performance metrics for WVCH; and evaluating cost-sharing for OHP members.
Based on internal documents, including unpublished meeting minutes shared with
the researcher, after a year into the creation of WVCH, the board was still working to
address the following issues: (1) unclear structure to support the various committees,
including a lack of alignment between the existing committees and the strategic focus of
the board; (2) absence of a permanent executive director after the founding executive
director resigned; (3) lack of clarity among the board roles, responsibilities, and strategic
direction, which were not clearly defined or set; (4) lack of clarity about the
accountability of the board; and (5) minimal interest in community involvement and
public engagement.
In September 2013, the governing board participated in an all-day retreat. The
intent of this “strategic planning” retreat was to provide members with an opportunity to
consider the organization’s mission and purpose, identify and share accomplishments,
assess the quality of the board’s process, including suggestions for improvement, and
share the most significant issues and concerns facing the organization and members. The
board and advisory committees do not coordinate or interact in a structured and wellfacilitated way, to the point of being referred to as “dysfunctional.” Towards the end of
the retreat one of the board members stood up and said (according to one interviewee),
“This is the most dysfunctional group of people I have ever worked with” (ID 18).
That’s part of the challenge right now for WVCH…really discovering its identity
as an organization. (ID 20)
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The main activities of the board have been reviewing metrics, passing budgets
and allocating finances across the partnering organizations, including disbursement of
transformation funds, and voting on contracts. These three activities, all technical in
nature, have been the focus of the majority of board meetings during the initial year of
operation. One of the reasons for this was the 2013 lawsuit involving Salem Health and
WVCH.
We rarely talk about clients and what’s going on, or strategies or things like that.
Initially, we were dominated by the lawsuit, which threw everything back, but
now at last it’s resolved, we’re still…stuck in looking at numbers and that type of
thing. (ID 18)
We have been spending the lion’s share of our time talking about contracts and
budgets. (ID 17)
Functioning. In terms of function, the board of directors has the authority to
manage and conduct WVCH’s operations and budgetary oversight as well as set the
policy and direction of the organization. The WVCH board has two unique characteristics
related to voting rights, executive decision-making, and authority. First, the two counties
represented on the governing board have “veto power,” which is referred to as a “special
vote.” Any decision put forward by the board for a vote can be vetoed if the two counties
do not both support the proposed decision. The second unique characteristic is that the
hospitals have “increased representation.” The four hospitals represented on the board are
allocated two votes each. Any approval of the operating and capital budgets and contracts
requires a “supermajority” or approval by at least 70% of the “owning interests” and at
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least one of the public partners, i.e. the counties. Consequently, the board may take action
on an item with 70% of members in favor but if both of the county represented members
vote no, the issue is considered vetoed by the board.
In fact, there is veto authority on the part of the counties over anything the LLC
does. No county has that kind of influence. (ID 15)
The hospital positions on the board also have weighted authority to influence the
decision-making process, but the remaining “represented” members of the board have
single votes. Represented members are the organizations that provided capital during the
formation of the CCO. The agreement was that each member would have a vote and
contribute an equal share towards the initial capital costs or reserve account required by
law for each CCO. Interestingly (and described in the next section), the board was created
with two county positions, neither of which contributed to the capital reserves.
Collaborative governance.
Starting conditions are just given…. There’s nothing the legislature can do about
that history. (ID 15)
Starting conditions. CCOs are likely influenced by any number of external
environmental factors, beginning with the initial starting conditions that ranged from
political, legal, and economic issues. For the purposes of the study, three main concepts
emerged relative to the primary concept of starting conditions: (1) history of conflict or
cooperation, (2) power-resource imbalance, and (3) incentives and constraints on
participation.
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The starting conditions for WVHC were challenging primarily due to the history
of conflict in the Willamette Valley region. Salem is the second largest metropolitan area
in Oregon and home to the state’s capital. Prior to the passage of the CCO-enabling
legislation, there had been a history of conflict between the local IPA (MVIPA) and the
area hospitals, especially with Salem Hospital. During 2012-2013, state officials were
involved in discussions in Salem about forming a CCO to the point of offering mediation
services between the majority of the founding partners and Salem Health, the local forprofit hospital that operates Salem Hospital and West Valley Hospital in Dallas, Oregon.
Conflict between physicians and hospitals, however, is not unique to Salem or Oregon.
Physicians and hospitals are often in conflict due to competing economic interests
coupled with the historic consolidation of hospitals and physician groups. The historical
strife became a focal point with the creation of WVCH. According to one participant,
there was “a tremendous history of animosity between the leadership of the physician’s
association and the leadership of Salem Hospital” (ID 15).
In Salem, historically, the physician association operated as a fully capitated
health plan through which the area hospitals were reimbursed. Salem Health sued the
newly formed WVCH over the proposed new reimbursement methodology. The lawsuit
lasted approximately seven to eight months during 2012-2013. During this litigation,
state officials introduced House Bill 3309, referred to as the “bad actor” bill, in the
Oregon Legislature. Salem Health did not want to transition to a global budget payment
model for serving covered lives in Medicaid. The change in reimbursement model—from
a fee-for-service method to a global or capitated model—was not acceptable to Salem
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Health. Members of WVCH perceived that without a capitated payment model that
included Salem Health, which owns two of the four regional hospitals, the newly formed
CCO could not structure an accountability mechanism needed to manage the global
budget. Interestingly, Salem Health did not perceive sufficient incentives to participate on
the governing board, which WVCH interpreted as an unwillingness to help reduce and
control costs in two of the four regional hospitals.
State officials became involved by proposing legislation that would allow a twothirds majority from a CCO governing board to remove a member with approval by the
director of the Oregon Health Authority (OHA). If passed, WVCH could continue to
contract with Salem Health for services, but Salem Health would not serve on the
governing board and thus would be unable to participate in the CCO’s decision-making
process. The underlying issue was a power imbalance between WVCH and Salem Health
because two of the four regional hospitals in Marion County were owned and operated by
Salem Health, which had the leverage to request a preferred reimbursement model from
WVCH. Historically, a sizable portion of OHP members received inpatient services from
Salem Health. The economic power imbalance between the CCO and the local hospital
system created a dynamic that resulted in litigation. Salem Health did not perceive an
incentive, financial or otherwise, to participate in the newly formed organization.
However, WVCH was incentivized for Salem Health to join the CCO because two of the
four hospitals in the region are owned and controlled by Salem Health. During the 2013
legislative session, Governor Kitzhaber agreed to sign the bill, if passed. At that time,
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Salem Health agreed to mediation with WVCH. The result was that Salem Health was
given two votes on the WVCH governing board, one for each hospital.
A second area of conflict that emerged in the creation of WVCH was between the
private and public entities that serve on the governing board. The conflict stemmed from
the issues of control, public trust, and accountability. The local county public health and
mental health authorities were concerned about ceding authority and control to a limited
liability corporation. The issue also stemmed from another power imbalance, this time
between the local county authorities and private organizations working to form the CCO.
There’s a lot of regional work going on around the state. There’s a perspective
among the counties that the regionalizing of this is really designed to kind of cut
counties out. (ID 18)
From the local authority’s perspective, the issue was changing the longstanding
and historic relationships between the state and county governments and their
constituents, and forming a new and unfamiliar relationship between a CCO and county
government. At question was whether the counties would continue to receive public
funding for public health, mental health, and social services and continue to be held
responsible for the provision of such services, or contract with a CCO to provide them.
Local county officials expressed concern that over the long run, the existing
infrastructure supported by state and local taxes, which had been developed over decades,
would be gradually dismantled. As one participant commented, “If this whole system
fails and people aren’t served, generally they end up in the public safety system—a much
more expensive system that really isn’t designed to care for them” (ID 17).
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“Responsibility” in county government was an underlying theme for WVCH.
County government was considered accountable to both the local citizens by elected
officials and to the state through existing laws, which mandate that county governments
ensure provision of basic services that span public health, mental health, and social
services, including protecting individuals and families with disabilities. The role and
function of county government was perceived as being under scrutiny.
After a series of meetings in which each partnering organization brought legal
representation, the issue was resolved through a memorandum of understanding between
the two area counties, Marion and Polk, and the WVCH. This arrangement influenced the
collaborative process because the two county officials who served on the governing board
were skeptical of the goals and objectives of the newly formed CCO. They were
concerned about the financial risk and, specifically, funding that was historically
allocated to support public health and mental health services would now be redistributed
to the CCO. If WVCH were to fail, then the existing public infrastructure maintained by
the counties would be placed at risk, taking over the public health and mental health
services if failure occurred by the CCO. The resolution was to finalize an operating
agreement between the two counties and WVCH, in which the two counties were ceded
authority and did not have to serve as a capital partner, a requirement for the other
partnering organizations to participate.
The idea that you can take, for example, the mental health funds and transfer them
to a private provider blending in with general care, then the county still has
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statutory responsibility or health, and the money is over here, how does that
work? (ID 15)
Although this conflict was settled, the outcome was mistrust between the two
counties and members of the board.
County commissioners…were negotiating with a bunch of people that run
hospitals and doctors, and we’re seeing that maybe we’ll get lost in a power
struggle. (ID 18)
It also provided the two counties with authority and influence in the decisionmaking process, which influenced their control over the board’s governing process.
If you have a regional body [CCO] that is quasi-private, partially public, with
multiple counties, there’s no legal governance entity that has authority that is
equivalent to what the state authority is. (ID 18)
Institutional design. Public involvement at the local level included broad
participation among more than a dozen organizations prior to forming WVCH.
Community partners were invited to a number of meetings to participate in the initial
discussions around forming a CCO in the Salem area. These meetings were inclusive and
included the area “power players.” The early planning conversations were initiated to
discuss and develop consensus on the organizational form. The participants in these
planning conversations decided on a limited liability corporation (LLC), which would
allow county commissioners to participate. The form also offered a perceived legitimacy
from the standpoint of creating a new organization in which private and public partners
were “equal partners” on the board.
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Since the CCO was formed and the lawsuit transpired, the board meetings are no
longer open or transparent. As described by a board member, “Transparency: It’s a code
word for Salem Hospital wanting to know some things…” (ID 15).
An interesting theme emerged about board composition and dynamics. The issue
is an inherent tension among board members of the CCO who are the same board
members responsible to their parent organizations’ boards. This dynamic complicates
goal setting and decision-making by the board. The inherent conflict is that decisions and
resource allocations made by the CCO governance board and its members can negatively
impact one or more of the partnering organizations financially, which creates a conflict of
interest for those board members. This dynamic is occurring in an environment without a
significant amount of trust among board members who represent hospitals, counties, and
physician associations.
They still operate independently. The board members, they’re representing the
bottom line of their agency at the same time representing the bottom line to the
CCO. It’s a balance between the collective good versus the…you know, I’m the
CEO of my entity and am responsible to my own board. Board members of the
CCO are responsible for the bottom line of their organization. (ID 20)
It is clear there is an inherent tension and conflict present in the governing board’s
control structure.
Facilitative leadership. The founding chair of WVHC worked with community
partners to find a resolution with Salem Health. Through engagement with both
community partners and senior executives of Salem Health, the founding chair worked to
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mediate the dispute regarding the model for reimbursement. After several face-to-face
meetings with Salem Health staff, the chair and members of the board were not well
received by senior executives of the hospital system. Based on the interviews, the
president of Salem Health declined to participate in a series of discussions that transpired
during the initial formation of the CCO, opting to not engage with the WVCH board or
commit to a resolution process.
After approximately one year, the founding chair of WVCH resigned. The
WVCH board has yet to recruit and hire a new full-time permanent chair, and the lack of
leadership has created a few challenges. One theme was empowerment or lack thereof.
Members of the board are not often provided information in a timely manner. The
knowledge base and expertise among the board was described as lacking, in particular for
those members not well versed in health care operations. In order to have a functioning
board, members require actionable information offered through a facilitated process.
Without a permanent director, and with WVP Health Authority actively leading the board
in terms of agenda setting and managing the advisory board(s), the ability to engage and
empower the board has been absent. For example, the board often does not receive
meeting materials or minutes from the two advisory groups. The acting chair appears to
not value inclusiveness or be open to an extensive process and dialogue during board
meetings. This has limited the board’s ability to explore issues or encourage trust
between non-physician provider organizations and WVP Health Authority.
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The IPA, the hospitals, and health plans, they’re already cutting deals all over the
place for the PEBB agreement…. I know there’s a lot of backroom deals going
on. (ID 16)
The founding chair was viewed as having influential leadership, although no
direct authority. The loss of the first chair of the board, which was tied up with the
lawsuit initiated by Salem Health, created considerable distrust and an environment that
was neither transparent nor open in terms of process and participation by community
members beyond those serving on the governing board. Adding to this conflict was the
relationship of board members and their parent organizations, which are privately held
and operated, working with public agencies that have a culture of “open and transparent”
decision-making processes.
There were a lot of issues by commissions about open meeting laws about what
you share and not, what’s transparent or not—counties run a little differently. (ID
16)
When we get a new executive director, there’s going to be a bit more balance in
terms of the conversation and maybe a bit more conversation and maybe more
around the work of the CCO in terms of its responsibility to reform health care.
(ID 19)
Among the board members are a number of local competitors who have
historically competed against one another in the Salem area. The board has the
responsibility for reviewing contracts, which requires a level of transparency and
openness among board members. Several member organizations expressed concern that
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the level of transparency required to review the contracts would offer a competitive
advantage to those around the table. Furthermore, WVP Health Authority has contracts
with local service providers, similar to the contracts needed by the CCO to operate and
often with the same contracting organizations, which sets up a power imbalance and a
perception of information asymmetry between members of the board and WVP Health
Authority executives. This arrangement has also created distrust among several of the
partner organizations represented on the board, and it raised questions regarding the
boundaries between WVP Health Authority and WVHC.
Collaborative process.
There are still some really deep fundamental things that we just aren’t in
agreement on and don’t get. (ID 17)
With the exception of Salem Health, the founding members of WVCH were
committed to the CCO development process. Over a period of months, numerous
planning meetings served as a forum for county commissions and local area health
leaders to engage in a dialogue. WVP Health Authority, previously the local IPA,
convened the community partners. These planning meetings, in which face-to-face
dialogue transpired, helped to create trust among individuals who did not know one
another previously, particularly county officials and senior executives of the private
health organizations who ultimately transitioned to serving on the governing board. This
process allowed relationships to develop among civic and health care leaders in the
community and built trust for the partnering organizations that spanned across the public,
nonprofit, and private entities. Initially, the meetings of community partners did not
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include the local federally qualified health centers (FQHCs). Another area of contention
was the inclusion of Atrio, which offered Medicaid and commercial plans but not a
Medicaid insurance product, and which is partially owned by WVP Health Authority.
Providing Atrio a seat on the board was perceived as providing WVP Health Authority
with two votes.
The theme of control was present throughout the interviews. The issue is control
of the CCO by the IPA, the WVP Health Authority.
The biggest challenges have been, how do you take a successful IPA, which ran
M-CHIP, the former Medicaid program, and turn that into a collaborative effort
when it’s been very comfortably run as a private entity? (ID 16)27
Based on WVCH’s control structure, which has a single board with decisionmaking authority, the advisory boards waited for the board to define their role and
provide direction. During the first year of operation, the board did not provide direction.
The outcome was twofold. First, the advisory boards were directionless, operating
without any guidance or clear set of expectations or authority. Second, the clinical
advisory panel lost some credibility with the board because the clinical advisory panel
was not operating in connection with the board. As a result, the CAP put forward
proposals that were “disconnected” from the financial realities the board was facing. The
result was a loss of credibility. The CAP has gradually started to earn trust and regain
credibility among the board because members of the CAP are serving on the CAC, which
has resulted in crossover and enhanced communication as well as shared understanding
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“M-CHIP” refers to Title XIX and XXI of the Social Security Act referred to as Medicaid and Children’s
Health Insurance Program or CHIP.
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between the two advisory groups. The clinical advisory panel now has a steering
committee, comprised of a smaller group of individuals from the full advisory panel.
An important event transpired approximately one year after the creation of the
WVCH. The organization was awarded transformation funds from the Oregon Health
Authority along with the other 15 CCOs. The board was then required to focus on
allocating the funds, which temporarily created a shared goal for the entire board. The
decision-making process used to award proposals was unclear without decision-making
principles, however, and it ultimately became contentious. The need to award the
transformation funds did help the clinical advisory panel define its role in relationship to
the board by focusing its efforts on putting together the transformation initiatives, which
included working toward the accountability metrics set by the state. The clinical advisory
panel created four subcommittees. Recently the CAP has focused on developing clinical
systems and processes to achieve the CCO metrics.
WVP Health Authority’s control of the advisory councils was a recurring issue.
The CAP and CACs were both staffing these two entities. According to one respondent,
“WVP Health Authority has tried to work around the committee by creating its own
subcommittees” (ID 16). Similar to the CAP, the community advisory committee has not
had a clear and well-defined role in relation to the board.
The CAC…. We don’t totally know what we’re are doing except we meet
regularly and want to get in front of the board. (ID 19)
Decision-making by the board has continued to be an issue. Several members
perceive that there are certain partner organizations, primarily physician groups that
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would prefer to make decisions behind the scenes rather than through a collaborative
process. A secondary theme that emerged was the issue of culture among physicians, in
which they are not naturally inclined, trained, or incentivized to be engaged in protracted
collaborative processes, an important feature of collaborative governance. Collaboration
is achieved through dialogue and process rather than a hierarchical command and control
structure.
The notions of shared understanding and mission are an important factor in any
collaborative process. For WVCH, the board operated initially without a shared
understanding or agreed-upon mission statement, leaving the board to govern without any
strategic direction besides what is required in the OHA transformation plan. After one
year of operations, the board had neither a finished mission statement nor had it adopted
principles or set of values.
We’re more driven by the fear of what will happen if we don’t do anything than
the…it’s my perception, than the driving vision that this is the most wonderful
thing to do. I think for everyone around the table, that we’re just kind of hoping
that it works as opposed to believe in our heart of hearts that this is the right way
to go…. We’re all here to make money. They want to make sure that they’re
financially solvent. (ID 18)
The prior history of conflict between Salem Health hospital and the local IPA
resulted in litigation, influencing the early functioning of the CCO in terms of impeding
the organization’s ability to engage in decision-making and agenda setting for the
advisory entities. The lack of trust among the partnering organizations led to an inability
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among the board to develop and adopt a mission statement and vision, to identify
common problems, or even achieve a commitment to the process after a year of having
created Willamette Valley Community Health CCO. The board has been challenged to
define the role of the advisory boards, which had initially created a lack of credibility of
the CAP among the board.
The composition and function of the board is unique in that the two counties
represented on the board have “veto power.” Another important aspect to the composition
and functioning is that there are four hospitals represented on the board with Salem
Health having two votes. The hospitals and two counties are disproportionately
represented on the board in terms of influence in the decision-making process and
authority over the CCO. The local IPA, WVP Health Authority, continues to staff the
newly created CCO, which has influenced the institutional design, in terms of staff
controlling the information and agenda setting for the board.
The creation of the Willamette Valley Community Health CCO was led by an
existing regional IPA, which influenced the structure, function, and control of the new
CCO. The executive director of the IPA has been serving as the interim director for the
CCO. For more than 18 months, the CCO has not hired a permanent executive director.
The absence of facilitative leadership has limited ability of the board and CCO to
function effectively and efficiently. Furthermore, the board continues to operate without
transparency, with its meetings not open to the public.
The conflict among the private entities and the two counties that formed the CCO
was perceived as impeding the organization’s progress towards clearly defining roles and
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responsibilities for the new CCO. Issues of control, public trust, and accountability
between the two county governments and the CCO initially affected the collaborative
process as the various organizations sought to develop a shared and agreed-upon
understanding regarding responsibilities of county government in Oregon according to
state law.
Combined, these factors have limited the board’s ability to develop a shared
understanding or agreed-upon set of goals and priorities, long-term, for the new CCO.
The ability of the new CCO and its board to engage in a collaborative governance process
as a means to achieve the desired outcomes of Oregon’s health system transformation has
not been fully realized.
Case Three: Yamhill CCO
The Yamhill County Care Organization (YCCO) was created as a new 501(c)3
nonprofit organization in a geographical area comprised of the largest percentage of
open-card OHP enrollees in the state. Open-card refers to OHP members who are not
enrolled in a managed care organization (MCO). In essence, there was limited Medicaid
managed care in Yamhill County prior to the creation of YCCO. Compared to the other
15 CCOs, Yamhill is unique because it was not created by an existing health plan,
provider association, hospital system, or other existing managed care organization. This
approach was influenced by the community leadership’s interest in local control and
accountability.
Yamhill is the only area where there was no predecessor organization. (ID 4)
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The organization serves OHP members in Yamhill County as well as Clackamas,
Washington, Polk, Marion, and Tillamook counties.28 Prior to Oregon’s Medicaid
expansion in January 2014, the organization served approximately 18,000 OHP members
who reside primarily in the two cites of McMinnville and Newberg (Yamhill CCO
Transformation Plan, 2013, p 1).29 The organization has adopted vision and mission
statements as well as a set of 10 guiding principles.
Composition. The organization’s partners include health plans, physical and
behavioral health providers, two hospital systems, and a large FQHC. The composition of
the organization consists of 14 member organizations listed in alphabetical order is:
CareOregon, Head Start of Yamhill County, Lutheran Community Services, Mid-Valley
Behavioral Care Network, McMinnville Imaging Associates/McMinnville Physicians
Organization, Physicians Medical Center, Providence Medical Group and Providence
Newberg Medical Center, Virginia Garcia Memorial Health Center, Willamette Valley
Medical Center, and Yamhill County Health Department and elected officials.
The board of directors consists of 15 individuals: executives from one nonprofit
and one for-profit hospital system, members of Yamhill County agencies, two regional
health plans, and three social service based organizations. As with Health Share and
Willamette Valley Community Health, in accordance with legislation, the chair of
YCCO’s CAC also serves as a member of the board of directors. The individual board
members are competent senior level health care executives and public officials with
decades of experience—highly trained, educated, and skilled in the health care entities.
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The other members who make up the remainder of the board are health care
professionals, primarily clinicians.
Structure. The organization’s governance structure is comprised of three main
groups that were established to conform to the state legislation. These groups include the
governing board, the clinical advisory panel (CAP), and the community advisory council
(CAC). The role of the CAC is to “assure communications, outreach, member
engagement, and services are tailored to cultural, health literacy and linguistic needs”
(Transformation Plan, 2013, p. 14). Of the 13 members of the CAC, the majority are
either OHP members or family of an OHP member. The CAP is comprised of 19
members, including physicians (allopathic and osteopathic), dentists, emergency medical
practitioners, and a pharmacist.
Control. The board has established a number of subcommittees within three
workgroups: the board, the CAP, and the CAC (YCCO 2013 Transformation Plan, p. 3).
For the governing board, there are the “alternative pay” and “finance” subcommittees.
There are five subcommittees under the CAP, which include emergency department (ED)
utilization, specialty care, transitions of care, behavioral health, and patient-centered
medical home. These subcommittees serve as advisory entities to the board, CAP, and
CAC (also referred to as workgroups). During the first year of its existence, the board of
directors held periodic joint sessions with its CAC and CAP. Several of the board
members also serve on the CAP, CAC, or both. Another unique aspect of YCCO is that it
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was the first CCO to apply and be designated by the state as an Early Learning Hub.30
That success was partially the result of creating the community partnership through the
CCO, which then leveraged the partnership to work towards integration of health and
education services in the county.
The board was designed to be self-perpetuating, as listed in the board’s bylaws,
mandating that the existing board members recruit new members when a position
becomes vacant or a term expires.
Yamhill created something new and decided how they were going to staff it, run
it, and finance it. (ID 23)
The CAP is an active advisory committee to the board, operating without
considerable guidance or direction from the board. The CAP consists of highly engaged
clinicians who serve as experts within the community. The CAC has also been active
since its creation, and after a year continues to meet twice a month. The CAC is
comprised of community volunteers with diverse backgrounds who are actively engaged
in serving on the CAC and initiatives being led by Yamhill CCO. Both the CAP and
CAC operate in an open and transparent manner; their meetings are open to members of
the public.
Functioning. The governing structure of the CCO, including the board and
advisory entities, operates well. There are clearly defined roles for the advisory panels
and workgroups under the board. The CAP is focused on addressing the CCO incentive
metrics, the CAP is leading the community health assessment, and the finance
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subcommittees are reviewing the financials and assessing the revenue for the new
organization. The role of the CAC has been to provide insight about gaps in the
community and identify issues the CAP should address from a community-needs
perspective. The CAC also developed the CCO’s mission and vision statement; the CAP
then reviewed the documents and provided input with a focus on the guiding principles.
The board reviewed the materials and approved the mission and vision statement with the
set of guiding principles.
The organization realized that it was very important that the community of the
people we serve had a strong input in developing the mission and vision and
guiding principles. (ID 26)
The board has facilitated meetings larger than their monthly meetings, in which
the CAP, CAC, and subcommittees convene. These larger meetings have helped
members engage with one another as well as assisted the various panels and subordinate
committees in setting explicit responsibilities with one another and in relation to the
board, i.e. clear boundary setting.
The whole board is engaged…. We’ve had longer, almost mini-board retreats,
where we brought all the different committees together to really engage the
various parts of the CCO in, overall look at where the CCO is, what are the issues,
where it’s going, which have also been helpful in getting different committees
talking to each other. (ID 27)
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The clinical advisory panel, the clinical vision, then the governing board approved
the funding for different [community] projects that met the clinical visions
developed by the CAP. (ID 22)
The explicit set of responsibilities that Yamhill needed to address was risksharing among the founding members of the CCO. The new organization would be
required to manage risk locally and not have a third party organization serve as the riskbearing entity. The organization functions under a set of “simple rules”:
1. Community spirit should guide transformation.
2. Plans and projects should be data-driven and monitored.
3. Process and outcome goals should work toward the Triple Aim.
4. Payments should be based on measurable production of value.
5. Transformational plans and projects should follow the general stepwise format of
•

smart standardization adoption,

•

meaningful metric adoption,

•

respectful reporting of metrics, and

•

reimbursement development based on reported data.

6. Care transformation should focus on care coordination, cost control, and patient
choice. (YCCO Transformation Plan, Feb. 2013, pp. 2-3)
According to YCCO’s transformation plan, these rules were adopted by the board
to guide the organization towards the Triple Aim of health system transformation.
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Collaborative governance.
There are lessons there that are really unique among the other CCOs. (ID 28)
Starting conditions. The starting conditions in Yamhill were unique compared to
the other two CCOs. Prior to the creation of the CCO legislation, there had been minimal
managed care in Yamhill County. The lack of an existing Medicaid managed care
organization or large IPA serving OHP members created a set of starting conditions that
did not spring from a history of conflict. Leadership of the local county health and human
services organizations initiated a series of community meetings, inviting public, private,
and nonprofit executives across Yamhill county to discuss the possible formation of a
CCO. Not having a large or dominating MCO or IPA in the county meant there was not a
power imbalance or struggle among existing health plans, IPA(s), or the local area
hospitals.
Yamhill County probably had the least penetration in managed care of all the
different other counties in the state. That means there was not the experience from
either the providers or from the patients of being in a managed care environment,
nor was there a lot of data to share. (ID 27)
This was a “hallmark” starting condition for the CCO. The majority of providers
that served OHP members prior to the creation of CCOs were reimbursed on a fee-forservice basis; however, a considerable number of local providers opted not to see OHP
members.
We should go back to the mid-90s and the creation of the Oregon Health Plan,
and the fact that the Yamhill physician community, which at the time was largely
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an independently-run, individual business model in the McMinnville area,
anyways (and somewhat Newberg), was resistant to the Health Plan, was resistant
to serving Medicaid patients, reimbursement, client population/demographics…
(ID 21)
The idea of forming a CCO and moving to a global budget did not provide a
financial incentive for area providers to participate.
I think initially having these organizations step up to the plate for the betterment
of the community and willing to take on this additional work and deal with that,
they’re not easily earned dollars dealing with the Medicaid population, I think has
been a real driver. (ID 26)
As a direct result of the vacuum of any MCO or large IPA in Yamhill County, the
community had an opportunity to collaborate and envision what a CCO might look like in
the county. Through a series of public meetings, which were inclusive, open, and well
attended by community leaders and interested stakeholders, the participants explored
different organizational forms and ultimately agreed to create a 501(c)3. The rationale for
a nonprofit rather than a limited liability corporation was that community partners
believed it was important to operate a nonprofit rather than a for-profit enterprise.
Another reason was that it would be easier for counties to participate in the CCO if
formed as a nonprofit rather than an LLC.
After the participants opted to establish a 501(c)3, the head of the county mental
health department, who had been facilitating the series of public forums, asked the entire
group of executives and local leaders whether they would participate in the CCO. The
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participants unanimously agreed and committed to form a CCO. Many of these same
participants had not previously been champions of Medicaid in their community. The
level of participation was notable among the interviewees. The steering committee grew
from the community meetings and gradually transitioned into the governing board once
Yamhill CCO was established. The steering committee also served as a forum; a number
of conversations were facilitated early on regarding infrastructure decisions, composition,
and ownership models.
What I saw as key was everybody’s dedication. Especially in that steering
committee and then the governing board, especially in the beginning. We had, I
think, I think there were bimonthly meetings, for months, like two to three hours.
So it was a big time commitment. And then, time and time again, everybody was
showing up, everybody was there and was talking and it wasn’t hostile at all. I
mean, I think, in the beginning, people were kind of very willing to acknowledge
their ignorance. (ID 22)
I’m going to go around the table and say, “Are you in this or not? Are we going to
do a CCO?” And everybody said, I’m in and here’s why. (ID 24)
The incentive for agreeing to participate in the CCO was described as wanting to
help the local community. There are two hospitals in Yamhill County, a for-profit and a
nonprofit. The CEO of the for-profit did not foresee any financial incentives to their
hospital for participation but still agreed to participate, which surprised several of the
local health care leaders.
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The Yamhill CCO provided a forum for us to start problem-solving around this
and we were able to come up with a plan. Now those things wouldn’t have
happened, at least not without a structured environment, so I think that’s been
helpful. (ID 27)
Institutional design. The member organizations that partnered to create Yamhill
are not at financial risk, which to some extent is unique compared to the other CCOs.
From an incentive-to-participate perspective, not exposing one’s organization to financial
risk from participating in the CCO is significant. As one board member commented,
“They all recognize that on a community level, they’re all at risk. They need to make
decisions that are beyond what’s good for their own organization” (ID 23).
In Yamhill, the providers individually are not at financial risk. The risk, if they
were here, what they would say is the risk they have is that their payment is far
below their cost, in Medicaid. And they would be right. They don’t have… No
individual provider or hospital or clinic is at risk if Yamhill CCO loses money—
there’s not a direct correlation to the provider losing money. So technically, none
of those providers are risk-accepting entities. The organization is at risk. (ID 23)
The lack of an existing health plan or MCO in the area resulted in needing to
either build the necessary administrative infrastructure required to operate a health plan
or contract with a third party to provide administrative services. The early partners in
Yamhill CCO held a series of meetings with two managed care organizations in Oregon
that had historically served OHP clients. The meetings were designed to assess whether
one of the two organizations would contract with Yamhill CCO to provide administrative

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS 183
services, referred to as “infrastructure partners.” The governing board decided early on it
was in the interest of the organization to maintain local control rather than be a subsidiary
of another organization such as a health plan or IPA.
The key to Yamhill is that the community came together and decided very early
on that they were only going to have one CCO and that they were going to steer
it—in fact they called it a steering committee. So they were very intentional from
the beginning about some of the things that were important to them—that it be
locally-driven, that it be Yamhill County, and that the leadership of Yamhill be
the one to drive some of the decisions. (ID 23)
Yamhill CCO said, “We’re expected to run our own business, we are going to be
our own organization.” (ID 24)
The community strongly valued the notion of local control. The preference to
maintain local control served as a mechanism to develop consensus and build an initial
set of principles and values that the majority of participants could endorse. As one
member described it, “No matter what we ought to have, local control and design, that
was our strongest asset, community cohesion” (ID 21).
The guidelines for participation with Yamhill were that any contracting
organizations would provide services, either administrative or clinical, but would not
have significant influence or control over the CCO, compared to other CCOs that were
largely managed by a health plan, hospital system, or IPA. The board decided that local
control and autonomy from parties outside of the region were of paramount importance.
One example was that Yamhill CCO opted to directly hire an executive director who had
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previously been working for the organization that was contracted to provide
administrative services. The CCO delegates administrative functions to a third party
organization through contracting, which includes customer services claims, billing, and
related insurance administrative functions. The CCO was concerned about to whom the
executive director would be responsible: either the CCO or the administrative services
provider (ASP).
After several conversations and discussions about executing an agreement with an
ASP, and in order to solve the issue, the CCO decided to hire the individual who had
previously been serving as the regional director in Yamhill on behalf of the ASP,
CoverOregon. A member of the ASP also serves as a member of the governing board.
I think that’s actually quite unique within the state in terms of provider groups and
the community coming together and saying, “Ok, we’re going to do this and
we’ve got a plan, but this is going to be a locally controlled process.” (ID 22)
Creating the CCO offered a new forum for community providers to engage in
dialogue. The CAP in particular has brought together provider groups that now interact
and discuss population health across the different systems, which had occurred prior to
the CCO. As stated by one board member, “This is our opportunity to address substance
abuse in our community, providers in our community…this is our opportunity.” (ID 21)
An unprecedented level of enthusiasm now exists, at least in a coordinated and
actionable manner that resulted from engaging a diverse group of providers, i.e.
individuals who volunteer their time to serve on the CAP.
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The CCO has generated this collaboration and coming together and talking about
everything from access to behavioral health and integration, to screening, or
substance abuse within primary…and is getting the community mobilized and
thinking about the Triple Aim. (ID 27)
Facilitative leadership. Prior to the creation of the Yamhill CCO, a small group
of leaders in the community were closely tracking the CCO legislation, starting with
House Bill 3650 passed in 2011. Several months after the 2012 legislative session, a
county commission convened a meeting in September to kick off the community
conversation about creating a CCO in the county. Early on, local officials in the
community took an active leadership role in engaging and convening community partners
around forming a CCO. The county served as the intended neutral convener for the early
planning conversation with health care leaders in the community.
Facilitative leadership was instrumental in the creation of Yamhill CCO. Leaders
within the CCO have engaged public and private organizations and actively sought to
engage a broad and diverse set of stakeholders across the county, with a targeted focus on
hearing the voice of consumers. For example, CCO leaders facilitated a series of public
forums and community meetings attended by individuals from across the community.
Since forming the CCO, the organization continues to hold community forums that bring
together the local partners, members of the governing board, the CAP, and the CAC,
along with interested stakeholders including local officials.
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The things that have impressed me about Yamhill, beside the leadership, is the
openness and transparency with which they’ve interacted with the community
partners, providers, and the hospitals. (ID 28)
The leader behind the genesis of Yamhill was the Director of Yamhill Health and
Human Services. In contrast to other CCOs, the leader was not a physician or part of a
health plan, but had an extensive background from a government perspective in public
health and social services.
The leadership within the CCO was frequently referred to as “visionary.” The
evident strong leadership at the CAP and CAC level has helped with engagement, an
important and defining feature within Yamhill CCO. The organization continues to be
engaged with its partner organizations and the broader community. Interestingly,
physician and provider organizations that historically had not been actively involved in
Medicaid did become “involved and really engaged” through the community meetings
and visioning process that resulted in the CCO. This engagement likely led to a
considerable level of physician participation in the CAP. One of the participants shared a
reaction from a meeting attended just prior to the interview, which was a meeting of a
subcommittee of the CAP:
I couldn’t believe it. I showed up…. I thought I’d be one of four people. I walk in
and there’s people from public health, there’s people from this community hub,
people from Virginia Garcia, their head administrator, people from the hospital
calling in, people from physicians’ medical centers, this private primary care
clinic there, so…pretty exciting. (ID 26)
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Yamhill was a little slow to come to the game, but they did via very strong
leadership and a very collaborative, community-focused, organic, initial
investment and gathering of individuals. (ID 28)
As previously described, the board, CAP, and CAC conduct open meetings.
According to one board member, “Within the CCO, at the board level or finance
committee levels—the financial transactions and the nuts and bolts are very transparent”
(ID 23). Although the CCO is not subject to Oregon public meeting laws, the leaders of
the board, in particular those who serve in an official public capacity, value openness and
transparency as part of encouraging participation and ensuring that an inclusive process is
supported by the board and various advisory committees. The one exception is when the
board needs to hold an executive session, which can be held if sensitive personal or
private information will be disclosed among board members.
Collaborative process. The collaborative process that resulted in the formation of
the CCO was extensive, inclusive, and deliberate. Through the series of public forums
and community meetings, the leadership of the CCO was able to become established by
convening organizations and local leaders that had not historically collaborated beyond
one-time initiatives. In addition to helping build trust, the face-to-face meetings also
fostered a shared understanding about the opportunity for the community by creating the
CCO. Community partners perceived a unique and unprecedented set of circumstances
that could be “leveraged” to improve the health and well-being of Yamhill County
residents. Over the past 18 months, the local medical community developed a different,
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broader understanding about health versus health care and is starting to think beyond the
traditional model of medical care in the community.
The collaborative process has been used to facilitate dialogue, develop
relationships, and foster trust within the community. It also helped create a shared
understanding in Yamhill about the role and function of county government, local public
health needs, the interconnection between physical and mental health providers in the
community, and the value of working together as a community to address the unmet
health needs of OHP members.
In the beginning, we really didn’t know what public health did. We didn’t know
what the Department of Health and Human Services did…. I had no clue they had
three different divisions and what all they did. So, we really had to educate
ourselves on that. On the same token, a lot of people in behavioral health, they
don’t know what physicians do. And we’re still learning a lot from each other. (ID
26)
The efforts in Yamhill really came about in a very grassroots sort of way. It was
really though a series of community meetings that were convened by the county.
(ID 25)
This is a local community stepping up and taking on something here, and I think
quite extraordinary in terms of a new approach to managing the care and benefits
for this population. (ID 27)
Yamhill is distinct from the other two cases in that the newly created 501(c)3
nonprofit organization was not formed by an existing organization. Furthermore, the
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creation of Yamhill was largely the result of local leadership among officials with
Yamhill County government. Also notable as a starting condition, compared with the
other two cases, was that there was minimal managed care present in the region prior to
the creation of the CCO. The majority of Medicaid enrollees were not enrolled in
managed care for physical health services. Without a dominant MCO or IPA, there was
not a perceived power imbalance among the local area providers or health care
organizations, including the hospitals. Lastly, Yamhill was one of the last CCOs certified
by the OHA. The community purposefully sought to take sufficient time to develop trust,
build relationships, and foster identification of shared values among community leaders
prior to legally establishing the CCO.
Through a comprehensive and intentional strategy of engaging the community
and seeking participation through a collaborative process, the partnering organizations
developed a shared understanding and commitment to assume responsibility for the
health and well-being of those covered by Oregon’s Medicaid program. The local
leadership in Yamhill was instrumental in the creation of Yamhill CCO. The presence of
collaborative processes facilitated by local leadership served as a key factor that
influenced the effectiveness of the collaborative governance model adopted by the CCO.
Limitations
The research design for this study has a number of limitations. First, the scope of
the study is limited to specific geographical regions, i.e. only three of the 16 CCOs, each
with their own unique historical context, political culture, and community norms that ay
not be applicable to other regions in Oregon or the country. Subsequently, themes
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identified from the three cases may contain some geographical, cultural, political, or
normative bias that may limit the generalizability of any conclusions. Also, the limited
number of interviewees from each CCO provides only a partial picture about the
emerging CCO governance models. Furthermore, due to the limited number of cases
selected and minimal number of respondents, the transferability of some of the
conclusions in regard to collaborative governance serving as an effective model is limited
at best. The more subjective nature of this research may be viewed as less rigorous than a
quantitative research design and may open the research study’s conclusions to
considerable scrutiny. Finally, the research design does not lend itself to analysis of the
data over a lengthy period of time, which may decrease the dependability and
confirmability of the conclusions offered in the study.
Role of the researcher. One potential sensitive issue was the researcher’s role as
an employee with the Oregon Health Authority, which oversees the state’s Medicaid
program. This role likely helped in the level of access and responsiveness among state
officials, all of whom agreed to participate, including the three Innovator Agents with the
OHA’s Transformation Center. Innovator Agents are employees of the Oregon Health
Authority and provide technical assistance to CCOs, help foster the spread of best
practices among CCOs, and serve to help facilitate issue resolution among CCOs.31 Only
one CCO board member was knowledgeable about the researcher’s professional role with
the OHA because of a prior working relationship; however, the individual was candid,
honest, and open during the interview, perhaps due to pre-established respect and trust.
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No other interviewees were aware of the researcher’s role with the OHA or the Oregon
Medicaid Advisory Committee. Therefore, the researcher did not notify the interviewees
that he was an employee of the OHA until after the interviews had been conducted.
Conclusion
The findings regarding collaborative governance resembled Ansell and Gash’s
(2007) variables: institutional design coincided with CCO institutional design,
relationship dynamics with CCO collaborative process and facilitative leadership, starting
conditions and history of conflict or cooperation, and collaborative governance and trust
building. Ansell and Gash (2007) identified that future research may be most fruitful in
examining natural experiments or actual cases of collaborations, and especially
comparative examination of multiple independent cases. This study provides
recommendations (described in Chapter 5) for future policy that seek to develop an
overarching framework for the purposes of collaborating on complex social challenges.
Collaborative governance is an interesting and promising approach for addressing the
need for more efficient use of both public and private resources as well as the need for
consensus-based decision-making among stakeholders across nongovernmental and
governmental organizations. Although the scope of this study is narrow, the implications
for future research as a result of this study are broad. This analysis may be applied by
future researchers to other policy contexts plagued by resource constraints and limited
prior cooperation or partnership. It may also enhance management of the collective good
from a community perspective through new governance models such as CCOs that span
the private, nonprofit, and public sectors.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations for Future Research
The purpose of the study was to explore and understand the structure, processes
and conditions in which collaborative governance facilitates or impedes the ability of
Oregon’s coordinated care organizations (CCOs) to integrate and deliver comprehensive
health care services. Obtaining insights from CCO board members helped identify mutual
goals and objectives as well as assess collaborative governance as a viable model to form
new partnerships among for-profit, nonprofit, and public organizations in an effort to
create new models of community-based health services. A key question was whether
collaboration, through CCOs, brings together governmental and non-governmental
organizations to solve “intractable problems” by establishing new public-private
partnerships (Trist, 1983). Issues of governance of CCOs may serve as barriers to, rather
than facilitators of, successful system integration. Specifically, governance may hinder
formation, performance, and sustainability of CCOs in Oregon (Pointer, Alexander, &
Zuckerman, 1995).
The central research question guiding this study was the following: “What are the
key factors of collaborative governance that facilitate or impede the ability of CCOs to
implement health care reform?” Stated differently, the goal of this study was to assess to
what extent, and in what way, governance enhances system integration and effectiveness
and to identify areas for future research. The study also sought to describe the degree to
which collaborative governance can be utilized as a new “organizing framework” or
model to form productive, noncompetitive collaborations among nonprofit, for-profit, and
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public organizations to better utilize available limited resources to improve the health and
well-being of those served by Medicaid.
The state played an important, if not critical, role in establishing CCOs by
creating a new regulatory framework and the “necessary conditions” through public
policy. CCOs are working to solve fundamental problems within the financing, delivery,
and organization of health and health care services for a specified population. Results of
this study suggest that collaborative governance offers a new and innovative approach for
local communities to collaborate through new partnerships to set priorities, make
decisions, and implement solutions to problems identified by the community. Through a
new model of governance in community-based and locally governed organizations,
CCOs have developed a flexible governing structure to address the needs of individual
communities. In response to environmental changes, these new complex organizations
serve as a promising new model with new rules, norms, and values implemented through
horizontal and vertical integration and new governance arrangements.
The results of the study support existing theory and literature (Pointer, Alexander,
& Zuckerman, 1995; Savage, Taylor, Rotarius, & Buesseler, 1997), which suggest that
four broad dimensions influence the model of collaborative governance within a CCO:
(1) prior history of conflict or cooperation; (2) open, transparent, and inclusive processes
for stakeholders in the governing process; (3) face-to-face dialogue, trust building, and
shared understanding; and (4) the functioning of an organization. However, results also
indicate that maintaining stakeholder participation can be challenging due to time and
cost, power imbalances and competing interests among stakeholders, and mistrust and
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lack of facilitative leadership. Furthermore, the results suggest that stakeholders’
involvement in CCO collaborative governance is a dynamic process, evolving over the
life of the collaboration and conflict-resolution processes during the early formation of
these new organizations.
Based on two dozen interviews with board members and executive staff from
three of Oregon’s 16 CCOs, this study identified distinguishing characteristics of the
governance of CCOs. It also explored and assessed key differences in CCO development
affected by local political, institutional, and historical contexts, planning processes, and
governance structure. The study also examined CCO board members’ perceptions of
collaborative governance, including the relevance of collaborative governance to the
goals and objectives of the CCOs and the communities they serve. Key factors included
the history of conflict or cooperation, incentives for participation among a broad and
diverse group of stakeholders, power and resource imbalances, leadership, and presence
of a formal structure (Ansell & Gash, 2007). The significance of this study is that it
achieved the following: (1) identified conditions that facilitate and impede the ability of
CCOs to effectively solve problems through governance mechanisms, (2) developed
insights into similarities and differences among three CCO governance structures, and (3)
advanced the present understanding of the potential and limitations of a collaborative
governance model in supporting Medicaid reform.
Results of the study can help to inform a larger, more fundamental question in
public administration about contemporary governance: whether government through
collaborative governance can create the “conditions for rule and collective action”
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through public-private partnerships to achieve policy goals (Stoker, p. 1, 1998). CCOs in
Oregon offer an example of multiple layers of governing institutions (federal, state, and
county) using formal authority to influence a specified set of outcomes, the Triple Aim,
in a specific policy domain, health care for the poor (Forbes, Hill, & Lynn, p. 454, 2007).
This chapter discusses the implications presented by the research findings as they relate
to the study’s literature review. The primary research questions are reviewed and key
findings are summarized. Finally, the limitations of this study, conclusions, and
recommendations for future research are presented.
Discussion
In Chapter 2, the relevant literature was summarized by drawing on different
theoretical foundations, including organizational theory and the notion of complex
organizations within the context of health care, institutional theory and open systems,
governance structure and composition, and the concept of collaborative governance.
CCOs are new organizations that are responding to a rapidly changing environment—
environments that influence organizations, structures, and outcomes (Scott, 2003). To
understand CCOs, it is necessary to assess the environment, including the interactions
and interdependencies or “open systems” perspective as offered by Scott (2003), which
places importance on the environment. According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), formal
organizations such as CCOs are influenced by institutional and cultural factors as posited
by institutional theory.
Institutional theory suggests that an organization will enter into partnerships in an
effort to meet legal or regulatory requirements (Meyer & Scott, 1992). In Oregon, a new
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“rules system” of legislation, statutes, administrative rules, and contracts was created,
which mandated a new set of norms for organizing the state’s Medicaid program. The
outcome was the creation of new complex organizations, CCOs, which are
geographically bounded organizations that collaborate through contractual mechanisms.
CCOs are a “set of interdependent parts which together make up a whole,” in which each
organization “contributes something and receives something from the whole, which in
turn is interdependent with some larger environment” (Thompson, 2003, p. 4). The
Oregon Legislature, a public institution, reshaped the environment of Oregon’s Medicaid
system by requiring new governing functions for organizations that serve the state’s
Medicaid population (Scott, 2003). According to Guo and Acar (2005), the potential for
collaboration is more likely among nonprofit organizations that receive public funding,
which is the case with the majority of partnering organizations among the three CCOs, in
particular Health Share and Yamhill.
Institutional theory also suggests that an organization’s ability to survive is
“improved by…conformity to the norms and social expectations of the institutional
environments,” which can include political and legal frameworks (Shafritz et al., 2005, p.
478). Scott (2003) states that institutional theory focuses on the notion that “organizations
are open systems, strongly influenced by their environments” (p. 119). According to
Scott (2003), there are “regulative” features that emphasize institutions as “systems of
rules or as governance systems” (p. 135). To accomplish a given end, two of Oregon’s
public institutions, the legislative and executive branches, modified the environment by
specifying the governance structure and collaborative model, including setting norms and
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the desired organizational form: complex organizations (Scott, 2003, p. 137). Partnering
organizations recognized the new “regulative” features of Oregon’s CCO legislation.
Consequently, these same organizations decided to collaborate rather than continue to
operate as individual entities in the new environment.
The CCOs in the study contend they serve as both “problem-facing and problemsolving” complex organizations responding to the changing environments of financing,
policy, and health care delivery in Oregon. New formal complex organizations were
formed in response to changes in the environment. New laws were enacted in response to
the larger environment of health systems, public financing, and changes in the federal and
state heath policy institutional environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Specifically, there
were significant changes in resources and the dependence of organizations across Oregon
on Medicaid funding. Through the Oregon legislative process and the Oregon Health
Authority, a new legal and rules-based framework was established, reshaping the external
environment for Medicaid services and more broadly the organization and financing for
health care services for one-fifth of Oregon residents. Over time, it will be important to
monitor whether the modified external environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), controlled
by the new regulatory framework, “stabilizes” Oregon’s Medicaid system, which for
decades has been buffeted by cyclical fiscal crises.
According to Scott (2003), CCOs serve as an example of organizations that
combine “technical requirements with a strong public good component” (p. 140). Such
organizations often have complex structures that include advisory boards and
administrative structures (Scott, 2003, p. 140). One could posit that Oregon’s legislative

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS 198
and executive branches (or regulative institutions) served as a “coercive mechanism”
among organizations that historically constituted the Medicaid system (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983). Either way, CCOs offer a new economic organization for the state’s
Medicaid system and potentially serve as a model for the larger health care system with
new complex structures, functions, and responsibilities.
Collaborative Governance and CCOs
Conclusions of the findings from Chapter 4 are presented here in two sections.
The first section describes implications for the understanding of the governance structure
of CCOs. The second section describes findings related to collaborative governance. In
general, the results offer an understanding of how and why CCOs were formed as well as
key internal and external factors or characteristics that influence the structure and
effectiveness of CCOs’ collaborative governance processes, all of which are operating in
a dynamic and rapidly evolving environment. The results offer both insights into the
process of CCO development and early implementation as well as important new
understandings that aim to inform future studies that are focused on CCO outcomes. The
key for future studies will be to assess outcomes in terms of enhanced integration or
coordination of health services. Furthermore, changes in utilization or cost implications
from health system transformation will take years to understand, and thus are not a part of
the present study. Rather, this study is focused on the processes rather than the outcomes
of CCOs.
The hypothesis for the study was that a preferred governance structure or model
would influence and affect the collaborative process. Results indicate that collaborative
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governance and its key functions and structure are interdependent, to the extent of having
significant potential to influence the desired outcomes of CCOs. For any organization,
including complex organizations such as CCOs, the governance structure influences the
decision-making processes, and it facilitates or impedes (or both) the effectiveness of the
organization, at least in the intermediate future.
Governance structure. In the health administration literature, four dimensions of
governance are often cited for integrated delivery systems or networks: control, structure,
composition, and functioning (Pointer, Alexander, & Zuckerman, 1995; Savage, Taylor,
Rotarius, & Buesseler, 1997). The results of this study provide an understanding of
whether the four governance dimensions affect an organization’s ability to effectively
manage issues and challenges faced by a CCO (Savage et al., 1997, p. 12). Developing an
understanding of these four governance dimensions leads to understanding important
issues, including the level of governance, system complexity, functions of governance,
and board composition among Oregon’s newly formed CCOs (Savage et al., 1997, p. 12).
Results indicate that these dimensions do affect a CCO’s ability to effectively
manage issues and challenges faced by these new organizations. A CCO’s governing
board is responsible for specifying the organizational vision, mission, and goals and
ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of governance (Alexander, Zuckerman, &
Pointer, 1995). Of interest in this study is the finding that the governance structure
adopted among the selected CCOs served more as a facilitator to the formation and
development of the new organizations than a barrier to achieving integration among
organizations that provide services within a CCO (Pointer, Alexander, & Zuckerman,
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1995). What is not understood is how a model of collaborative governance within CCOs
will “facilitate or impede the…performance of integrated systems” (Pointer et al., 1995,
p. 4). Table 5.1 displays the presence of the four concepts that comprise the CCO
governance structure.
Table 5.1: Governance Structure Elements
Concepts

Indicators

Health Share

Willamette

Yamhill

Yes

Yes

Yes

Multiple subordinate boards
or workgroups for each
CCO

5

3

5

Advisory bodies

5

3

3

Central

Central

Central

Central;
bylaws;
shareddecision
making
20

Central
decisionmaking by
board
13

Semi-central;
bylaws;
shareddecision
making
13

Both

Both

Both

Health care
executives,
public,
private, notfor-profit

Health care
professionals,
public,
private, notfor-profit

Health care
professionals,
public,
private, notfor-profit

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Single board
Control

Structure

Number and arrangement
of boards
Bylaws and decisionmaking processes divested
among the board,
subordinate boards, and
advisory entities
Board size
Representation
(representative or nonrepresentative)

Composition
Member characteristics

Clearly defined roles
Functioning

Explicit set of
responsibilities
Execution of decisionmaking
Intermediate outcomes
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Control. Control refers to layers of governance and the number of boards needed
to effectively govern the system (Pointer, 1995). More broadly, control focuses on the
governance of the system, or CCO, and its parts—the organizations that form the system
(Pointer et al., 1995, p. 17). There are two main approaches in control, centralized or
decentralized. In a centralized model, the governance board is a single entity in which the
decision-making function and authority are centralized. In contrast, the decentralized
approach has multiple layers of subordinate boards that share decision-making functions
and authority. This approach is more often found in community-based organizations,
whereas centralized approaches are found in corporations.
The governance system of the three CCOs studied consisted of a single board
with advisory entities. However, the advisory entities are not decision-making bodies, but
rather serve at the discretion of the governance board. The decentralized approach to
control, with multiple layers of subordinate boards that share decision-making functions
and authority, was not present in any of the three cases. This is interesting in that CCOs
are perceived as community-based organizations in which the decentralized approach is
more often found, whereas centralized approaches are more common in corporations
(Pointer et al., 1995).
The findings indicate that the centralized arrangement was the main governance
model among the three CCOs. For all three CCOs, the main board had clear decisionmaking authority and oversight of the subordinate boards. Without a comparative CCO
that operates with a decentralized governing board, it is not possible to compare which of
the two approaches may better fulfill the principles of HB 3650. One conclusion is that a

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS 202
centralized approach—which Health Share, Willamette Valley Community Health, and
Yamhill all adopted based on the professional expertise of the board members—was
more favorable to meeting the needs of the CCOs, at least during the early forming stages
of development and implementation.
Although Willamette Valley Community Health’s board has direct decisionmaking authority, there are several important differences when compared to Health Share
and Yamhill. Willamette Valley Health Authority, the local IPA, continues to staff the
new CCO with direct influence of the board through executive board staff. A second
dissimilarity is the influence of hospitals and the two county governments that serve on
Willamette’s board. The two positions represented on the board by Marion and Polk
counties have veto authority. The county public health and mental health authorities did
not want to cede authority or relinquish “control” to a limited liability corporation. The
arrangement influenced the functioning of Willamette’s board (see section on
functioning).
Structure. Structure refers to how the board, subordinate boards, or advisory
entities are arranged, i.e. the governance structure. Each CCO governance structure was
relatively complex. For example, each CCO was comprised of ten or more partnering
organizations. Each CCO had a governing board and at least three or more subordinate
boards, multiplied by partnering organizations and their respective boards. Although each
CCO could be perceived as having a sizeable number of boards and subordinate boards,
the level of complexity presented in terms of decision-making and diffused authority
across the entity was not a significant factor. One of the questions proposed before the
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start of the study was to gauge how much autonomy the partnering organizations retained
in relationship to the CCO. Based on the findings, each partnering organization retained a
large degree of autonomy.
Each CCO had one or more advisory entities and all three CCOs had a clinical
advisory panel (CAP) and community advisory council (CAC). Two of the CCOs also
had additional subordinate boards or workgroups that focused on financing and quality
within the CCO. For example, Health Share had five chartered workgroups and two
chartered advisory councils that had decision-making functions and authority delegated
by the board. Similarly, Yamhill’s board also delegated “some” minimal amount of
decision-making authority to its subordinate boards.
One of the CCOs was challenged by determining which boards at which levels
“should perform particular functions” to minimize duplication of efforts as well as
internal conflicts (Pointer et al., 1995, p. 8). Two of the CCOs were similarly challenged
by determining the amount of authority necessary for individual subordinate boards to
function effectively, yet not transcend the authority of the main governing board. This
configuration is critical to the structure, decision-making, and authority of the governance
model (Alexander, Zuckerman, & Pointer, 1995). In general, findings from the three
CCOs indicated similar configuration and relationships among subordinate
boards/advisory bodies and the governing board.
Composition. Composition pertains to whether members of a CCO board and any
subordinate board consist of representatives, non-representative members, or a
combination of both (Pointer et al., 1995). The distinguishing feature between
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representatives and non-representatives is whether a board member has a direct
relationship with any of the partnering organizations in a CCO. For all three CCO boards
in this study, members of the governing board were representatives of one or more of the
partnering organizations in the CCO.
In terms of composition, there were two key aspects for the CCOs: (1) whether
the representatives and their partner organizations were risk-accepting entities (RAEs),
and (2) whether a partnering organization was granted a special vote, such as was
observed for the local county departments in Willamette. Based on the findings, all three
CCOs had adequate board representation from the array of organizations that serve OHP
members within each of their respective communities, including the chairs of the CACs
serving on the governing board. By having an inclusive and participatory process during
the early formation of all three CCOs, the partner organizations were representative of the
various community-based organizations that care for OHP enrollees in Oregon.
Each CCO board was noted as having the professional mix of skills, knowledge,
experience, and perspectives needed for the board (Pointer et al., 1995, p. 10). The
challenge, however, was ensuring that board members were kept informed by staff about
activities across the CCO. The challenge was complicated by the size of the governing
boards, which is an important factor. Larger governing boards can be “inefficient” and
impede governance effectiveness (Prybil et al., 2008). According to a 2008 report on
governance among nonprofit health systems (Prybil et al., 2008), a “hallmark of good
governance” is limiting the number of members who vote and serve on a governing board
(p. 4). The issue is ensuring the governing board does not become too large and unable to
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make decisions. For example, Health Share has 20 board members whereas Yamhill and
Willamette both have a 13-member board. The composition of CCO board members is an
important governance dimension as the enabling legislation requires a CCO governance
structure to include non-representative members, including community members, on the
board.
Functioning. Functioning refers to roles and responsibilities within the
governance structure, in other words, how CCO governance functions, including what
issues a board should address and how it should govern. Function pertains to how roles
and responsibilities are fulfilled by the CCO governing board (Alexander & Zuckerman,
1989; Pointer et al., 1996, p. 13). A governing board, including those of CCOs, should
perform three core roles: policy formulation, decision-making, and oversight (Pointer et
al., 1995, p. 26).
By and large, the three cases demonstrated the presence of organizational policy
formulation and direction, direct oversight including financial controls, and decisionmaking through formal authority. For Health Share and Yamhill, findings did not indicate
that the boards delegated decision-making to subordinate boards. The various advisory
boards provide input and recommendations to the governing board. In contrast, the board
of Willamette Valley Community Health had delegated, perhaps unintentionally,
decision-making to the internal management structure of the IPA.
In addition to roles, a board also has responsibilities. According to Pointer et al.
(1995), there are five key responsibilities: (1) formulating the mission, vision and goals
of the organization; (2) ensuring the organizational performance, including executive
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management; (3) ensuring the financial health of the entity; (4) assuring the quality of
health services; and (5) assuming responsibility for accountability to itself, the board, as
well as accountability among the partnering organizations to the main governing board
(Pointer et al., 1995, p. 25). The CCOs varied considerably in their demonstrated ability
to fulfill the five responsibilities of an executive board.
Yamhill CCO is best characterized as fulfilling all five of these key functions or
responsibilities with the possible exception of the fifth, which has more to do with the
limited duration of the study and the newness of the organization. Health Share was clear
in its organizational mission and goals; the board was actively overseeing the
organizational performance, even to the extent of trying to manage the day-to-day
operations of the CCO. Further, Health Share’s board actively reviewed financial reports
of the CCO. Study participants did not provide much insight into whether and how
Health Share and its board were working to ensure the quality of services. Health Share’s
Transformation Plan, however, did provide explicit goals for improving the quality of
services, including identification of performance targets. This is an example of an
“intermediate outcome” in which participants recognize the potential value or advantage
from collaborating, which can encourage trust and further commitment to the
collaborative process (Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Findings indicate that Willamette
Valley Community Health did not have a clear mission or goals and as a board was not
overseeing the executive management of the CCO, which was led and directed by the
IPA (Toomey & Toomey, 1993).
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For all three CCOs, an inherent conflict was identified that influenced the boards’
ability to fulfill their responsibilities and execute decision-making. The issue is as
follows: Decisions acted upon by the board may result in one or more of the board
member’s parent organizations experiencing a negative financial impact. However, board
members are required to act upon decisions solely in the interest of the organization, the
CCO. This complexity in terms of governing was noted especially with Health Share and
Willamette Valley Community Health. Board members of Health Share are responsible to
the CCO while concurrently needing to ensure their fiduciary responsibilities to the board
of their parent organization. This dynamic is an example of organizations responding to
changing environmental conditions: recognizing scarce resources and resource
interdependencies and the advantages created by collaboration over competition in
forming interorganizational partnerships (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thomas, Ketchen,
Trevino, & McDaniel, 1992; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). For Yamhill, the partnering
organizations in the CCO were not significant risk-accepting entities and thus did not
have the inherent conflict evidenced with Health Share. It is unknown whether this aspect
of Health Share and Willamette Valley Community Health may influence the boards’
ability over time to fulfill all five responsibilities of a functioning governing board of an
integrated health system.
Collaborative governance. This study adopted Ansell & Gash’s (2007) model of
collaborative governance that includes four key concepts: starting conditions, institutional
design, leadership, and collaborative process (Freeman, 1997; Ansell & Gash, 2007, p.
549). These concepts are a contribution “to or context for” a collaborative process for any
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system (Ansell & Gash, 2007, p. 550). By building on and incorporating variables from
Ansell and Gash’s (2007) analytic framework, the study was able to identify and assess
which of the four concepts influence collaboration through CCO governance
arrangements.
A conceptual framework for studying CCO collaborative governance was
constructed from the four dimensions of governance from Pointer et al. (1995) and Ansell
and Gash’s (2007) four concepts of collaborative governance. Findings support the
framework shown in Figure 5.1. The starting conditions influenced the governance
structure, which in turn influenced the collaborative process. These concepts are
interdependent of one another and when taken together as a whole describe the
governance model of CCOs.
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Figure 5.1. Conceptual Framework for CCO Collaborative Governance

Starting conditions. The history and context of the starting conditions of any
collaborative have been found to be important variables that facilitate or deter (or both)
cooperation among the partners (Gary, 1989). For this study, three concepts were adopted
to form the starting conditions: (1) presence of any imbalances between resources or
power among the various partners, (2) presence of incentives to collaborate, and (3)
history of conflict or cooperation, which will hinder or facilitate collaboration (Ansell &
Gash, 2007, p. 550-551).
From a state perspective, key precipitating factors that helped to foster support for
the CCO legislation were the looming budget crisis of the “Great Recession”; recognition
and acknowledgement of unsustainable growth in health care; a general sense of urgency,
particularly the impact of Medicaid expenditures on Oregon’s biannual budget; and an
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opportunity to achieve health reform in Oregon. These factors contributed to bipartisan
support, and along with Governor Kitzhaber’s leadership, created an unprecedented effort
to transform Oregon’s health care system, starting with the Oregon Health Plan.
The environment or starting conditions influenced the early formation of the
CCOs. For Health Share, the prior history with the Health Leadership Council and TriCounty Medicaid Collaborative helped the partners of the CCO leverage existing
relationships, further recognize different aspects of the health industry, and remove
historical mistrust. In the case of Willamette Valley Community Health, the history of
conflict between the IPA and the largest for-profit, privately owned hospital affected the
institutional design, collaborative process, trust building, and ability of the CCO to work
towards intermediate outcomes, including developing a mission statement and vision.
Salem Health and its two affiliated hospitals, which serve the majority of OHP members
in the Salem region, experienced a power differential. Salem Health did not perceive
sufficient incentives to participate in the Willamette Valley CCO’s new financial model
of a global budget. Salem Health preferred to continue providing hospital-based services
through the existing financial model, which was more lucrative for the organization. In
contrast, the starting conditions in Yamhill were unique compared to the other two CCOs.
Prior to the creation of the CCO legislation, there had been minimal managed care in
Yamhill County. The lack of an existing Medicaid managed care organization or large
IPA serving OHP members created a set of starting conditions that did not spring from a
history of conflict.
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The role of incentives served as a key factor among the three CCOs and
partnering organizations (Gunton & Day, 2003; Imperial, 2005). For example, in Yamhill
the incentives identified by participants were more focused on wanting to help the
“community” and less financial in nature; partnering organizations were not riskaccepting entities. In comparison, the role of financial incentives was a significant factor
in organizations partnering in Health Share. In Willamette Valley Community Health,
financial incentives influenced one of the larger hospital systems to not participate
initially in the new CCO arrangement.
Institutional design. The institutional design refers to the guidelines and ground
rules that exist for collaboration (Weech-Maldonado & Merrill, 2000; Fung & Wright,
2001; Ansell & Gash, 2007). In a model of collaborative governance, the institutional
design should foster an open, transparent, and inclusive environment for stakeholders
(Ansell & Gash, 2007, p. 555). For this study, institutional design was an outcome of the
formalization of a governance structure among the CCOs. CCOs had to determine how
inclusive or exclusive they were in terms of stakeholder participation, which included not
only partnering organizations but organizations beyond those that formed the CCO. All
three CCOs supported an open and inclusive process during the early forming stage of
these new organizations. Public involvement at the local level included broad
participation among dozens of organizations prior to forming each CCO. In the early
planning stages, community partners were invited to participate in the initial discussions
around forming a CCO. After formation, however, the notion of transparency and
openness with Health Share required cultural change for several board members. For
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example, staff with the new CCO was intentional in making sure that the CAC meetings
were facilitated in an open and transparent environment. Conversely, after Willamette
Valley Community Health was formed and the lawsuit transpired, the board meetings
were no longer open or transparent. The board continues to operate without transparency,
with its meetings still closed to the public. In comparison to Willamette Valley
Community Health, Health Share and Yamhill value openness and transparency as part of
encouraging participation and ensuring that their boards and advisory bodies support an
inclusive process.
An important design aspect among the CCOs was the type of organization: the
LLC or 501(c)3. All three CCOs needed to incorporate because they were “new”
organizations. Health Share and Willamette Valley Community Health both expressed an
early concern about the type of organization because the mixture of local governmental
entities, nonprofits, and for-profit partnering organizations required caution to avoid
compromising state or federal regulations. The type of organization was an important
design feature in terms of legitimacy among stakeholders.
Leadership. Leadership is key for any governance system and played an
important influencing factor in a CCO’s ability to bring stakeholders together and engage
in the collaborative (Ryan, 2001; Lasker & Weiss, 2003). Collaboration does not happen
in a leadership vacuum. Ansell and Gash (2007) state that leadership is “crucial for
setting and maintaining clear ground rules, building trust, facilitating dialogue, and
exploring mutual gains” (p. 554). Leadership can also help to achieve balance when
power and resources among stakeholders are asymmetrical. The presence of leadership
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within individual CCO board members, coupled with leadership by state officials and the
governor, has been an instrumental force in Oregon. Leadership is a necessary condition
for collaborative governance, and it was a necessary starting condition for CCOs. This
was most evident with Yamhill and the local leadership from the county government,
which was instrumental in the creation of Yamhill CCO. With Health Share, the CEOs of
the member hospitals and health plans were well known leaders within the health care
community. The leaders and future board members were able to engage with one another
and through consensus design a governance structure that was acceptable to the board. In
contrast, the change in and lack of leadership within Willamette Valley Community
Health hindered the board’s ability to engage in decision-making or develop an agreedupon mission and vision for the new organization.
Collaborative process.
Success is pulling together the community in forming a coordinated care
organization…trying to establish new relationships. (Case ID 3)
Collaboration can be cooperative or required by formal processes, in this case
through public policy-making by the Oregon Legislature. The purpose of collaboration is
to solve one or more problems that cannot be solved by a single organization (Agranoff
& McGuire, p. 21, 2003). Through collaborative governance, CCOs leverage
“interdependencies with the nongovernmental sector” while simultaneously directly
involve public sectors across the horizontal and vertical levels, in this case state and
county intergovernmental agencies (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). Governmental
collaboration is occurring vertically through CCOs, the Oregon Health Authority, and the
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federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Horizontal governing is also
occurring through county agencies, nonprofits, and private organizations within a CCO’s
geographically defined community.
Ansell and Gash (2007) state that the collaborative process itself is an iterative
cycle that builds on communication, mutual trust, commitment to the process, shared
understanding, and mutually beneficial outcomes. For CCOs, the first step in this process
was direct and frequent communication between partnering organizations. For all three
CCOs, the direct and frequent dialogue lasted over a period of months and was face-toface (Ansell & Gash, 2007). For Health Share, the collaborative process was initiated
with the creation of the Health Leadership Council, continued with the Tri-County
Medicaid Collaborative, and ultimately led to the creation of the CCO.
The notion of having stakeholders interact in person is important but not
“necessary” for effective collaboration to transpire (Ansell & Gash, 2007, p. 558).
Consistent with the literature, however, the interaction among CCO board members was
“necessary” for collaboration, particularly face-to-face dialogue (Lasker & Weiss, 2003;
Huxam, 2003). The “endless hours” of long in-person meetings led to a shared
understanding for two of the CCOs. Another finding consistent with the literature was
that the personal meetings among board members served as a forum to help develop
relationships and trust, mutual understanding, and a new appreciation for one another—
all of which were achieved through the collaboration (Weech-Maldonado & Miller, 2000;
Daniels & Walker, 2001; Vargen & Huxham, 2003).
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Any collaborative process must include ongoing deliberation and negotiation and
be transparent and consensus-oriented, with stakeholders sharing responsibility for the
process (Ansell & Gash, 2007). This was evident in each of the three CCOs. For CCOs,
the collaborative process built trust, often among organizations where mistrust was
present, and more importantly where mistrust was a product of historical conflict.
Through a time-intensive process of meetings that spanned months, CCO board members
were able to build trust by interacting frequently and regularly with one another in
person. This was especially the case with Health Share, where the historical mistrust
among area hospital systems, health plans, and provider groups diminished through the
process. In contrast, Willamette Valley Community Health was not able to build trust or a
shared understanding through a collaborative process. The findings indicate that, for
CCOs, commitment required that board members develop trust and a shared
understanding as a means of working towards outcomes. This process, over time, resulted
in “mutual recognition” that the objectives for CCOs are only achievable through
collaboration.
Consistent with the literature is that through the collaborative process, “shared
understanding” can emerge. This refers to the collaborative having a clear mission, a
common and shared definition of the problem, and an identification of common values
across the stakeholders. For Health Share and Yamhill, the board members developed a
mission and shared understanding for the CCO as well as a shared understanding that
extended beyond the CCO. Board members developed new understanding and insights
into different professions, different organizations, and their roles as part of a community
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health system, which offered individual board members a clear understanding of the roles
and responsibilities across the health care spectrum. This included the role of local health
authorities, behavioral health providers, the dental community, community health
workers, health plans, and hospitals. The findings suggest that collaboration is best
achieved through dialogue and process, not hierarchical command and control structures.
Implications for Policy
CCOs offer a new complex governing model at the local level that is
characterized by new structural relationships among public, private, and nonprofit
organizations. The literature reviewed for this study, reinforced by the study findings,
indicated that collaborative governance is a strategic approach for the optimal utilization
of resources provided to public, private, and nonprofit organizations to deliver services to
Oregon’s Medicaid population within regional communities with local control and
accountability. Additionally, this study focused on expanding the knowledge base related
to the development of partnerships between public, private, and governmental agencies
(Austin, 2003). Table 5.2 provides a summary of which indicators were present or absent
(i.e. yes/no) across the CCOs that were used to construct the individual concepts that
form the collaborative governance model.
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Table 5.2: Collaborative Governance and CCOs*
Concepts

Starting Conditions

Indicators
Power-resource imbalance
Incentives for and constraints on
participation (legal, economic,
political)

Facilitative
Leadership

Collaborative
Process
(Relationship
Dynamics)

Willamette Yamhill
+

−

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

−

+

+

−

+

Skills and knowledge
Facilitation

+
+

−
−

+
+

Engagement

+

−

+

Empowerment

+

−

+

Collective choice decision-making

+

−

+

Face-to-face dialogue

+

+

+

Trust building

+

−

+

Commitment to process

+

−

+

Shared understanding

+

−

+

Intermediate outcomes

+

+

+

History of conflict or cooperation

Institutional Design

Health
Share
+

Participatory
inclusiveness/exclusiveness:
public involvement, local
involvement
Broad participation: composition
of membership by expertise or
geographic location
Procedural legitimacy: guidelines
and rules for participation
Open, transparent, and inclusive
process

* Key: Present/Yes = +; Not present/No = −
The results in this study align with Goldsmith and Eggers’s (2004) belief that the
devolution of governmental services to the private and nonprofit sectors has resulted in a
reduction of more hierarchical types of governance and the emergence of more horizontal
models that focus on public value. CCO board members who participated in the study
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expressed a strong concern for engaging in key functions of collaborative governance due
to their perception of the benefit to the community and the need to identify solutions to
problems within their locale. This indicated a certain willingness of CCO board members
and partnering organizations within a CCO to relinquish a degree of autonomy and
authority for the benefit of those served by a publicly financed program, in this case
Medicaid (Chi, 2008).
Bingham, Nabatchi and O’Leary (2005) indicate that new governance models
should include quasi-legislative processes such as citizen input and targeted dialogue
among stakeholders and that future research should identify the environments in which
new governance processes would thrive. The emerging themes in this study are important
factors for collaborative governance among CCOs: community inclusion and engaged
deliberative participation, the perception of mutual gain and shared benefit through
collaboration across sectors, recognition of shared understanding, and trust building.
Inclusive processes encompass for-profit and not-for-profit health care
organizations, including governmental entities within a geographically defined
community being incentivized and engaged in a problem-solving enterprise. Furthermore,
the themes emerging from this research imply readiness by the study participants to test
more complex systems, such as collaborative governance in CCOs, that will provide
opportunities for the optimal utilization of organizational and financial resources, which
will likely result in a more efficient and systematic allocation of resources in Oregon
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2003).
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Ceding authority from the county public health and mental health agencies to a
non-governmental agency raises issues of control, public trust, and accountability.
Historically, public agencies were considered accountable to the local citizens by elected
officials and to the state through existing regulatory structures. Oregon law mandates that
county agencies ensure provision of basic services, which include public, mental, and
social services. The role and function of county government is evolving under the
collaborative governance model of CCOs, blurring the boundaries between county
government and private agencies and resulting in issues around control, public trust, and
accountability that affect the collaborative process.
Results suggest a number of key factors as contributing to both the success of
collaborative governance as well as strategies for the resolution of identified conflicts.
Most of the study participants indicated that, at some level, the communities and other
stakeholders who are involved in a collaborative governance process must perceive a
“shared understanding” and that the process is mutually beneficial. A summary of
recurring statements related to the starting conditions that facilitate effective governance
includes: (a) commitment, consistency, and perception of credibility and trust within the
CCO; (b) existence of facilitative leadership within the board; (c) prior history of
cooperation that encouraged the success in the early formative period of the CCO; (d)
recognition of incentives to participate; and (e) clarity and commitment regarding roles,
responsibilities, goals, and objectives of the new CCO, including functioning among the
board and advisory entities.

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS 220
The results suggest several challenges regarding participation in collaborative
governance models: (a) clearly defining the extent of the decision-making authority of
board members, including clearly defining the roles of advisory entities in relation to the
governing board; (b) clearly defining the mission of the CCO, including the mission
statement and vision; (c) clarifying the accountability of the individual board members to
the CCO and their parent organizations; and (d) ensuring the development of a model that
is appropriate for all of the communities represented within the collaborative governance
structure, i.e. those served by the OHP.
A number of factors were identified as potentially impeding the ability of a CCO
to adhere to a collaborative governance approach. The main factor identified was the
potential for conflicting or competing agendas among board members. Emerging themes
were for-profit verses nonprofit orientation, transparency of purpose, and recognition that
board members may at times be required to make decisions that conflict with the
financial interests of their home organizations. Such statements imply that the study
participants were aware of the possibility of conflict related to competing agendas as well
as the potential adverse influences on the development of strong collaborative
relationships within a CCO. Although the issue of inherent conflict was identified, the
themes of inclusion and perceptions of empowerment and shared understanding implied
that the participants perceived that collaborative relationships can exist within a formal
collaborative governance structure if the proper foundation exists to promote and
maintain such relationships. Study participants recognized the importance of overcoming
a history of conflict and mistrust through ongoing engagement and face-to-face dialogue.
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Therefore, the model of collaborative governance can offer a novel approach for a diverse
group of stakeholders with complex and often intertwined historical relationships: the
opportunity to collaborate and seek strategies to meet the needs of both urban and rural
communities in Oregon.
CCOs’ support of a collaborative governance structure was evidenced by
transparency, commitment, and shared understanding. Emerging themes such as fear and
mistrust may compete with the desire for consensus building and were expressed in the
desire of study participants to diminish power struggles and other forms of power
imbalances. Ongoing dialogue and communication were identified as strategies to
mitigate mistrust and conflict within a CCO. One assumption is that public and private
organizations will participate in collaborative governance structures when perceptions of
mistrust and inequality are less than perceptions of mutual benefit and gain. Conversely,
when public and private organizations do not perceive a shared interest or commitment
along with a presence of distrust, such organizations are less likely to participate in a
collaborative governance arrangement. All three cases demonstrated that stakeholders
should be encouraged to continue their engagement in boundary-spanning activities.
These activities, along with the utilization of personal and professional influence, are
necessary to gain access to additional resources that will strengthen the sustainability of
the participating organizations and legitimize their value to the community (Kumar & van
Diessel, 1996; Miller-Millesen, 2003).
The study participants’ perceptions of inclusion and empowerment may also
compete with perceptions of power imbalance and may reduce conflicts related to
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mistrust if stakeholders are brought to the table with clearly defined roles, missions,
goals, and objectives, and with the majority of participants committed to the formation of
a collaborative governance structure. Results indicated that the following factors impeded
the collaborative governance process according to the study participants: sources of
conflict, such as not viewing the collaborative governance process as beneficial; lack of
legitimacy, ineffective communication; mistrust; insufficient information and knowledge;
perceptions of the lack of empowerment; resource allocation; and ineffective leadership.
The results of the study are consistent with Ansell and Gash’s (2007) notions
regarding key factors for collaboration: (a) if some stakeholders perceive a lack of
empowerment, or if there is not equal access to resources, the level of commitment
required for effective collaboration will be diminished; (b) a strong sense of
interdependence provides the incentive for stakeholders to pursue mutual/shared goals
and objectives; (c) stakeholders must perceive that the outcomes of their collaboration are
respected by other forums; (d) existing conflicts among stakeholders must be resolved or
minimized; and (e) strong relationships and social capital must exist among stakeholders.
In sum, results indicate that trust, inclusion, transparency, mutual gain, empowerment,
and community benefit must be present for collaborative governance processes to work.
The analysis identified several distinct (but related) roles played by CCOs that
resulted from a collaborative governance approach, summarized below:
•

CCOs address competitive pressures among participating organizations.
Competing organizations would otherwise be reluctant to expend their own
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resources on collective goals that help competitors, even when benefits are
shared.
•

CCOs assist in solving significant and fundamental problems in the health care
industry that are too complex for voluntary, independent coordination, especially
among participants distracted by their own organizational-level goals in conflict
with other organizations.

•

CCOs serve as a new structure for coordination by creating a new institutional
design that is transparent and requires that competitors share information. This
only applies when a CCO has earned the trust of the organizations with which
they work.

•

CCOs have developed or contracted for the expertise and infrastructure required
to complete the administrative tasks of running a large health care organization,
allowing the board to engage in collective and community problem-solving that is
too time-consuming for individual organizations to manage on their own.

•

CCOs provide accountability when partner organizations cannot enforce
commitments upon each other either because they either lack the capacity or
compete with them. Enforcement (or at least pressure) from a neutral CCO is
perceived as more acceptable. This extends to accountability of the partner
organizations to the CCO, which is then held accountable by the state.
The role of the state or public institutions in stimulating collaborative

partnerships, in particular the role of a government, is as a topic of continued importance.
The Oregon legislative and executive branches of government intentionally and
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deliberately adopted and required new governing arrangements. Through legislation,
administrative rulemaking, and contracting, Oregon’s executive branch required the key
concepts of a collaborative governance model for all CCOs. In Oregon, legislation and
regulation served as facilitating forces and shapers of both a collaborative governance
model and its processes. The initiation and/or success of collaboration could, in fact, be
potentially dependent on credible threats of imminent or future regulation, the “shadow
of the state,” as was the case with Willamette Valley Community Health (Ansell & Gash,
2007).
Findings support the notion that CCOs are “intergovernmental” as evidenced by
regulatory and contractual relationships in which the boundaries of government and its
functions, including public and mental health services, are no longer the exclusive
domain of state and county governments in Oregon (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003).
Furthermore, CCOs are new organizations, purposive in nature, and operate through
contractual and multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems in the financing and
delivery of comprehensive health care services for hundreds of thousands of low-income
Oregon residents (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p. 4).
According to Agranoff & McGuire (2003), the level of “interdependencies…both
vertical and horizontal” between governmental and non-governmental organizations
illustrate the “greater the need for coordination and collaboration” (p. 35). CCOs are a
case in point with the federal and state (vertical) government dollars responsible for
funding services through both governmental and nongovernmental (horizontal)
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organizations. Furthermore, county government is at the “hub of both horizontal and
vertical connections” through 16 CCOs that span all 36 counties in Oregon.
The need for facilitating forums indicates that collaboration across sectors, at least
in health care, is unlikely to occur merely due to the recognition and support for the
larger community or public good. In the case of CCOs, if participants do not foresee
immediate gains or “benefit” for their parent organization, and if there is no pressure
from regulations, laws, or coordinating organizations, incentives to collaborate could be
minimal. In fact, they could be insufficient to achieve the desired outcomes, in this case
the fundamental restructuring of Oregon’s Medicaid financing and delivery system,
including bringing about local control and accountability in communities throughout
Oregon. Furthermore, when there are a number of difficult conditions present, such as
interorganizational competition, finite resources (primarily funding), accountability
concerns, goal divergence, and time-consuming collaborative processes, the likelihood of
promoting the public good as the motivating factor of a collaborative governance model
is suspect. Based on the findings from the three case studies, additional motivating
factors or incentives are needed, depending on the local environmental factors and
composition of the potential partnering organizations (e.g. for-profit versus nonprofit).
Results indicate that regulations or laws that encourage financial incentives to CCOs and
Oregon’s CCO collaborative endeavors help further “spur” collaboration.
Results from the thematic analyses also have other practical implications. For
instance, interpersonal relationships among area health care leaders and government
officials were critical to both building future working relationships and resolving
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conflicts. It is important for public officials, therefore, to cultivate personal relationships
with potential partners. Interviewees stressed the importance of frequent face-to-face
dialogue and engagement, willingness to understand different perspectives, and
willingness to engage in the process. Results suggest that organizations often find
common ground through sustained engagement, even when the principal players disagree
on goals and values. The Tri-County Medicaid Collaborative that evolved into Health
Share is an example of such engagement.
As described in this chapter, it is critical to know whether collaboration creates
and distributes public benefits at a reasonable cost to society. Collaboration is often
mandated or strongly encouraged as a policy tool because of expected benefits, even
without hard evidence of those benefits. Furthermore, collaborative processes are thought
to be costly, especially in terms of time, so it is important to know whether they are worth
it. In 2011 and 2012, an unprecedented “policy window” (Kingdon, 1995) was created in
Oregon with the convergence of (a) the growing problems in health care, both in Oregon
and nationally; (b) policies under development for reforming Oregon’s Medicaid system;
(c) the politics of the elections, locally of Governor Kitzhaber and nationally of President
Obama; and (d) passage of the ACA. The result was that Oregon’s policymakers passed
legislation that sought to reform Oregon’s health system starting with coordinated care
organizations. For policymakers and public administrators looking for new governing
models, collaborative governance holds considerable promise for a range of policy issues
beyond health care.
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Assumptions and Limitations
There are several methodological limitations of this research. First, there are no
comparison cases of non-collaboration. While problematic for a traditional case study,
the lack of non-collaboration cases is less concerning because the three cases offered an
opportunity for comparative analysis.
Researchers might be concerned with the narrow focus on collaborative
governance within three limited geographic regions in Oregon when approaching such a
broad topic. However, what appears to be a narrow policy focus is, in reality, quite broad.
For example, issues of conflict, cooperation, limited resources, fragmentation, and crosssector actors expand beyond the delivery and financing of health care services. Examples
include land conversion, public resource management, and education (see Ansell & Gash,
2007). The interviewees worked in diverse areas in health care and public health. Insights
obtained from analysis of the transcriptions are therefore assumed to be at least broadly
generalizable to similar policy areas in other localities in the United States.
Another limitation of the study was the number of participants interviewed from
each CCO. Due to the limited number of individuals who were willing or able to
participate in the interview process, the findings are not necessarily representative of the
full spectrum of partnering organizations within each case study. The ability to draw
formal conclusions based on a limited sample of board members and staff necessarily
limits the ability to draw conclusions with any degree of certainty. A number of
organizations represented on the three CCO boards were not able to participate in the
study and thus were not represented in the findings. For example, if the majority of
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participants from one CCO were from partner organizations that are nonprofit, it would
be difficult to ascertain implications in the context of for-profit organizations, including
incentives for and constraints on participation, cultural differences, and commitment to a
shared or “collective” interest among the newly formed CCO.
A final limitation relates to the reality of time and resources available to complete
this study. Because this research was conducted as dissertation research, it was necessary
to articulate certain parameters and constraints in order to ensure the timely completion
of the dissertation. Despite these stated limitations and assumptions, the findings provide
one of the first descriptive assessments of CCO governance in Oregon.
Recommendations for Future Research
Given the limited focus of this study, the findings raise a number of
recommendations for future research. For future research that includes qualitative,
quantitative, and mixed methods, larger number of cases may be beneficial in further
testing theoretical models for collaborative governance, including the influence of the
main concepts explored in this study: starting conditions, institutional design, facilitative
leadership, and collaborative process. Of equal importance will be for future studies to
assess the influence of these factors on the desired outcomes of CCOs, and more broadly
the ability for collaborative governance to serve as a means to achieve the desired end(s).
It will be valuable to understand the expected versus realized outcomes when
organizations collaborate, including outcomes from interorganizational collaboration
among nonprofit and for-profit organizations.
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At this point, it unknown to what extent CCOs will take on the historical roles of
county agencies in relation to public and mental health services. Also unknown is
whether the state and county governmental agencies’ responsibility for and accountability
to the public, in this case low-income Oregonians, is “compromised and limited” by the
use of collaborative governance in CCOs (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p. 189). The state
is required to hold CCOs accountable for achieving the goals of the Triple Aim, and the
CACs are designed to hold the CCOs accountable to the communities served by these
organizations. The extent to which either of these accountability mechanisms will
function is also an unknown.
Also of considerable interest for future research is whether local communitybased organizations such as CCOs offer a model by which there is “more government
action and less government involvement” (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p. 24). State and
federal governments have central authority in the context of contemporary societal issues.
However, the complexity of today’s issues—specifically around insurance, access,
quality of care, and financing—requires effective new models for governing, in which
governmental and non-governmental organizations seek to solve problems
collaboratively rather than independently; thus recognizing the organizational
interdependencies in health care, specifically Medicaid.
Over the coming years, it will be important to conduct quantitative studies to
determine whether collaborative governance influences the outcomes of CCOs as
evaluated by their ability to contain health care expenditures per capita, increase quality
of care delivered, or be held accountable to the communities served. Furthermore, the
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extent of the relevance of themes identified through qualitative research and the
development of collaborative governance models will need to be supported by multiple
sources and types of empirical data. Mixed methods studies on the topic of collaborative
governance, by design, might be able to move beyond identification of themes and
concepts. Such studies can also provide quantitative data to more accurately and
confidently determine the key facets of collaborative governance, including arrangements
that ultimately impede and facilitate governing in a multi- or cross-sector environment.
Longitudinal studies will certainly benefit a scholarly, theoretical approach to the
development of collaborative governance models in health care.
Another area for consideration is whether previously well-organized interests with
significant financial resources, such as large hospital systems, retain the power
differential that existed prior to the creation of CCOs, either lasting or changing over time
through collaboration and institutional designs (Fung, 2002). An intriguing question is
whether larger hospitals and health plans will co-opt smaller, less resourced organizations
in the governing or decision-making process within a CCO.
Future research will be able to confirm whether CCOs achieve the desired
outcomes including the Triple Aim, and if they effectively coordinate and integrate
comprehensive community-based services for hundreds of thousands of Oregonians in
the years to come. Researchers will be able to determine whether and how key concepts
of collaborative governance are transferable to other policy domains and regional settings
beyond Oregon.
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Conclusions
What do all the CCOs have in common? And we all sat around to think about
what we have in common…and what we have in common—we all reflect our
community. That’s what we have in common. (Case ID 5)
Results from this study enhance the early understanding of coordinated care
organizations, which are a new and innovative model of community governance intended
to improve the health status of individuals and communities by involving local agencies
and individuals to create a new health system that is responsive to, and accountable for,
communities in Oregon. The results indicate that organizations that have formed CCOs
are characterized by a problem-solving orientation, are participatory and seek broad
representation, are actively engaged in collaborative processes, are interdependent and
accountable to each other, and transcend the public-private divide (Freeman, 1997). A
number of differences were identified as influencing early CCO development: local
political, institutional, and historical contexts; different starting conditions; leadership;
and governance structures. Important factors identified in the collaborative governance
process were history of conflict or cooperation, incentives and willingness to participate
among a broad and diverse group of stakeholders, power and resource differences,
presence and commitment of leadership (or lack thereof), and presence of a collaborative
process. The model of collaborative governance examined in this study offers a new and
effective regional approach to address community-based problems that span public and
private sectors.
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The significance of this study is that it identified important starting conditions that
facilitate or impede the ability of CCOs to effectively solve problems through
governance. Since CCOs are a new organizational form, there was no previous research
studying these governance mechanisms. Collaborative governance models for CCOs
serve as a mechanism to address the collective resource management issue faced by
health care that spans public and private boundaries in Oregon. Oregon’s CCOs are an
example of Kettl’s (1993) assertion that “government refers to the structure and functions
of public institutions. Governance is the way government gets its job done” (p. 11).
Collaborative governance offers a new model for public institutions to create effective
public-private partnerships where integration of public and private entities at the local or
regional level can solve complex problems within a particular policy arena.
The analytic framework of collaborative governance used to explore CCOs in this
study offers a descriptive model to assess these new organizations. CCOs are designed to
deal with one of the most vexing problems presented by the U.S. health care system—
publicly financed health care services in Medicaid. The study suggests that CCOs serve
as an emerging governing model to implement community-level reforms, in which
collaborative governance extends the functions of the state by leveraging public-private
partnerships, intergovernmental organizations, and use of contracting to support functions
and responsibilities through a “hollowed out” administrative bureaucracy in a postmodern era (Rhodes, 1997; Frederick, 2007). The Oregon Legislature used its legal and
financial resources to create conditions believed to achieve cost reductions in Medicaid
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and promote efficiency and quality improvements in the health care delivery system
(Skelcher, 2007).
According to Forbes et al. (2007), the services delivered and utilized serve as
outputs of the U.S. health care industry, with the health status of individuals and
populations serving as outcomes. In Medicaid, the outputs and outcomes are the result of
complex interactions among interdependent organizations, public and private, with public
policies that specify “rules” and “allocate” resources to organizations (Forbes et al., 2007,
p. 474). Without an adequate understanding of the governance structure or arrangements,
and processes, it will be difficult to (1) determine what factors or attributes of CCOs
facilitate success or failure, and (2) assess outcomes at two levels. The first level is the
CCO in terms of community health status; the second level is collaborative governance as
a model to address complex social issues including delivery of publicly funded health and
human services at the community level. The study sought to address the question posed
by Alexander and Zuckerman (1989) 25 years ago about whether health care
organizations such as CCOs “are community service organizations or competitive
business entities” (p. 762). A critical question is whether for-profit versus nonprofit
matters. Based on the study results, the notion of for-profit versus nonprofit may
influence the outputs and outcomes of Oregon’s Medicaid delivery systems in the future.
This study developed insights into similarities and differences among CCO
governance structures by investigating three CCOs. The study advances our present
understanding of the potential and limitations of collaborative governance as a promising
new model to effect health care reform. As stated by Rhodes (1997), “Messy problems
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demand messy solutions” (p. 15). Oregon’s financing and delivery of Medicaid services
illustrates a messy problem: CCOs are potentially messy, yet also have the ability to
create an innovative solution that offers a new strategy designed around creating new
complex organizations that build trust through collaboration in a resource-scarce and
competitive environment.
As governmental organizations continue to recognize the limitations of the
traditional command-and-control, hierarchical model of governing, collaborative
governance serves as a new model for public agencies to use formal authority to address
particular governance challenges by creating new processes of collaboration over time
among a complex set of organizations that span the multiple sectors of public, private,
and nonprofit. The potential for federal, state, and local governmental agencies to create
and influence the conditions for collaborate governance in sectors beyond health care
holds promise. Through public policy, including establishing new laws and rule-making,
public institutions can enhance their ability to govern and achieve public policy goals by
forming new public-private partnerships through collaborative governance. In the specific
example of Oregon, which provided the basis for this study, the new coordinated care
organizations can promote effective collaborative governance across communities and
help Oregon along its path to achieve the Triple Aim and improve the health of
Oregonians through cost-effective delivery of Medicaid services.
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Appendix A: IRB Application
II.

Project Title & Prospectus

Title: “Oregon’s Health System Transformation and Coordinated Care
Organizations: A Case Study of Collaborative Governance”
Principal Investigator: Oliver J. Droppers, MS, MPH, Portland State University
Dissertation Chair: Sherril B. Gelmon, DrPH, Division of Public Administration
In 2011, the Oregon Legislature and Governor John Kitzhaber through passage of House
Bill 3650 laid the foundation for the creation of coordinated care organizations (CCOs).
This legislation was the embodiment for transformation of Oregon’s health care delivery
system around the Triple Aim of improving health, health care, and lowering costs.
Oregon’s CCOs are intended to create “community-base organizations” governed by
health care providers, community members, and organizations responsible for financial
risk to create a “more coordinated and affordable, patient-centered health care delivery
system” (Oregon Health Authority, 2012, p. 1).32 These entities will be responsible for
the integration and coordination of physical, mental, behavioral, and dental care services
for individuals eligible for Oregon’s Medicaid program: the Oregon Health Plan (OHP).
Starting September 1, 2012, there are 13 certified CCOs operating in 33 counties
covering nearly 500,000 adults and children in OHP.
The proposed multi-case research study will explore CCOs in an effort to understand the
process and conditions under which participation and decision-making among
stakeholders are facilitated or impeded through a collaborative governance model. This
study will observe the governance process in order to be able to assess and evaluate
future policy decisions about CCOs, and more broadly, inform state-level health care
reform. The theory of collaborative governance offers a promising analytic framework
for investigating CCOs. It is unknown whether a preferred model of governance may
emerge in terms of facilitating effective CCOs that generate benefits for providers,
consumers, local, state and federal agencies, and other stakeholders involved with health
care reform efforts. The importance of researching the collaborative governance
infrastructure and process is that the presence of a combination of key factors, or their
absence, will affect the ability of CCOs to be effective and successful.
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  Oregon Health Authority (2012, May). Coordinated Care Organization
implementation proposal: Fact sheet. Retrieved from http://www.oregon.gov/OHA/OHPB/healthreform/docs/cco-factsheet.pdf?ga=t
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III. Exemption Claim for Waiver of Review
This study is part of a doctoral dissertation within the Hatfield School of Government.
The application requests an expedited review since the study will examine a public
service program, Oregon’s CCOs, which are responsible for delivering services for
500,000 individuals enrolled in the Medicaid: the Oregon Health Plan. I anticipate
sharing aggregated and de-identified findings through written reports with agency
leadership within the Oregon Health Authority to inform early CCO governance
arrangements. Research supported through the study includes the collection of existing
data, documents, and records that are publicly available except information collected
through key informant interviews.
IV. Subject Recruitment
This purpose of the study is to investigate the collaborative governance model of CCOs
by utilizing a mixed-methodology for collecting primary and secondary data among a
purposeful sample of Oregon’s 13 certified CCOs. Primary data will be collected by
conducting two sets of semi-structured interviews. Recruitment of subjects is described
below.
Oregon Health Authority and the Office of the Governor
The first set of key interviews will be with 4-6 key informants with the Oregon Health
Authority (OHA) and the Governor’s Office. Potential participants for the initial
interviews include senior leadership and policy advisors within the Oregon Health
Authority and the Governor’s Office. The purpose of this initial set of interviews is to
gather insight and background information from key public officials that led Oregon’s
effort to establish CCOs through passage of legislation in 2011 and 2012. This initial set
of interviews will help guide and inform the CCO selection process, given the in-depth
knowledge of these individuals who have been closely involved in the CCO formation
and approval process through the OHA and Governor’s Office. Specific areas of interest
that state officials will be asked to reflect upon include historical and environmental
factors unique to the individual CCOs and verification of the presence of facilitative
leadership among the study’s potential participants.
Officials with the OHA or Governor’s Office will not be selecting the CCOs. Rather,
these individuals are in a unique position to offer historical local context and information
about key environmental factors that might have affected early CCO formation and
implementation efforts across the 13 CCOs in Oregon, particularly initial starting
conditions and prior organizational history. The interviewees will also be asked about
whether alternative CCOs should be considered in lieu of the four CCOs previously
identified as potential participants (see next two sections for selection criteria). If one or
more alternatives are suggested, interviewees will be asked to provide their rationale as to
why an alternative CCO ought to be considered. Interviews with key leaders will also
offer an opportunity to enhance this applied research study by working to ensure that
findings might inform ongoing implementation efforts led by CCOs and overseen by the
Oregon Health Authority. The goal of an applied research study, including this study, is
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to construct the study in such a way that findings are relevant and applicable to policymakers and public agencies.
Coordinated Care Organizations (CCOs)
The second wave of in-depth interviews will be executive staff and board members of
CCOs. These interviewees will include Chief Executive Officers/Executive Directors,
Chief Financial Officers, and Chairs and Co-chairs of CCOs. Upon selection of the four
CCOs to study, 3-4 executive officers and board members will be identified from each
CCO as potential interviewees for the study. The total number of potential CCO
interviewees will range from 12-16 participants.
Selection Criteria
Using pre-constructed selection criteria, and based upon information shared by the initial
set of interview participants, four CCOs will be selected for study. Key selection criteria,
developed from a review of the theoretical literature related to organizational theory and
contemporary governance, include the following: organizational service coverage area
(i.e. geography), prior history as a health care organization, history of collaboration, and
size and complexity (i.e. geographic coverage area, number of enrolled clients, and
number of participating organizations within a CCO).33 The inclusion criteria consist of
CCOs certified by the Oregon Health Authority. The exclusion criterion is any existing
Medicaid managed care organization (MCO), certified as a CCO, that has either simply
changed the legal status of the existing MCO to a new limited liability company (LLC),
or serves as a wholly-owned subsidiary of exiting MCO. Three of the 13 certified CCOs
meet the exclusion criteria. From the remaining 10 CCOs, I propose to study four CCOs.
This number is because of limitations in resources necessary to support a study of this
size and scope. The four organizations selected for inclusion were screened using
selection criteria carefully developed, informed and reviewed by my Dissertation
Committee. In consultation with my Dissertation Chair, the selected CCOs provide
diversity that includes organizational size and structure, geographic coverage area, prior
organizational history and starting conditions, and number of participating organizations
within a CCO. The four selected CCOs are Health Share of Oregon, PacificSource
Community Solutions, Umpqua Health Alliance, and Willamette Valley Community
Health. The CEO of each of these CCOs will receive the invitation for the organization to
participate; if they decline, another CCO will be contacted.
All interviews will last approximately 45-60 minutes; I will conduct each interview. An
email invitation will be sent to each individual potential participant (see Appendices A &
B). Key informants who verbally consent to participate in the interview will be contacted
by me to set up a mutually convenient time to conduct the interview. The date, time, and
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  See: Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2007). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 543-571. (or) Pointer, D., Alexander, J., & Zuckerman, H.
(1995). Loosening the Gordon knot of governance in integrated health care systems. Frontiers of Health
Services Management, 11(3), 3-37.
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location of the interview will depend on the participant’s availability and preferred
interview location, such as their place of employment or at an alternate location such as
Portland State University. The in-depth interviews will be digitally recorded, and notes
will be taken to enable the investigator to capture all the information provided and to
accurately represent discussion from the interviews.
Secondary Data Collection
Document analysis is the second form of data collection. Secondary data will be collected
through existing published materials including newly enacted policies, statutes, and
regulatory frameworks, white papers, documentation from public committees and
hearings, and internal CCO application documents; all which are available to the public.
There is no implication for the use of publicly available information in terms of this
HSRRC application. A structured framework will be developed and used to code
collected data into themes with comparisons being explored among potential relations
between one of more themes. Legislative reports, internal planning documents (as
available), proposed legislative concepts and supporting policy analyses, drafts of CCO
legislation, meeting materials including relevant documentation from the Health System
Transformation workgroups and corresponding meetings and materials from CCOs, as
well as internal analyses and reports prepared to support the CCO legislation will be
collected and analyzed. Technical and financial applications submitted to the OHA as
part of the CCO certification process including all planning documents from CCOs will
be collected and assessed (as available). Additional pertinent sources of information
could include official government records including but not limited to Oregon
Administrative Rules, Oregon Revised Statutes, any meeting minutes and related
materials generated by entities in the initial stages of becoming and implementing a CCO.
V. Informed Consent
Informed Consent
Individuals will consent to participate when they agree to the interview. Participants may
refuse to answer any question presented to them, or to exit the study at any time.
Participants will be informed that they may withdraw their consent at any time without
penalty. Verbal permission to take notes and digitally record interview sessions will be
obtained from the participants prior to commencing the interview, which will be held in a
private setting to prevent others (not involved in the conversation) from hearing what is
said during the interview. Participants will be encouraged to contact the principal
investigator or my dissertation chair to answer questions about any issues discussed both
prior and subsequent to their participation.
Key Informant Interviews
All potential participants will be invited to participate in the study via an introductory
email (see Appendices A.1 & A.2). The introductory email will provide a brief
introduction describing the purpose and goal of the study and contact information will be
provided for the principal investigator. Upon written or verbal acknowledgement and
agreement to participate, the principal investigator will schedule the interview(s).
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Prior to starting the interview(s), the principal investigator will provide a brief verbal
introduction of the purpose of the study. The interviewer will request a verbal
acknowledgment assuring the participant’s willingness to participate. Potential
participants will be told that they are under no obligation to take part in the study.
Refusal to participate is acceptable at any time. All potential participants in this research
study will be provided either with a written statement and/or will be read a verbal
statement stating, “that you have the right to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to participating in this
study project and that declining to participate in the study, or abstaining from answering
certain questions, will not result in any loss of service or result in any other negative
consequences.” (See Appendices A.3 & A.4)
VI. First-Person Scenario
Interview: Executive Staff in OHA & Governor’s Office
“As a member of the Oregon Health Authority’s Health System Transformation (HST)
leadership team, a partnership between OHA and the Governor’s Office, I was invited to
participate in an interview that would take approximately 30 minutes by Mr. Droppers as
part of his dissertation research at Portland State University. He wanted to ask me
questions that arose from my experience in supporting OHA’s effort to development and
implement coordinated care organizations (CCOs). As part of the OHA HST leadership
team, I was interested in participating but had concerns about being interviewed. At first,
I was a bit hesitant to grant permission for this request because of the time commitment
and I had a couple of questions that I wanted answered. I called Mr. Droppers and found
out what type of information he may need to use that could potentially identify me. After
speaking with Mr. Droppers, I was assured that he would not use any potentially sensitive
information about me and that any information I provided would be kept confidential. I
was also informed that any information shared in the interview would be anonymous in
any reports, so that I could not be personally linked to any findings. He was willing to
listen to my concerns and made me feel safe about participating in the interview.
Therefore, we scheduled a time most convenient according to my work schedule. On that
date and time, Mr. Droppers arrived at the agreed upon location of my choosing. We met
in a secure, private room in my building. Prior to beginning the interview, I was
informed of my rights as a study participant and that I could quit at any time. I was also
asked for permission for Mr. Droppers to take notes and record our conversation. Mr.
Droppers then verbally asked whether I still was willing to participate. I did not foresee
any problems from being interviewed, and therefore I proceeded to answer the interview
questions.”
Interview: CCO Staff and Board Members
“As a board member of one of Oregon’s newly formed coordinated care organizations
(CCOs), I was invited to participate in an interview that would take approximately 60
minutes. The researcher notified me that they would like to ask questions based upon my
experience in helping form my CCO. The research study sounded interesting, but I had
concerns about being interviewed because of the internal politics currently at hand within
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my CCO. Initially, I was reluctant to grant permission for this request because of the time
commitment and concerns about anonymity and unknown audience for any findings the
study resulted in. I had a couple of questions that I needed answered. So I contacted Mr.
Droppers and found out what type of information he may need to use that could
potentially identify me. After speaking with Mr. Droppers, I was assured he would not
use any potentially sensitive information about me and that any information provided
during the interview reported in would remain anonymous and not be attributed to the
CCO or myself. After some consideration and speaking with a follow board member
about the interview request, I decided to participate. We scheduled a time convenient to
my work schedule. On that date and time, Mr. Droppers arrived early. We met in a
secure, private room at my organization. Prior to beginning the interview, I was
informed of my rights as a study participant and that I could quite at any time. I was also
asked for permission for Mr. Droppers to take notes and digitally record my conversation.
Mr. Droppers then verbally asked whether I still was willing to participate. I did not
foresee any problems from being interviewed but did ask that the interview not be
recorded. Mr. Droppers at that point put away the digital recorder and agreed that he
would only jot down a few notes during the interview. We agreed, and I proceeded to
answer the interview questions.”
VII. Potential Risks and Safeguards
There are no anticipated risks since no identifying information will be made available in
any reports generated from the study. Minimal risk to participants includes violation of
participant confidentiality through inadvertent divulgence of information to other
participants in casual conversation, printed reports or manuscripts, or public
presentations. There is no reason to expect any concerns about the interview questions or
actual interview process. To manage any potential risks, several precautions will be
taken. The interview invitation will include contact information for the HSRRC if
interviewees have any questions or concerns about the research study, the interview or
their confidentiality. There is a slight possibility that an interviewer’s confidentiality
could be breached. All electronic and procedural safeguards possible have been
established for this research project, so this risk is minimal (see section IX for additional
information).
VIII. Potential Benefits
The benefit of the study will be to improve our understanding of a model of community
governance intended to improve the health status of individuals and communities by
involving local agencies and individuals in an effort to create a new health system that is
responsive to, and accountable for, communities across Oregon. Specific benefits
include: (1) identifying conditions that facilitate or impede the ability of CCOs to
effectively solve problems through governance mechanisms; (2) developing insights into
similarities and differences among CCO governance structures; and (3) advancing
understanding of the potential for and limitations of a collaborative governance model in
supporting health care reform. By learning about conditions that facilitate or impede the
ability of CCOs to effectively solve problems through governance mechanisms and
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developing insight into similarities and differences among CCO governance structures, it
may be possible for State officials, governing boards of CCOs, as well as legislative and
elected officials to consider meaningful changes related to existing federal and state
requirements for CCOs and potentially amend existing contracts between OHA and
CCOs in an effort to further support statewide health care reform. I intend to share my
findings with OHA after approval and completion of my dissertation.
Oregon is viewed as a pioneer and leader in state health care reform efforts and is quickly
implementing key elements of the federal Affordable Care Act (ACA). Oregon’s CCO
model serves as a potential model that may inform other states as well as the federal
reform efforts aimed to transform the financing and delivery of physical, mental,
behavioral, and dental services to Medicaid clients. Findings from this early study have
the potential to inform alternative models of health care reform across the country such as
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). Finally, the study has the potential to advance
my professional career as an aspiring health services researcher by examining Oregon’s
cutting edge and innovative approach to health care reform.
IX. Confidentiality, Records & Distribution
Confidentiality
Prior to taking part in the study, all participants will have either read and/or been verbally
told about the purpose of the study and that participation is completely voluntary.
Participants will be notified that any information obtained in connection with this study
that could be linked to them will be de-identified and remain anonymous. Data will not
be used to identify any individual study participant or their organization. All potentially
sensitive information will be de-identified and reported in such a way as to protect the
identity of relevant individuals and agencies/organizations. No individuals affiliated with
the Oregon Health Authority, Governor’s Office, or CCOs will have access to the raw
data. All data will be reported in the aggregate, and it will not be possible to identify any
individual respondent in any reported results. All attempts will be made to completely
blind study participants. All written reports or presentations will offer information that is
discrete and presented in a manner that protects all study participants and their
organization(s) from being identified.
Records
All completed interviews and all related data (notes, digital recordings, transcriptions)
will be kept in locked cabinets at PSU when not in use. Data entered and stored on the
computer will be saved on a computer at PSU in the Hatfield School of Government, only
accessible to the principal investigator. All data (interview notes, digital recording files,
transcripts etc.) will remain in locked file cabinets for at least three years after the study
ends. The principal investigator will control access to the locked files, and electronic data
will be solely in the possession of the principal investigator. Only the principal
investigator will have access to the data and any identifiable information in digital
recordings and transcripts.
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Public Release of Data
No personally identifiable information on study participants will be used in reports,
manuscripts, or presentations. All potentially sensitive organizational and personnel
information (e.g., official title, proprietary information, etc.) will be de-identified and
aggregated to protect the identity of relevant individuals and the agency/organization. If
findings from the research study are submitted for publication or dissemination in other
arenas, all peer-reviewed presentations and potential manuscripts will be in the aggregate
only and will not include the release of raw data. At this time, no plans exist to release
data from this study to other researchers.
X. Training and Experience
Professional Training and Experience
The research is part of a doctoral program in the Hatfield School of Government. As the
principal investigator, I am actively supervised by my Dissertation Committee, with
direct supervision by the Committee Chair, Dr. Sherril Gelmon, former Chair, PSU
Human Subjects Research Review Committee (HSRRC). Dr. Neal Wallace, another
dissertation committee member, currently serves as a member of the PSU HSRRC. From
2005-2011, I worked as a graduate research assistant and research associate at PSU with
Dr. Gelmon. This afforded me an opportunity to assist in the preparation of multiple
HSRRC applications, develop consent forms and interview protocols, conduct key
informant interviews and surveys, analyze findings, and prepare written reports based
upon findings from surveys, interviews, and focus groups.
Clarification of Roles and Responsibilities
It is important to clarify my role as a PSU PhD student by acknowledging my
professional responsibilities outside PSU. Currently, I am employed by the Oregon
Health Authority and serve in two different positions: (1) Project Director, Children’s
Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA) Quality Demonstration Grant,
and (2) Director, Oregon Medicaid Advisory Committee. While my position does not
have any direct responsibility or connection to OHA’s CCOs, employment by OHA does
provide me with access to information that could potentially be perceived as creating a
conflict. The purpose of this study is exclusively academic in nature as part of my
dissertation and completely separate and independent from my professional
responsibilities with the OHA. I will conduct all of my communications from my PSU
email account, use my personal cell phone for calls, and not hold any research-related
meetings at my office to maintain clear separation between my PhD studies and my
employment.
Nonetheless, if at any time I perceive any potential conflict in my role as a PSU PhD
student and my professional role within OHA, I will immediately notify my Dissertation
Chair (Dr. Gelmon) and my OHA supervisor, Dr. Jeanene Smith, a PSU MPH:HMP
alumna and Administrator of the Office for Oregon Health Policy and Research (OHPR)
in OHA. Dr. Gelmon and Dr. Smith are aware of the potential for perception of conflict
of interest, and plan to communicate regularly.
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XI. IRB Appendices
A.1 Oregon Health Authority and Oregon Governor’s Office Interview Invitation
A.2 Coordinated Care Organization (CCO) Interview Invitation
A.3 Interview Questionnaire for OHA and Governor’s Office Staff
A.4 Interview Questionnaire for Coordinated Care Organizations (CCOs) Staff
and/or Board Members
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Appendix A.1
Oregon Health Authority & Oregon Governor’s Office Interview Invitation
NOTE: The email invitation will be sent by Oliver Droppers from his Portland State
University email address.
Dear OHA/Governor’s Office Official [insert recipient name here]:
You are invited to participate in an interview as part of a research study I am conducting
as a PhD candidate in the Public Affairs and Policy Program in the Mark O. Hatfield
School of Government at Portland State University (PSU) under the supervision of Dr.
Sherril Gelmon, Professor of Public Health and Chair, Division of Public Administration.
The purpose of the study is to explore Oregon’s coordinated care organizations (CCOs)
in an effort to understand the process and conditions under which participation and
decision-making among stakeholders within a CCO are facilitated or impeded through
different community-based approaches to governance.
During this early CCO implementation phase, there is a unique opportunity to learn about
initial starting conditions and contextual factors that might influence the CCO
governance process. As a key public official that helped to lead statewide efforts to form
CCOs, you can offer valuable historical information about environmental factors that
might have affected early CCO formation and evolving implementation efforts across the
13 certified CCOs. You also have important insights about existing leadership among
CCOs and can provide a unique perspective on key factors such as the history of conflict
or cooperation within a CCO.
The interview will take approximately 45 minutes, and will be scheduled at your
convenience in a location of your choice. With your permission, I will be taking notes
and recording the discussion. All individual responses will be kept anonymous in my
reporting, and complete confidentiality of your actual responses is assured. The notes
and recordings will help me to accurately represent our discussion, but no one except me
will ever hear the recordings or see the written transcripts. If there are things that you tell
me that you do not wish repeated, please indicate that so that I do not include those
comments in any summaries developed from this conversation.
Your willingness to participate in the interview will be viewed as agreement to
participate in this phase of the evaluation; no written consent form is requested to
minimize the burden of responding with you. I do not intend to link comments back to
interviewees. While participating in this study, it is unlikely that you will encounter any
risks, as all information provided will be volunteered by you. You may not experience
any direct benefits from the study, but it is anticipated that the results will help to inform
the Oregon Health Authority in its effort to improve the state’s health system
transformation efforts, and to assist in future changes that may enhance CCO governance
models in Oregon and elsewhere.
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Your participation in this interview is voluntary. You do not have to answer any question
that you do not want to answer, and you may stop the interview at any time without
affecting your relationships with the Oregon Health Authority, any other state agencies or
CCOs, or Portland State University.
If you have any concerns about your participation in this study or your rights as a
research subject, you may contact the Human Subjects Research Review Committee,
Office of Research and Strategic Partnerships, Portland State University, 620 Market
Center Building, 1600 SW 4th Avenue, Portland, OR, USA 97201 or by telephone at 503725-4288 or 1-877-480-4400. You may also email the office at hsrrc@lists.pdx.edu. If
you have any concerns about the research study, you may contact Dr. Gelmon at 503725-3044 or gelmons@pdx.edu, or me directly at 503-803-1481 or ODropper@pdx.edu.
Your input is very important and will help me to gather important insights about the
Oregon’s early CCO efforts. If you agree to participate, please send an email to
ODropper@pdx.edu indicating your willingness to participate, and I will be in touch with
you or your assistant to schedule the interview. Thank you in advance for your input.
Signed: Oliver Droppers, PhD Candidate, Portland State University, Principal
Investigator
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Appendix A.2
Coordinated Care Organization Executive Staff/Board Member Interview
Invitation
NOTE: The email invitation will be sent by Oliver Droppers from his Portland State
University email address.
Dear [insert recipient name here]:
You are invited to participate in an interview as part of a research study I am conducting
as a PhD candidate in the Public Affairs and Policy Program in the Mark O. Hatfield
School of Government at Portland State University (PSU) under the supervision of Dr.
Sherril Gelmon, Professor of Public Health and Chair, Division of Public Administration.
The purpose of the study is to explore Oregon’s coordinated care organizations (CCOs)
in an effort to understand the process and conditions under which participation and
decision-making among stakeholders within a CCO are facilitated or impeded through
different community-based approaches to governance.
COOs are leading the effort to transform Oregon’s health care delivery system around the
Triple Aim of improving health, health care, and lowering costs. As one of the first
certified CCOs in Oregon, there is a unique opportunity to learn from [insert name of
CCO] about the initial set of challenges, opportunities, and lessons learned to date that
can help inform future CCOs and guide the development of best practices overtime
related to approaches to effective collaborative governance. I will be conducting
interviews with 3-4 board members and executive leaders of four of the Oregon approved
CCOs in the next few months. I hope you will make the time to share your valuable
perspectives.
I will be conducting all of the individual interviews, which will take approximately an
hour each. With your permission, I will be taking notes and digitally recording the
discussion. All individual responses will be kept anonymous in my reporting, and
complete confidentiality of your actual responses is assured. The notes and recordings
will help me to accurately represent our discussion, but no one except me will ever hear
the recordings or see the written transcripts. If there are things that you tell me that you
do not wish repeated, please indicate that so that I do not include those comments in any
summaries developed from this conversation. I am confident that I can blind all responses
in reports and findings presented from this study due to the participant selection method.
Your willingness to participate in the interview will be viewed as agreement to
participate in this phase of the evaluation; no written consent form is requested to
minimize the burden of responding on you. I do not intend to link comments back to
interviewees. While participating in this study, it is unlikely that you will encounter any
risks, as all information provided will be volunteered by you. You may not experience
any direct benefits from the study, but it is anticipated that the results will help to inform
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the Oregon Health Authority in its effort to improve the state’s health system
transformation efforts, and assist in future changes that are may enhance CCO
governance models in Oregon. Upon completion of the study, I will gladly share
aggregate findings in a written report upon request.
Your participation in this interview is voluntary, and will not affect your relationship with
the Oregon Health Authority, affiliated members of your CCO, or any other relationships
with the study investigator. You do not have to answer any question that you do not want
to answer, and you may stop the interview at any time without affecting your
relationships with any state agencies, as this research study is conducted through Portland
State University by a PhD candidate and is not funded or affiliated with any other federal,
state, or local agency.
If you have any concerns about your participation in this study or your rights as a
research subject, you may contact the Human Subjects Research Review Committee,
Office of Research and Strategic Partnerships, Portland State University, 620 Market
Center Building, 1600 SW 4th Avenue, Portland, OR, USA 97201 or by telephone at 503725-4288 or 1-877-480-4400. You may also email the office at hsrrc@lists.pdx.edu. If
you have any concerns about the research study, you may contact Dr. Gelmon at 503725-3044 or gelmons@pdx.edu, or me directly at 503-803-1481 or ODropper@pdx.edu.
Your input is very important and will help me to gather important insights about the
Oregon’s early CCO efforts. If you agree to participate, please send an email to
ODropper@pdx.edu indicating your willingness to participate, and I will be in touch with
you to schedule the interview. Thank you in advance for your input.
Signed: Oliver Droppers, PhD Candidate, Portland State University, Principal
Investigator
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Appendix A.3
OHA & Governor’s Office Staff Interview Protocol and Consent Narrative
I will read the following paragraphs before beginning the interview:
Thank you for making the time to talk with me today for this interview about your
experiences in leading Oregon’s health care reform efforts, specifically the creation of
coordinated care organizations (CCOs). As a key public official that has helped lead
statewide efforts to form CCOs across Oregon by working closely with certified CCOs
and affiliated organizations, you can provide information about important planning
processes, and local political, institutional, and historical factors that might have affected
early CCO formation and implementation efforts across CCOs in Oregon.
As CCOs develop, a fundamental challenge will be establishing and maintaining an
effective governance model -- one that is able to both meet the criteria proposed by the
Oregon Health Authority (OHA) and still be responsive to the needs of its community.
The purpose of this study is to learn about conditions that facilitate or impede the ability
of CCOs to effectively solve problems through governance mechanisms and identify key
factors of collaborative governance. The benefit of this study is it can inform future
policy decisions about CCOs, and more broadly inform state-level health care reform.
I have scheduled 45 minutes for this interview. With your permission, I will be taking
notes and digitally recording the discussion. Your participation in this interview is
voluntary and you may stop the interview at any time. You do not have to answer any
question that you do not want to answer. All individual responses will be kept
anonymous in any reporting, and complete anonymity of your actual responses is assured.
The intent of these conversations is to help identify key insights related to early
development and implementation efforts among Oregon’s CCOs from the perspective of
state leaders and public officials, so I hope you will be candid. The notes and recordings
will help me to accurately represent our discussion, but no one other than me will ever
hear the recordings or see the written transcripts. If there are things that you tell me that
you do not wish repeated, please indicate this so that I do not include those comments in
any summaries I develop from this conversation. Similarly, if at any time you would like
me to stop recording, please indicate this and I will turn off the recording device. All
comments will be presented without attribution to any individual. The results of these
conversations will be synthesized into written summaries that will be analyzed as part of
my dissertation study.
At this time, do you have any questions or concerns? [After addressing any questions
and/or concerns state…] Then let us begin.
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I have a number of questions to ask you, so please offer brief answers – we can
always go back if time permits to expand on any of your answers. First, I would like
to ask you some questions that focus on your experience in helping support
Oregon’s health care reform efforts.
Questions:
1. In consultation with my Dissertation Chair, I selected four CCOs that demonstrate
variation among important factors such as organizational size and structure,
geographic coverage area, prior organizational history and starting conditions, and
number of participating organizations within a CCO. The selection criteria were
developed from, and informed by, a careful review of theoretical literature. The
four preliminary selected CCOs are Health Share of Oregon, PacificSource
Community Solutions, Umpqua Health Alliance, and Willamette Valley
Community Health. Are there are other CCOs that you would suggest for
inclusion or as an alternative based upon this preliminary list of CCOs? If so,
please explain your suggestions. (10 minutes)
2. From your perspective, what factors are most important in terms of collaborative
governance within a CCO? Examples include composition and structure,
prehistory of conflict or cooperation, incentives for, or constraints on participation
within a CCO, etc. (10 minutes)
3. Do you have any insights to share about important historical and environmental
factors unique to any of the CCOs selected that might affect the study? (10
minutes)
4. Do you have any insights to offer about the importance and role of leadership
among the selected CCOs? (5 minutes)
5. Is there anything else you would like to add I have not covered, including any
other concerns or thoughts about any of these CCOs? (5 minutes)
Closing: “Thank you for participating in this interview, and for your thoughtful
comments, insights, and candor. I am meeting with 4-5 other officials from OHA and the
Governor’s Office. I will be analyzing and synthesizing the combined responses in order
to finalize the CCO selection process. Findings from the interviews will be included in
my dissertation and read by the PSU faculty serving on my dissertation committee. At the
conclusion of the study, I would be happy to share any aggregated written findings with
the OHA. Again, I appreciate your time and contributions to this dissertation study.”
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Appendix A.4
CCO Interview Protocol and Consent Narrative
Please read the following paragraphs to individuals before beginning with questions:
“My name is Oliver Droppers, and I am a doctoral student in Public Affairs and Policy at
Portland State University. As part of my doctoral studies, I am conducting a research
project studying Oregon’s coordinated care organizations (CCOs). As the [insert
position] for the [insert CCO name], you and your newly established CCO are viewed as
key stakeholders in supporting the success of Oregon’s health system transformation
initiative.
CCOs are at an early phase in their development, and there is a window of opportunity to
learn about conditions that facilitate or impede the ability of [insert CCO name] to
effectively solve problems through its adopted governance mechanism and develop
insights into similarities and differences across CCO governance structures. The purpose
of this interview is to capture your perspectives about the early development and
implementation of your CCO and its governance structure, and to identify factors that
facilitate or impede achievement of the organization’s goals from your professional
perspective.
The interview will last approximately one hour. With your permission, I will be taking
notes and recording the discussion. Your participation in this interview is voluntary and
you may stop it at any time. You do not have to answer any question that you do not want
to answer. All individual responses will be kept anonymous and complete confidentiality
is assured outside this interview. Since there are only four CCOs that are part of this
project, and the intent of these interviews is to help identify opportunities for
improvement in this project, it may be some what difficult to completely blind the
organization that is the source of the comments, but I will de-identify individual
respondents.
The notes and recordings will help me to accurately represent our discussion, but no one
other than me will ever hear the recordings or see the written transcripts. If there are
things that you tell me that you do not wish repeated, please indicate this so that I do not
include those comments in any summaries I develop from this conversation. Similarly, if
at any time you would like me to stop the recorder, please indicate this and I will turn off
the recording device. All comments will be presented without attribution to any
individual. The results of these conversations will be synthesized into written summaries
that will be analyzed as part of my dissertation study.
At this time, do you have any questions or concerns? [After addressing and questions
and/or concerns state…] Then let us begin.

OREGON HEALTH REFORM AND COORDINATED CARE ORGANIZATIONS 270
I have a number of questions to ask you, so please offer brief answers – we can
always go back if time permits to expand on any of your answers. Also, please
respond knowing that I have already read your organization’s application to OHA
to be recognized as a CCO as well as pertinent background information.
Questions:
6. I would like you to think back to the events that lead up to the creation of the
[insert CCO name]. Please describe the key events that occurred, identifying what
occurred, who were the key players, and when these events occurred. Also, were
there any organizations excluded from participating or any that or opted out? If
so, why? (5 minutes). Please try to do this in chronological order, but we can skip
around if necessary. (10 minutes)
7. Please describe the existing partnership, organizational structure, and prior
relationship among the key players within [insert CCO name]. For example, does
your CCO have a formal agreement between partner organizations or any
guidelines or rules that govern activities including how decisions are made by the
CCO board? (10 minutes)
8. How does your organization set priorities and problem-solve through its existing
governance structure? For example, does your CCO use standard operational
procedures such as formal rules, policies, and committees, or do you have an
open, transparent, and inclusive process? (10 minutes)
9. What arrangements do you think work well in your CCO’s decision-making
process? For example, is there mutual recognition of interdependence within your
community, a shared purpose, common problem definition, or shared mission and
set of values? Alternatively, what arrangements do you think are not helpful for
your organization to date? (10 minutes)
10. Have there been any events or incidents that have created barriers or challenges to
establishing an effective governance structure or decision-making? What
arrangements would you suggest as helpful to improve the governance structure
or decision-making processes of your CCO? (10 minutes)
11. Is there anything else you would like to add that I have not covered? (5 minutes)
Closing: “Thank you for participating in this interview, and for your thoughtful
comments, insights and candor. I am meeting with 2-3 other board members from your
CCO as well as from three other CCOs. I will be analyzing and synthesizing the key
themes and issues that emerge over the course of the study. If you think of anything else,
please contact me. Findings from the interviews will be included in my dissertation and
read by PSU faculty serving on my dissertation committee. At the conclusion of the
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study, I would be happy to share any aggregated written findings with your organization.
Again, I appreciate your time and contributions to this dissertation study.”
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Appendix B: Coordinated Care Organization (CCO): Selection Criteria Matrix (*as
of Sept. 2012)
Organizational Size
Coordinated
Care
Organization

AllCare Health
Plan

Columbia
Pacific
Coordinated
Care
Organization,
LLC

Eastern Oregon
Coordinated
Care
Organization
(EOCCO)

FamilyCare,
Inc.

Health Share of
Oregon
Intercommunity
Health Network
Coordinated
Care
Organization

Geographic
Number
Service
of
Area (by
Enrollees
County)
1-2, 3-4, >5
All of
Curry,
Josephine,
Jackson and
23,000
part of
Douglas
counties (4)
All of
Clatsop,
Columbia &
Tillamook.
9,000
Parts of
Coos &
Douglas
counties (5)
Baker,
Malheur,
Sherman,
Union,
Wallowa (5)
Clackamas,
Multnomah,
Washington,
& part of
Marion
County (4)
Clackamas,
Multnomah
&
Washington
counties (3)
All of
Benton,
Lincoln &
Linn
counties (3)

Starting
Conditions

Organizational
Structure/Composition

Prior Org.
History:
Yes, Some,
No

New/
Existing
Org.

Yes:
IPA/MCO,
Mid Rogue
Independent
Physicians
Associations,
Inc.
Some
history:
MCO
and
MHO

Number of
Partnering
Orgs.
1-2, 3-9, >10

(High,
Medium,
or Low)

Existing
Org.
[No change]

One
organization

TBD

New:
Whollyowned
subsidiary
of
CareOregon,
new as a
501©(3)

Two
organizati
ons

TBD

TBD

TBD

Some
history:
MCO &
MHO

New: LLC

Two
organizations
ODS and
Greater
Oregon
Behavioral
Health
(GOBHI)

Yes: MCO

Existing
MCO
20+ years as
a MCO [No
change]

One
organization

158,000

No

New:
Public
benefit
corporation

32,100

Some
history:
3 existing
MCOs

New:
Public
benefit
corporation

9,500

54,294

Facilitative
Leadership

11 private
and public
affiliates
form Health
Share
13 private
and public
affiliates
form IHNCCO

TBD

TBD
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Organizational Size
Coordinated
Care
Organization

Geographic
Number
Service
of
Area (by
Enrollees
County)
1-2, 3-4, >5

Starting
Conditions

Organizational
Structure/Composition

Prior Org.
History:
Yes, Some,
No

New/
Existing
Org.

18,000

Yes: existing
MCO,
whollyowned
subsidiary of
CareOregon

38,900

Some
history:
Existing
MCO/MHO

Facilitative
Leadership

Number of
Partnering
Orgs.
1-2, 3-9, >10

(High,
Medium,
or Low)

Existing
MCO

10 private
and public
affiliates
form JCC

TBD

New: LLC

9 private and
public
affiliates
form PSCS

TBD

New: LLC

Two
organizations

TBD

New: forprofit LLC
(96%
control by
physicians)

Three
organizations
(MCO,
MHO and
County
partnership)

TBD

New: LLC

Four
organizations
(MHO,
DCO,
FQHC,
hospital)

TBD

New: LLC

18+ affiliates
including
MCO, MHO,
& DCO from
WOAH

TBD

(IHN-CCO)
Jackson Care
Connect (JCC)

Jackson
County (1)

PacificSource
Community
Solutions
(PSCS) [Central
Oregon Region]

All of
Deschutes,
Crook &
Jefferson &
part of
Klamath
County (4)

Primary Health
of Josephine
County, LLC

Josephine
County &
parts
Douglas &
Jackson
counties (3)

Trillium
Community
Health Plan

All of Lane
County (1)

Umpqua Health
Alliance

Most of
Douglas
County (1)

Western
Oregon
Advanced
Health, LLC
(WOAH)

All of Coos
and Curry
counties (2)

5,500

47,700

16,300

11,500

Yes: existing
MCO &
MHO,
whollyowned
subsidiary of
CareOregon
Yes:
IPA/MCO
Lane
Individual
Practice
Association
Yes: IPA
Douglas
Country
Independent
Practice
Association
(20+ years)
Some
history: IPA,
Southwest
Oregon
Independent
Practice
Organization
(18 years,
prior history
as single
MCO)
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Organizational Size
Coordinated
Care
Organization

Willamette
Valley
Community
Health
(WVCH) LLC

Geographic
Number
Service
of
Area (by
Enrollees
County)
1-2, 3-4, >5
All of
Marion
County and
58,300
most of
Polk County
(2)

Starting
Conditions
Prior Org.
History:
Yes, Some,
No
Some
history:
1 MCO,
MHO, and
DCO

Organizational
Structure/Composition
New/
Existing
Org.

New: LLC

Facilitative
Leadership

Number of
Partnering
Orgs.
1-2, 3-9, >10

(High,
Medium,
or Low)

13 private
and public
affiliates
form WVCH

TBD

